

EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF
**KOREAN
STUDIES**

ISSN 2631-4134 (print)
ISSN 2516-5399 (online)

VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (2022)

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About the British Association for Korean Studies

The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) was founded in 1987 as a forum to host conferences and workshops on Korean Studies around the UK. At such events, papers have been presented on a wide range of subjects including archaeology, art, economics, literature, politics, and society. BAKS continues to hold annual conferences, sometimes in partnership with her sister organisations, The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) and The British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS).

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS Papers) was founded in 1991 to publish the editorially approved transactions of the then annual conferences of the Association. The journal for several years actively solicited submissions from outside the conferences as well. Fifteen volumes were published, the final two issues digitally.

Initially the quality of *BAKS Papers* was maintained by an internal editorial board and the editor. Since Volume 14 (2012), *BAKS Papers* became a fully peer-reviewed journal. There was established an external editorial board of 20 international scholars covering a range of areas within the humanities and the social sciences. The Editorial Board is under the leadership of the Editor. There are prescribed rules for the examination of submissions and regulations for writers making a submission. Just under half of the submissions (including external submissions) were rejected for publication in Volume 15 (2013).

Since its inception in the late 1980s, *BAKS Papers* has focussed on modern and contemporary Korea but has not neglected traditional culture and history. For example, Volume 5 (1994) was a special issue devoted to archaeology and material culture. *BAKS Papers* has published other special issues, such as Volume 6, which focused on 'Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia', reflecting the Association's broader interests in contemporary East Asia, and Volume 14 (2012), which focussed on British witnesses to the social, cultural, political, and economic changes in late twentieth-century Korea.

About the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

At the General Meeting for The British Association for Korean Studies in London on 9 September 2016, the Association decided to re-launch *BAKS Papers* as the *European Journal of Korean Studies*.

The new name better reflects the existing breadth of the editorial board as well as the extensive range of submissions that result from expanded offerings on Korean Studies across the European continent, including Great Britain. Using our experience gained in publishing *BAKS Papers* over the last 25 years, we are delighted to relaunch the publication as a Europe-wide journal dedicated to Korean Studies.

BAKS Papers has been blind, peer-reviewed since volume 14 (2012), and the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will carry on being blind, peer-reviewed. The *Journal* is being published twice a year, rather than just annually. It is the only English-language journal in Europe devoted to the broad field of Korean Studies, and we hope that it will become the show-case journal for the outstanding work on Korea being done in Europe.

First published in 1991 and originally available in printed format, *BAKS Papers* is now available online through the Association's website. Articles are indexed with SCOPUS and SSCI. Volumes 1–16 are available for download, as future issues of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will be as well. Since Volume 17 (1) the *European Journal of Korean Studies* is available again in print. The *Journal* is free to BAKS members and those who want copies can access them on www.ejks.org, **uk** or contact Robert Winstanley-Chesters: treasurer@baks.org.uk

Editors

James Lewis, Editor in Chief

Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Managing Editor

Editors' Note

We welcome readers to the new issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*. The year 2022 has begun in as tumultuous a way as the last couple of years, and we hope all our readers in Ukraine are safe and well, and that our colleagues in the Russian Federation, including authors in this journal of papers recent and future, make it through these difficult times unscathed. The *Journal* continues to accept papers for review from prospective authors from the Russian Federation or from institutions in the Russian Federation as normal; the nationality or personal political commitments of an author or institution do not and should not play a role in our assessment and review of work submitted to us. We very much enjoyed the Association for Korean Studies in Europe conference in La Rochelle, France, last October, the first in-person academic conference for many, and we hope to see many of you at a forthcoming British Association for Korean Studies event, as well as at the World Congress of Korean Studies in Seongnam, South Korea, on the Academy of Korean Studies campus in October 2022.

Regardless of geopolitical conflagration and continuing issues with the global pandemic, we are delighted to bring you another issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*, and we continue to thank those who choose us as the destination for their writing and research. In this issue, Keith Howard contributes a paper on the successes and tribulations of the famous North Korean dancer Ch'oe Sünghüi's encounter with and response to criticism of her class background and ideological commitment. Nur Aisyah Kotarumalos of Seoul National University provides an analysis of the cultural challenges encountered by Indonesian expatriates in the South Korean workplace. Phillip Shon of Ontario Tech University offers a comparative analysis of parricidal mass murder in the societies of the United States of America and South Korea, relative to culture and offense characteristics of incidents. Hasan Tinmaz of Woosong University and Viet Phuong Doan provide a highly data-driven case study of South Korean mobile payment applications, comparing Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay for user satisfaction. Patrick Vierthaler of Kyoto University continues to trace the development of South Korea's New Right with a focused historical recounting of the Anti-Chosun Movement and its campaigns against the *Chosun ilbo*. Professor Antonetta Bruno of Università di Roma "La Sapienza" offers an analysis of the history of terms for smallpox used by Korean shamanic traditions to explore internal and external worldviews and

the personification of disease deities. Finally, Andrew Logie of the University of Helsinki provides a thorough study of the revival of the Trot genre of popular music in South Korean, as well as the revival's "retro and newtro aesthetics" and Trot's role in the discourse of South Korean national identity. We are also able to offer a book review of Seo Young Park's exploration of the processes and places of fast fashion, *Stitching the 24-Hour City: Life, Labor, and the Problem of Speed in Seoul* by Christin Yu of the Royal College of Art and University of the Arts London's Central St Martins College.

We hope that our readers remain safe in the pandemic, and we continue to encourage our readers and subscribers to submit their research and writing to the *Journal*. If you are considering submitting a manuscript, please read our revised style and submissions guidelines at the back of this issue, or online at www.ejks.org.uk. Because the editors offer their time as service to the field, we strongly encourage authors to make their best effort to conform to our stylesheet and thereby shorten the review and editing processes. As always, we are most grateful to the Academy of Korean Studies, which awarded the *Journal* a Scholarly Publication grant (AKS-2021-P11) to defray production costs. If it were not for this generous support, we would not be able to produce the *Journal*.

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Dance and Ideology in North Korea: Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi and Her Response to Criticism

KEITH HOWARD SOAS, University of London¹

Abstract

Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi (J. Sai Shōki) was the most celebrated Korean dancer of the twentieth century. In the 1930s, she developed a set of dances for the new stages of urban Korea, Japan, and beyond that showcased elements taken from Korean tradition, particularly from “folk” dances (*minsok muyong*). In 1946, after Korea’s division at the end of the Pacific War, she moved to Pyongyang, where her dances became the foundations of North Korea’s “national” dances (*minjok muyong*). She rose to prominence, until in 1957, together with her husband An Mak, she was attacked for being bourgeois. She was stripped of her seat on the Supreme People’s Assembly. Ch'oe’s experience shines light on how national dances were established as ideological control was rolled out in North Korea. But there is a second side to her story: in 1957 and 1958, in her response to criticism, she adopted a blinkered approach. She resisted control and the mechanism—later known as “literary art theory” (*munye iron*)—of its delivery, and this sealed her fate. Although temporarily reprieved, her name disappeared completely from North Korean programs and from newspaper and journal accounts about dance in the early 1960s, and within a few years she was dead.

Keywords: North Korea, folk dances, national dances, ideology, Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi

Introduction

Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi (J. Sai Shōki) is broadly considered the most significant twentieth-century Korean dancer.² In the 1930s she—alongside others—developed a set of dances for the stages of new urban theaters in Korea, Japan, and beyond that combined elements taken from Korean tradition, particularly from “folk” dances (*minsok muyong*),³ with more modern, Western-inspired styles. Her dances (or, more precisely, her versions of dances) form a central part of what in South Korea is still typically referred to as *sin muyong* (new dance). Her dances also became the foundations for North Korea’s “national” dance (*minjok muyong*) after she moved to Pyongyang in 1946, following Korea’s division at the end of the Pacific War, and settled there.

In Pyongyang in 1957, Ch'oe was attacked for being bourgeois.⁴ This article explores the attack on Ch'oe, together with her fightback, and how, reprieved in the early 1960s, she continued to promote her approach to dance choreography until she disappeared from view: did she die of illness, as the North now claims, or was she purged again and shot for failing to conform, as journalists and scholars have suggested? Exploring this episode allows a reassessment of Ch'oe's legacy, illustrating in particular how North Korea's national dance (*minjok muyong*), as it continues today as part of national culture (*minjok munhwa*) and together with its theoretical and practical apparatus, was assembled. My discussion aims to shed light on how and why artists trained during the Japanese colonial period prior to 1945 were purged and removed when they did not—or were claimed not to—fully comply with the new ideology for literature and arts, and how and why they were replaced by a new generation of supposedly proletarian artists.

Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi

Ch'oe was born on 24 November 1911 into an upper-class family reduced in status by her father's alcoholism and misfortune, and she graduated from Sookmyung Girls' School in Seoul. After showing promise as a singer, in early 1926 she encountered the Japanese modern dancer Ishii Baku (1886–1962) and, most likely introduced by her brother, Ch'oe Sŭngil, who had studied aesthetics at Nihon University, she followed him back to Japan. In Korea, dance had long been associated with courtesans (*kisaeng*), and not surprisingly her family, except for her brother, are thought to have opposed her move to Japan. The 27 March 1926 *Maeil sinmun* (Daily Newspaper) reported on Ch'oe's decision, stating that Sookmyung School also considered its honor would be damaged if its graduates pursued dance as a career. Ch'oe studied with Ishii for three years, returning

to Seoul in 1929 and setting up a dance institute. She continued to work with Ishii, on and off, for a further five years. Ishii had initially studied ballet at the Imperial Theater (Teikoku Gekijō) in Tokyo but over time came to doubt its value to a modern Japan geographically distant from ballet's European heartland.⁵ It is thought that he was intrigued by the modernity of the American dancer Isadora Duncan and the Swiss-originating *eurythmie* of Émile Jaques-Dalcroze, since, between 1922 and 1925, he travelled to Europe. In Germany he encountered Mary Wigman's expressionist *Ausdruckstanz* works,⁶ and it is generally agreed that this led him to develop his own style of narrative dance, a style which when combined with elements of local dance he considered suitable for Japan.

Ch'oe, in turn, absorbed Ishii's influence. In the early 1930s, she began to fuse Korean aesthetics to his dance grammar, creating a blend suitable for Korea, where new dances were needed as new theaters opened and where a demand was growing for dances with a distinct Korean flavor. However, a further influence on Ch'oe is regularly noted, since she introduced demonstrably Korean elements after encountering Han Sŏngjun (1874–1942), who was experimenting with Koreanesque choreographies. She may well have worked with Han for one or more brief periods (Han Kyŏngja 2008, 247; other scholars indicate she worked with him for “one week,” “several weeks,” “forty days,” and so on), although some, including her student and sister-in-law Kim Paekpong (b.1927), dispute this. And her autobiography—which stands witness to the considerable success she quickly achieved since it was written when she was just twenty-six years old—states she never learned Korean dance from any single dancer. This does not surprise, though, since modernity is a multifaceted beast; within it, experimentation, and the questioning of inherited traditions, was common across the globe throughout the twentieth century.⁷ The Japanese colonial period in Korea was a time when questions swirled as to whether traditions had any place in the contemporary world, although Ch'oe's early success was partly due to her utilization of Korean elements, in what Atkins describes as the “exotic familiar.”⁸ Van Zile sums up Ch'oe's approach: “She tried to create a kind of dance that was both distinctively Korean *and* modern.”⁹ Her fame quickly spread, often under the Japanese pronunciation of her name, Sai Shōki. Toward the end of the 1930s she embarked on a two-year tour to America and Europe;¹⁰ in the United States, she was richly rewarded for a five-month performance contract with the Russian-born impresario Sol Hurok (1888–1974). She also worked as a model, famously as a muse for Picasso, but in 1939, she evacuated from Europe on the liner *Kashima Maru* due to the impending war. After returning to Asia, she continued to dance, travelling between Japan, Korea, and China.

Ch'oe had married the Tokyo-trained Russian literature scholar and political activist An Mak (born An P'ilsŭng) in 1931. Following the division of Korea at the end of the Pacific War, he crossed to the northern zone. Ch'oe followed him, possibly—as O Sejun argues on the basis of a 1946 article Ch'oe wrote for the *Minju ilbo* (*Popular Daily*) newspaper—because she shared his left-wing views.¹¹ Quite apart from their marriage, an equally plausible reason for the move was because, when she returned to Seoul from Shanghai in spring 1946 and requested help from the United States' military government in control of the southern zone to set up a dance school, she was rebuffed. This was reported at the time by the United States' officer for cultural matters in Seoul, the pianist and later music professor Ely Haimowitz.¹² Ch'oe, with Kim Paekpong, took a fishing boat northwards, camouflaging herself in peasant clothes and landing near Nampo, the port to the west of Pyongyang.¹³ Soviet cultural advisers helped her set up a school in Pyongyang, the Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi Muyong Yŏn'guso (Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi Dance Study Institute). Here, her approach to dance was core to pedagogy, hence allowing it to continue after her death, notably through her daughter An Sŭngja (b.1932) but also through institute graduates. Also, while many of her earlier dances had been solos, in Pyongyang she mostly choreographed group dances, often working with her own troupe. In 1956, her institute was merged with the Pyongyang Music School to form the Pyongyang Music and Dance College, with her husband An Mak serving as its first dean.

Ch'oe became “an icon of socialist internationalism.”¹⁴ She encouraged new forms of modern dance to emerge beyond Korea, including in China. In fact, her connections to China predate her move to Pyongyang. In Beijing (Beiping) in 1943 she sought training from Peking opera star Mei Lanfang and proposed creating a new Chinese dance style based on opera forms, and a year later she set up, in Beijing, an Oriental Dance Research Institute. Then, in 1950, she took refuge in Beijing to escape the Korean War from November 1950 until October 1952, working with Mei and also with the Kunqu actors Han Shichang and Bai Yunsheng. The communist government invited her to relocate her dance institute from Pyongyang to Beijing, and she established a dance research course (the 崔承喜舞蹈研究班 Cui Chengxi wudao yanjiu ban) at the Central Academy of Drama (中央戏剧学院 Zhongyang xiju xueyuan).¹⁵

She also travelled to Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. In 1951, her Korean troupe won first prize at the East Berlin Youth Festival for her “*Chosŏn ŭi ōmōni*/Mother of Korea.” But what should have been a triumphant return to Pyongyang soured when she was targeted for criticism. A campaign had begun against writers and artists who had migrated to the North from Seoul, and Ch'oe's choreography was attacked as being insufficiently political, while she was

personally attacked because of what was claimed to be her promiscuity.¹⁶ She sought and received protection from the northern leader, Kim Il Sung.¹⁷

This, however, proved to be only a temporary reprieve. An had become critical of Pyongyang's increasing isolationism from the global socialist community by 1957, as the leadership worked to establish a narrowly defined nationalism. He criticized Kim's Juche Speech and, as Kim moved to take tighter control, such criticism could not be tolerated. Although Ch'oe's dances were able to meet the nationalist agenda, and although she had experienced contemporary dance and developments in mass dance elsewhere, she criticized new dance works that involved mass performance, in particular “*Ch'ŏllima*/Flying Horse,” on the grounds that artistic skill and artistic expertise were being diluted. Both Ch'oe and An were attacked, and as performances of “*Ch'ŏllima*” went ahead, Ch'oe's work “*Pak Hyŏnch'ŏn*,” based on a historical figure, was criticized for lacking “revolutionary optimism.”

This time, Ch'oe could expect no protection from Kim Il Sung. She was stripped of her seat on the Supreme People's Assembly while her husband, An Mak, was removed both as a deputy minister and as dean of the College. However, Ch'oe still had supporters. Sŏ Manil celebrated her life and detailed her dances in six sequential issues of the journal *Chosŏn yesul* (조선예술 Korean Arts), beginning in October 1957.¹⁸ In 1958, Ch'oe was allowed to publish two book-length accounts, one of her own dances and the second containing her choreographies for stage dances; the first of these will be discussed at length below.¹⁹ She served on the editorial board of *Chosŏn yesul* until November 1958, and then her name disappeared from its pages. Her disappearance is striking given the journal's focus: although at first its coverage included music, there was already a separate music journal, *Chosŏn ŭmak* (조선음악 Korean music), published under the aegis of the Union of Korean Composers (Chosŏn chakkokka tongmaeng 조선 작곡가 동맹), hence *Chosŏn yesul* quickly shifted its focus to dance and theater (music was only reintroduced to its pages as *Chosŏn ŭmak* ceased publication at the beginning of 1968).

Indicative of her rehabilitation, her name reappeared in *Chosŏn yesul* in June 1961, when the journal published a three-page article authored by her.²⁰ The attack on her immorality, however, returned in March 1962. Initially, this seemed not to affect her position, and she was able to publish a volume of dance choreographies for children in 1963.²¹ Seven further articles by her appeared in *Chosŏn yesul* between June 1962 and November 1966, and while these indicate she was back at the centre of the northern dance scene, examining them reveals she continued to resist accepting all state directives on art.²² In each article, she was described as an *inmin paeu* (인민 배우 people's artist), a significant honorary

award she had been given in 1955.²³ She was, though, permitted to celebrate her approach to dance and dance choreography. Hence, in the June 1961 article she returned to her earlier “*Taedong kangbanesō*/Taedong Riverside” to argue that it reflected both the socialist victory and the paradise that North Korea’s capital had become (the Taedong river runs through Pyongyang). Again, her April 1965 article positioned “traditional” dance alongside creative dance, while two articles in July 1965 and September 1966 defended solo and small-scale works rather than massive displays and the by-then favored spectacles.²⁴

That support for her was strong is evident from her October 1965 article, where she was introduced not only as a people’s artist but as the Korean Dance Federation National Committee chair. Her article was suitably laudatory, praising the flowering of dance during the era of the Korean Worker’s Party.²⁵ In the same vein, the final article published by her, in the journal’s November 1966 issue, proclaimed that Korean dance art reflects the struggles of the nation.²⁶ But, by then, the latitude she had been permitted in the articles had fatally damaged her. Her final two articles no longer named her as chair of the federation. Her name was no longer given in (known) dance performance programs. The *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper in Tokyo reported that both Ch’oe and An had been arrested in November 1967, and rumors circulated that both had been executed. This remained the belief beyond North Korea’s borders into the new millennium.²⁷ Then, in May 2005, a North Korean newspaper announced that 40 of her dances had been revived.²⁸ Five years later, a VCD showcasing a series of her dances was distributed at the international-facing 2010 April Spring Arts Festival in Pyongyang. Photographs of her gravestone in Pyongyang began to be circulated, its inscription stating that she had died on August 8, 1969, from ill-health; it is not known when this was erected. At some point, her grave was moved to its current, elevated position in the Mount Taesōng Revolutionary Martyrs’ Cemetery (대성산 혁명 렬사릉 Taesōngsan hyōngmyōng ryōlsarūng).

Meanwhile, in South Korea, because Ch’oe had moved to the North in 1946, mention of her name was banned until the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, North Korean dancers performed in Seoul as part of a rare artistic exchange, and at a conference held at the Academy of Korean Studies I listened as southern dance scholars identified Ch’oe’s legacy in the “*K’al ch’um*/Knife dance” that had been performed. Scholars began to research her.²⁹ Still, a South Korean commission in 2008 ruled that Ch’oe should be considered a collaborator with the Japanese colonial authorities. Indeed, her staged versions of folk dances can be interpreted as a mirror of Japan’s curation of Korean folklore and archaeology, through which the colonialists sought to identify something of Japan’s pre-modern past.³⁰ But much as with other Korean writers and artists, maintaining a career that

brought reasonable financial rewards during the decades of occupation necessitated negotiating with the Japanese authorities and often required the creation or performance of works that celebrated Japan.³¹

Changing times and a new ideology: *Juche* and *Ch’ōllima*

To understand the attacks on Ch’oe, I must first outline how ideology emerged that impacted and controlled artistic production. During the first decade of North Korea’s existence, and as the embers of the Pacific War died down, artists and intellectuals were allowed some independence; they enjoyed considerable latitude as Soviet advisers cultivated cultural and educational development. Excluding those who had been anti-Japanese guerrillas (who Lee Chong-Sik has remarked were “preponderantly of the illiterate and indigent”³²), the writing and artistic community was split between four groupings that broadly mapped onto factions jockeying for power:³³ a large contingent of southern artists and writers—many of whom had trained in Japan (and some of whom had worked in Japan) during the colonial period—who had settled in Pyongyang from 1945 onwards; those born or living in northern territories before 1945; leftist intellectuals who had returned from China (some of whom had been with the Chinese Communists at Yan’an); and a group of Soviet Koreans, some of whom had been sent back to Pyongyang by the Soviets. The latter looked to Moscow for direction, but what they received was not, according to Szalontai, substantial.³⁴ Art criticism tended to follow factional lines, drawing on Confucian hierarchical norms to ensure a “patrimonial functioning of the cultural apparatus.”³⁵ Controls on artistic production began to be enacted. The Central Committee, for example, in March 1947 established censorship mechanisms on the grounds that art should henceforth educate the people in socialism. To an extent, the North Korean situation mirrored but compressed what had been the case in the Soviet Union, where latitude and avant-garde approaches were initially permitted but where, in the late 1920s, the culture commissar and playwright Anatoly Lunacharsky began to restrict artistic freedom, and where prescription became normal with the 1930s’ roll out of socialist realism.

The attack on Ch’oe in 1957 and its aftermath reflected a marked shift in approach: henceforth, production was to sublimate aesthetic artistry beneath an emerging ideology which, over time, came to be justified through what is typically referred to in North Korea as “literary art theory” (*munye iron*) or, through its association with *juche* (*chuch’e*) philosophy, as “self-reliance literary art theory” (*chuch’e munye iron*). The shift was signalled by Kim Il Sung’s speech, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work” (hereafter, the “*Juche* Speech”), delivered on December 28, 1955,³⁶ and

the implications began to be worked out through the *Ch'öllima* “flying horse” campaign (the *Ch'öllima undong*), a campaign ostensibly about mass mobilization which began, according to official North Korean accounts, in 1956.

The Juche Speech reveals that North Korean ideology had drifted from the Soviet model. The speech is often considered to have had a slow burn,³⁷ and Brian Myers questions whether it marked a watershed at all,³⁸ but it quickly began to impact the performing arts. An article by Kim Hiyöl about “national” (*minjok*) art in the September 1956 inaugural (*ch'angganho*) edition of the journal *Chosön yesul* reported how juche addressed issues in national culture, demanding that creators of art should not merely be cosmopolitan (that is, learning from foreign practice) but must always reflect the Korean people (that is, practice nationalism).³⁹ Juche was, however, omitted from Ch'oe Sünghüi's comparison of global directions in dance with national dance, carried in the October 1957 edition of the same journal.⁴⁰ It was also missing from her 1958 account of national dance, *Chosön minjok muyong kibon* (조선 민족 무용 기본 The Basis of Korean National Dance), her most significant volume. This, surely, was deliberate, but can conceivably be considered part of how artists and writers were expected to work out the implications of speeches and directives, and how they did so through the pages of their journals. This is the conclusion I draw from the parallel journal for music, *Chosön ūmak* (Korean Music), where juche was not mentioned so far as I have found until the July 1958 issue, when the composer Kim Wön'gyun (1917–2002) explored what a juche direction in music should be.⁴¹ Then, indicating how juche was already considered to have led to advances in national music culture, seven articles in the journal's June 1959 edition, including one that introduced “model” songs by the composer Sin Tosön (1924–1975), explored it.⁴² The patchy coverage indicates an ongoing discussion: what should the new ideology mean for creative practice?

The divergence of the new ideology from Soviet practice became more obvious with the roll out of *Ch'öllima*. The campaign was ostensibly about mass mobilization, and in some ways it continued what began as the North Korean version of the Soviet Stakhanovite movement when a Korean train engineer, Kim Hoeil, was championed in the late 1940s as the equivalent to the Soviet miner Stakhanov who had reputedly shifted 102 tons of coal in a single shift. But the campaign was more than a mere continuation. The normal interpretation is that it began as a reaction to Soviet reforms after the death of Stalin. These had been confirmed by Khrushchev's February 1956 “secret” speech, and summer 1956 saw members of the Chinese and Soviet factions in Pyongyang attempt to set up a collective leadership that would limit Kim Il Sung's authority. This was much as some Chinese communists had sought to do to limit Mao's authority; Pyongyang always closely watched its neighbor.⁴³

Commentators, however, disagree about exactly when *Ch'öllima* began. Myers writes that it was backdated to 1956 in a deliberate ploy by later northern historians to distance it from the parallel Chinese movement—which, in turn, also marked China's divergence from Soviet machinations.⁴⁴ Cheehyung Kim states that the earliest written reference to *Ch'öllima* dates from 1958, and that its work team element does not predate the next year, 1959.⁴⁵ However, in 1958 Kim Wön'gyun and Cho Kilsök (1926–1996) co-wrote a song, “*Urinün ch'öllima t'ago tallinda*/Ride and Run Our Ch'öllima,” suggesting it was already well established. Still, the first mention of the campaign I have found in the journal *Chosön ūmak* is a short text in the January 1959 edition which tells how “workers had risen up” five years previously, that is, in 1955.⁴⁶

Ch'öllima harnessed the image of a mythical horse (*ma*) able to gallop a daily thousand (*ch'ön/ch'öl-*) “miles” (*ri/li*); each “mile,” though, much shorter than the imperial measure. The Korean peninsula north to south is around 1,200km and is measured in both the North's “*Aegukka*/Patriotic Song” (with music by Kim Wön'gyun) and the South Korean equivalent (“*Tonghae mulga*,” with music by Eaktay Ahn [1911–1965]) as 3,000 *ri*, so the horse could theoretically cover around 400km daily. The image may have been taken from a fourteenth-century Chinese novel but surely links back to Turkic legends about richly caparisoned flying horses that possessed amazing stamina.⁴⁷ The campaign made subservience to state leadership ordinary and everyday. Analogous to Mao's “Mass Line,” it evolved what Andrew Walder refers to as “organized dependence,” through which workers became reliant “economically on their enterprises, politically on the part of management, and personally on supervisors.”⁴⁸ Through the monolithic *yuil sasang* ideology, it gave Kim Il Sung paramount authority. “The reason for this was simple,” writes Frank Dikötter in his recent exploration of dictators, because,

few people in predominantly rural countries like Russia, China or [North] Korea ... understood Marxism-Leninism. Appeals to the leader as some sort of holy figure were more successful than the abstract political philosophy of dialectical materialism that a largely illiterate population in the countryside found hard to comprehend.⁴⁹

Ch'öllima can be interpreted through the parallel Chinese movement, but it can also be considered to retain the tripartite Soviet division of *narodnost*, *klassovost*, and *partiinost*, as *inminsöng* (people-mindedness), *kyegüpsöng* (class-mindedness), and *tangp'asöng* (party-mindedness). If we take the latter as a starting point, then juche, which literally means “subject,” folds the three aspects together into what Jorgenson summarizes as “culturally specific ethnic nationalism,”⁵⁰ and then opens them out to shine a spotlight on Kim Il Sung's unsurpassable brilliance

while, at the same time, maintaining that people are, as workers, the masters of the revolution.

Taken together, the campaign and the working out of the speech unleashed purges against the Soviet faction and any others who might threaten Kim Il Sung's leadership, including artists and writers. In the previous paragraphs I have mentioned three composers, Sin Tosŏn, Kim Wŏn'gyun, and Cho Kilsŏk. All three had reason to quickly fall into line, because all three had in preceding years been sent to study in the Soviet Union (Cho to Leningrad in 1948, and Sin and Kim, under a cultural exchange agreement Pyongyang signed with Moscow in 1949, to Moscow in 1949 and 1952 respectively). Much the same applied to Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, due to her activities in and links to both China and the Soviet bloc, although, as I explore here, she proved much less compliant. Juxtaposing *juche* with *Ch'ŏllima* required literature and art to be ordinary and everyday but also exceptional. This required ideological conformity, which rendered literary art monothematic, retaining inherited genre conventions but redefining aesthetics away from the vagaries of artistic excellence. Simply put, this is not what Ch'oe's dances, and her pedagogy, were about.

Conformity would be, once *juche* became part of the state's constitution in 1972, measured through "seed theory" (*chongjaron*). The latter links to Kim Jong Il and his intervention in film creation and is given its fundamental exposition in the first chapter of Kim's *On the Art of Cinema*.⁵¹ It requires the incorporation of ideology and its premises, relating to the people, party, and leadership; didactic content rather than aesthetic and technical elements are considered to give artistic success.⁵² Seed theory left no space for artistic factions; creativity was constrained. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi's dances, and her writings, however, enshrine creativity.

Literary art was also required to reflect socialist realism. Soviet socialist realism emerged in a 1933 essay by Maxim Gorky and was taken up by Stalin at the 1934 First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers. Commentators typically identify five aspects: reflection (in which ideology frames reality), typicality (the historical dialectic), revolutionary romanticism (hyperbolic marking of revolutionary action), popular spirit (of the people and for the people), and subjectness (joining the people to the party).⁵³ In North Korea, the comprehensive text on literary art theory appeared in 1975, two years after Kim Jong Il discussed seed theory.⁵⁴ But policy is never static hence, and rather than each aspect of socialist realism being monolithic in its own right, interpretation reflects the given moment in which a work of literary art is created or promoted. Max Hayward argues this was the case in Soviet literature,⁵⁵ and Katerina Clark states that socialist realism, as a result, should be regarded less as a unified theory than as a "canonical doctrine defined by its patristic texts."⁵⁶ Socialist realism requires model works,

so in North Korea, although the pre-eminent model works have since the 1970s been five "revolutionary operas" (*hyŏngmyŏng kagŭk*) created between 1971 and 1973, Sin Tosŏn's article in the June 1959 edition of *Chosŏn ūmak* indicates how model songs had begun to be elevated as soon as *juche* and *Ch'ŏllima* took hold.⁵⁷ Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi's 1958 book—to which I turn in the next section—does much the same for dance. But, and dissonant to what became literary art theory, Ch'oe's book proposes model dances based on her own creative choreography.⁵⁸

Curating national dance

The *Juche* Speech criticized the writer and leader Pak Ch'angok (?–1958), not just for associating with bourgeois reactionaries but for failing to learn from Korean history and culture and for not using the Korean language properly. Han Sŏrya, the writer and leader of the southern artist faction, levelled much the same criticism at the composer Kim Sunnam (1917–1986), who, he wrote, neglected his Korean roots in his promotion of foreign music styles.⁵⁹ Two *Chosŏn ūmak* articles by Mun Chongsang and Wŏn Hŭngnyong (1956/2: 58–65, 1956/3: 65–79) refined Han's criticism:⁶⁰ Kim poorly imitated Soviet songs and failed to consider the lives of today's Korean people; he also used meters and tempi that everyday people could not follow (in this, the inference is that he was influenced by European and North American avant-gardism). Kim Sunnam was from the south but had settled in Pyongyang; still, Mun remarked that his association with the foreign "betrayed" Koreans. Kim's fate was not as final as Pak Ch'angok, but he was purged and sent into internal exile to Shinp'o in South Hamgyŏng province, where he was permitted only to write folksong arrangements; his career in Pyongyang resumed some years later, in the mid-1960s.

Musicians and composers, much as in Mao's "100 Flowers" campaign in China, were sent to rural areas to learn to understand the people by collecting folksongs (*minyo*). Even if the more direct influence was China, the importance of folksongs in creating national music had long been recognized in the Soviet Union, where Boris Krasin's 1918 report to the Moscow Proletkult invoked folksongs, while recognizing that revisions and updates were needed because folksongs had been created in "different times and with a different consciousness." They were to serve as "the starting point for the new creation of the proletariat."⁶¹ In North Korea, four large volumes of folksongs were printed, *Chosŏn minjok ūmak chŏnjip: minyo p'yŏn* (조선 민족 음악 전집: 민요편 Korean national music collection: folksong volumes) (1958–1959, reissued 1998–1999), and from these, as the musicologist Ri Ch'anggu sets out in his *Chosŏn minyo ūi chosik ch'egye* (조선 민요의 조식 체계

Explaining the System of Korean Folksong),⁶² a national folksong style was established that was considered both popular and populist.

Compared to music, dance was more difficult to bring into line, because of the central position of Ch'oe Sünghüi. Her 1958 volume, showcasing her own dances, offered the equivalent for dance of both the folksong transcription volumes and the prescriptions of folksong style, as its title made clear: *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon* (The Basis of Korean National Dance). Still, though, it did so on her terms. She felt able to challenge the control mechanisms, and this is clear from how she fought criticism. Her fightback to that criticism began with an article in the party newspaper, the *Rodong Sinmun*, on September 3, 1957. In this she balanced ideological change, accepting that dance should capture revolutionary sentiments and support socialist construction, with an appeal for the maintenance of dance aesthetics—that is, her dance pedagogy. She accepted dance should reflect the popular will and serve to improve mass education and cultural awareness, and called for new works to be created that were monumental, martial, and cast in diverse forms, but also argued that for these to be properly staged, better, and more dedicated dance training was urgently needed—that is, using her pedagogy, as she had started in Pyongyang a decade earlier when she had set up her dance school, the Ch'oe Sünghüi Muyong Yŏn'guso, and also as she had attempted in China.

Much the same approach was adopted in Sŏ Ranil's articles about her in *Chosŏn yesul*: the first article gave her biography and described some of the national dances she created in the 1930s, and the second argued that she had for many years burnished Korea's international image.⁶³ Notwithstanding that Ch'oe worked alongside other distinguished dancers at her school and at the National Dance Theater (국립 무용 극장 Kungnip muyong kŭkch'ang; Ch'oe Kiya, Ham Kibong and Yi Soge are among those frequently mentioned, along with her dancer daughter An Sŏnghüi), there is little indication that she was ready to follow what ideology now required.

Her 1958 book continues in the same vein. The first section gives the foundation for national dance, claiming that elements long lost have recently been recovered and weak elements strengthened. It squares this with the emerging ideology by pointing out that dance comes from the people. Then it analyses body shapes, gestures and actions, and foot and hand positions—in ways that remained almost identical in texts published in Pyongyang after Ch'oe's death such as a 1982 dance theory text by Ri Mansun and Ri Sangnin and a 1987 dance notation volume by U Ch'angsŏp. Ch'oe gives precise angles of direction and elevation for some elements, and these also remain in North Korea's later dance notations, prescribing, for example, 45-degree divisions for directions on stage, and restricting hand

and arm holds to 45, 90, and 135-degree elevations outwards from the vertical. She also details more intimate body movements, including the tiny up-and-down shoulder movements, slight rotations of the head, and delicate hand and finger rotations that remain so characteristic of South Korean dance practice;⁶⁴ I note, however, that some of these movements are missing from U Ch'angsŏp's 1987 dance notation volume.

If Ch'oe's book parallels the then ongoing work on folksongs, I must reiterate that it is distinct in one significant way: Ch'oe had in the 1930s begun to create a set of dances based on Korean practice, and because these were considered to derive from folk dances (*minsok muyong/ch'um*), these are promoted as models for national dance (*minjok muyong/ch'um*). Ch'oe was also given credit for creating the dances in a film produced to complement the book, *Ch'oe Sünghüi-ryu Chosŏn muyong* (The Ch'oe Sünghüi School of Korean Dance).⁶⁵ Curiously, much as Ch'oe's national dances were based on her 1930s' choreographies for stage performance, the national folksong style that emerged was also based on popular folksongs, that is, folksongs performed by professional singers on stage, on recordings and for radio broadcasts during the Japanese colonial period, rather than on the diverse local folksongs found in rural areas across the Korean peninsula. As a result, the national folksong style abandoned regional characteristics such as the nasal vibrato and flexible metrical structures of *Sŏdo minyo* from the region around Pyongyang, and the "sad" (*aewan*) vocalization characteristic of *Namdo minyo* from Korea's southwestern region.⁶⁶ Similarly, then, Ch'oe modified some dance elements as she took from Korean tradition.

Demonstrating the above, Ch'oe devotes thirty pages in her volume to the Pongsan mask dance.⁶⁷ This dance, originating in Hwanghae Province in today's North Korea, has iconic status in both Koreas. Its status reflects folklore collection in the 1930s, but also because scholars suggest putative connections with ancient China, the Pongsan mask dance is referenced in descriptions of mask dances found in tomb paintings in the northern part of the peninsula dating to the Three Kingdom's period (that is, prior to the seventh-century unification of Korea). A preservation society for the mask dance is reported to continue in North Korea, and depictions appear in several folk-game volumes published in Pyongyang, while in 2009 the state media company issued a VCD of the dance, *Chosŏn minsok muyong: Pongsan t'al ch'um*. In South Korea, the mask dance was appointed National Intangible Cultural Property no.17 in 1967, initially designating "holders" (*poyuja*) who had migrated from North to South prior to the end of the Korean War.

In the early 1930s, Ch'oe lifted from the Pongsan mask dance what she termed a "vagabond dance" or, more fully, "*Pangnangin ūi sorŭm*/Sadness of the Vagabond." Her choreography most likely evolved over time,⁶⁸ and for a performance in 1936

she reverted to simply naming what seems to be a version of the same solo dance as “*Pongsan t'al ch'um*.” Later, she danced this in the United States, for which a photograph of her doing so survives in the New York Public Library.⁶⁹ Her solo dance outlived her, and much the same dance opens Act 5 of the 1988 national opera (*minjok kagŭk*) “*Ch'unhyangjŏn/Story of 'Spring Fragrance'*,” where rather than being solo, as Ch'oe's 1930s versions were, it is performed by a group of eight dancers to an updated folksong, “*Nongbuga/Farming Song*.”

Preceding the mask dance, twenty pages in her book describe a fan dance.⁷⁰ After criticism in 1951, Ch'oe had revived her choreography of this for a performance at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow at the Sixth World Festival of Youth and Students. And, after her death, much of her choreography was retained although props were changed, for the third scene of the celebrated suite “*Choguk ũi Chindallae/Azaleas in the Homeland*,” created in or before 1971 by the Mansudae Art Troupe and described by Kim Jong Il as “revolutionary” (*hyŏngmyŏng*) due to its adherence to *juche* ideology.⁷¹ Fans were replaced by winnowing baskets, hence some movements were adapted, and the title became “*Kich'um/Dance of Winnowing*”. The dance also sits behind dances in two revolutionary operas, in “*Tang ũi ch'amdwin ttal/True Daughter of the Party*” (1971)⁷² where the fans become lotus blossoms, and at the beginning of the finale of “*Kkot p'anŭn ch'ŏnyŏ/The Flower Girl*” (1972), where fans are replaced by azaleas.

Her book also details her version of the once exorcistic “*Salp'uri*.”⁷³ She had first danced this in Tokyo in 1936 under the title “*Munyŏ ch'um/Dance of the Female Shaman*,” but campaigns against superstition in North Korea may explain why her 1950s choreography merged elements of a second dance, “*Sŭngmu/ Monk's Dance*,” her version of which she had first performed in Tokyo in 1934, to become “*Sugŏn ch'um/Sleeve Dance*.” This title deftly substitutes an aspect of costume for anything allied to superstition or religion. In turn, “*Sugŏn ch'um*” became central to the second movement of “*Azaleas*,” choreographing a 1965 model song by the composer Ri Myŏnsang (1908–1989), “*Nuni naerinda/Snow Falls*.” In this choreography, female guerrillas descend from their camps on the sacred Mount Paektu as if angels, wearing diaphanous costumes with long, floating sleeves that link the revolution to a much more ancient, mythical past. The sleeves, though, revert to the sashes of Ch'oe's earlier “*Salp'uri*” in “*The Flower Girl*.” Ch'oe's dance was also recast by her daughter, most likely in the 1960s, into a new choreography that remains today, titled, in an onomatopoeic way, *Chaenggang ch'um* (*chaenggang* translates as “clank,” referencing the percussive accompaniment to a shaman's dance).⁷⁴

Ch'oe's 1958 book also details “*Sogo ch'um*,” a dance descending from rural Korea's eponymous percussion bands within the genre known as *nongak* or

p'ungmul.⁷⁵ During the late 1930s, Ch'oe had performed this as “*Sangmo ch'um*,” referencing streamers that many band members attached to hats—a reasonable name because, in percussion bands, the small *sogo* hand-held drum was primarily an excuse for acrobatics rather than a musical instrument. “*Sangmo ch'um*” is how Ch'oe's dance is still normally encountered in Pyongyang. In the January 1966 edition of *Chosŏn yesul*, Ri Hŭngsu differentiated a staged version (referring to the hat, *sangmo*), from an older dance used in percussion bands. However, Ri Tŏksun noted that the staged form, in a theatrical performance that depicted dry field agricultural labor, retained the “scent” (*hyanggi*) of the people—that is, of the older, rural, percussion band dance. Again, in 1980 and long after Ch'oe's death, Wi Pyŏng'aek in the journal's August edition reminded readers that the *sangmo* dance originally formed part of an entertainment held during intense periods of farming activity; Wi does not mention Ch'oe by name.⁷⁶

For performances in Moscow in 1950 and again in 1957, Ch'oe essentially upsized the small *sogo* to large barrel drums, *puk*, rebranding the dance “*Puk ch'um*.” Note, though, that several separate dances exist for the latter, the two most familiar in South Korea today being centred on Miryang in the southeast and Chindo in the southwest. The northern scholar Pak Chongsŏng claims “*Puk ch'um*” as a northern dance, fulfilling the nationalistic requirement by tracing it back 1500 years to the northwestern Koguryŏ state.⁷⁷ He does much the same with two further dances associated with Ch'oe, “*Changgo ch'um/Drum dance*”⁷⁸ and “*K'al ch'um/Knife dance*.”⁷⁹ “*Changgo ch'um*” was, after Ch'oe's death, invoked in the fourth scene of “*Azaleas*,” “*Sagwa p'ungnyŏn/Bumper Harvest of Apples*.” Known in both Koreas, this has roots as a solo or small group dance played on large hourglass-shaped drums by brawny farmers in percussion bands, particularly in the bands of Korea's southwestern Chŏlla provinces. It was reframed by Ch'oe as a more delicate, female dance, using a single stick and one hand to strike a smaller drum. In Pyongyang, Ch'oe's dance evolved, adding a second stick to allow more complex rhythmic patterns (likewise, percussion band drummers in both Koreas today use two sticks).

There is an overlap between “*K'al ch'um*” and “*Kŏmmu/Sword Dance*,” and it was as the latter that Ch'oe introduced her choreography in 1934.⁸⁰ Her dance gained local resonance in North Korea because, as several articles in the journal *Chosŏn yesul* confirm, it, or a precursor of it, appears in wall paintings in the third Anak tomb, a fifth-century tomb to the west of Pyongyang.⁸¹ “*K'al ch'um*” outlived Ch'oe, and featured in the “*Arirang*” mass performance spectacle which began in 2002 and continued annually through to 2013, before being revived in 2015 and 2018. The related dance preserved in South Korea, as National Intangible Cultural Property No. 12, is “*Kŏmmu/Sword Dance*.” This, though, is associated

with the town of Chinju in the southeast. South Korean scholars have compared the two, noting how the northern dance meets the requirements of socialist realism by using rapid, sharp, attacking outward-facing movements and rigid, upright postures, whereas the southern dance concentrates on non-programmatic aestheticism and more delicate movements.⁸²

Dance, nation, and people

Ch'oe Sünghŭi's fightback against criticism extended beyond the 1958 book. Once in Pyongyang, she had immersed herself in developing North Korea's dance culture, often collaborating with others. She is associated in particular with choreographing the 1948 staging of "*Ch'unhyangjŏn*," large-scale works such as the historical "*Sadosŏng ūi iyagi*/The story of Sado Castle" (1954), tales of the capital, Pyongyang, in "*Taedong kangban esŏ*/Taedong Riverside" and the folksong inspired "*Nodŭl kangbyŏn esŏ*/Nodŭl Riverside," and the revolutionary opera precursor "The Flower of Ch'ŏnsan Village." She also created choreographies for dramas and for children's dances, many of which were published in two additional volumes bearing her name.⁸³

Indeed, in the early days of North Korea, the regime accepted a bourgeois compromise to work with the writers and artists—including dancers—who were available. Many had migrated northwards from Seoul since, as is the case everywhere, artists tend to have left-wing sympathies. And those who settled in Pyongyang, including Ch'oe, initially inhabited, as Katherine Verdery defines it in respect to Romania, a "space of legitimation"⁸⁴ as they sought ways to link familiar and prized genres from the past with the new political reality. Hence, the first decade of North Korea's existence was a time for cultural revival and enrichment. Not just new dances, but new operas, orchestral music, and more were produced, and these are duly listed in the first edition of the 1956 text, *Haebanghu Chosŏn ūmak*.⁸⁵ But, the communist intellectual tradition among accomplished writers and artists who settled in Pyongyang was, at best, limited.⁸⁶ To Gabroussenko, the Korean Proletarian Artists Federation (조선 프롤레타리아 예술 동맹 *Chosŏn p'ŭroret'aria yesul tongmaeng*), which operated between 1925 and 1935, was only loosely Marxist, because its members came from the privileged class and lacked sympathy for the workers (or peasants) they championed.⁸⁷ The bourgeois background of many artists from that time is not in doubt, since building a career in the arts required funds and time—attributes that were not available to the many who struggled daily to put food on a family table. Again, accessing high-quality training tended to require expensive trips abroad.

With her experience of socialism in China and the Soviet sphere of influence, the new direction brought by *juche* and *Ch'ŏllima*, which discarded any remnants of Théophile Gautier's "*l'art pour l'art*" in favor of subservience to state ideology, would not have been surprising to Ch'oe. Lenin had in 1905 stated that literature and art must serve "not the bored 'upper 10,000' suffering from fatty degeneration, but the millions and tens of millions of working people."⁸⁸ Lenin, incidentally, is pictured on the frontispiece to the second edition of the journal *Chosŏn yesul*, published in October 1956, where one of the two feature articles is on dance. Broadly stated, totalitarian systems need compliant artists and, despite claims to the contrary, markers of one's individual artistry, such as artistic brilliance, creativity, and flair, are dangerous. Totalitarian leaders generally prefer mediocrity to brilliance.⁸⁹ They demand conformity to a discursive but at times shifting ideology⁹⁰ and sanction violence to keep celebrity in check—except, of course, the celebrity of leaders.⁹¹ The shifting nature of ideology, Richard Taruskin remarks in reference to how Soviet composers struggled under socialist realism, becomes "a Venus flytrap" that "gobbles up" creativity.⁹² It is not surprising that many artists resist side-lining artistry: artistry is the result of many years of competitive training; it is what makes artists special.

Juche and *Ch'ŏllima*, however, required compliant proletarian artists—artists found among the ranks of workers and trained by the state. Much as had been the case in the Soviet Union before, as these were nurtured in North Korea, so the bourgeois compromise unravelled. Indeed, it had to unravel since, henceforth, careers in the literary arts would progress according to how writers and artists worked within prescribed stylistic and thematic contexts.⁹³ Purges of older artists were inevitable.

Conclusion

By 1957, Ch'oe must have grasped the new reality. It is hard to conclude that she was not aware of how ideology was being brought into line with the pronouncements of Kim Il Sung. This makes her criticism of the new mass work "*Ch'ŏllima*" spectacularly naïve. When considered alongside her 1958 book, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, and the articles by her and about her in the pages of the journal *Chosŏn yesul*, it is hard not to see arrogance in her criticism and activities.

To approach my conclusion, permit me to briefly step to one side. If we recall how Ch'oe's dance master, Ishii Baku, travelled to Europe to create his dance grammar, it seems reasonable to read connections between what he found in Dalcrozierian *eurythmie* and Mary Wigman's work with the mass dances that emerged in North Korea. (Ch'oe, we should remember, was well travelled, and

knew contemporary dance trends, but also the philosophies and ideologies behind them, in Europe and the United States, as well as in the Soviet bloc and China.) Consider Germany: as the National Socialists took control, Wigman consolidated a group choreography based on the *Volk*, resolving problems associated with moving from individual (solo) to social (group) dances. Wigman also developed *Tanz-Gymnastik*, a method oriented to amateurs that differentiated dance as art from calisthenics as exercise.⁹⁴ All this was familiar to Ch'oe and, rather than the *Ausdruckstanz* of the 1920s, it is tempting to draw a line to Pyongyang's mass spectacles from *Tanz-Gymnastik* (and from Rudolf Laban's *Kinetographie Laban*, his system for notating dance based on body effort that was published in 1928⁹⁵). On its journey to North Korea, this line would take in the grand scale and overtly nationalistic opening of the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games that Wigman choreographed, "*Olympische Jugend/Olympic Youth*." This celebrated the Führer as the paramount leader and showcased the myths that had been assembled as the official history of the rejuvenating state.

Now, compare North Korea, where thousands-upon-thousands of *ch'öng-sonyön* young adults fill Kim Il Sung square in Pyongyang each April to celebrate the birthday of the "Eternal Leader" in massive, communal dancing, or where many thousands more until recently filled stadiums for the "Arirang" mass performance spectacle. North Korea essentially absorbed Germanic inter-war ideas, not just those of Wigman and Laban but also *Körperkultur* (Body Physical Training), in which mass displays of gymnastics showed off body perfection, and in which the individual communed in unity within the state.⁹⁶ With a history running from the German Friedrich Jahn's (1778–1852) *Turnverein* (Turners) and the Czech Miroslav Tyrš's (1832–1884) *Sokols* (Falcons), mass displays were harnessed by Stalin in the Soviet Union, and from Moscow they spread to Soviet satellite states.⁹⁷ Mass displays created and used national symbols in the Soviet Union,⁹⁸ as in North Korea. The Soviets, then, provided the filter, even though the official line in Pyongyang has it that Kim Il Sung created the first mass display for Korea in 1930.⁹⁹

Ch'oe knew the ideology behind mass displays. She would have seen how this was embedded within *juche* and the *Chöllima* campaign. But she continued to promote her own dances and pedagogy, and to champion the choreographies she had worked on both before and after she had settled in Pyongyang. To do so, I conclude, was tantamount to committing suicide, even if it allowed her choreographies to survive her demise. And, although her reappearance in the pages of *Chosön yesul* in the early 1960s suggests she had won a reprieve, this was never going to be more than a temporary reprieve, and she soon disappeared completely from public view. We may never know whether she died of illness, as North Korea

now claims, or was purged once more and shot for failing to conform, but the latter is, surely, the more likely.

Notes

1. kh@soas.ac.uk.
2. This article forms a companion to my exploration of how North Korea's developing ideology impacted music, "The Evolution of Cultural Policy and Practice in North Korea, Seen Through the Journal *Chosön ūmak* [Korean Music]," in *The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary North Korea*, edited by Adrian Buzo (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), pp. 251–256, and extends from my monograph, *Songs for "Great Leaders": Ideology and Creativity in North Korean Music and Dance* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020). My recent research on North Korea has been supported by a fellowship at the National Humanities Center, North Carolina (2017–2018) and by a Leverhulme Emeritus Fellowship (2018–2022).
3. "Folk" as in the common East Asian usage: the Little Tradition, in contrast to the court, aristocratic and literati Great Tradition. See Richard Bauman, "Introduction," in *Folklore, Cultural Performances, and Popular Entertainment*, edited by Richard Bauman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. xiii–xxi.
4. Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vol. 2 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 884–885 and 901; Brian Myers, *Han Sōrya and North Korean Literature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 90–93; Balázs Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 132.
5. Judy Van Zile, *Perspectives on Korean Dance* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), pp. 186–188; Yukihiko Yoshida, "Lee Tsia-oe and Baku Ishii Before 1945: Comparing the Origin of Modern Dance in Taiwan and Japan," *Pan-Asian Journal of Sports and Physical Education* (2011): 56–57.
6. Ishii's interactions with Wigman (1886–1973) are a matter of some conjecture. His interest, both in Dalcroze and Wigman, is mentioned by, among others, Son Okju ("Korean Dance Beyond Koreanness: Park Yeong-in in the German Modern Dance Scene," in *Corporeal Politics: Dancing East Asia*, edited by Katherine Mezur and Emily Wilcox (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2020), pp. 84–85. Son notes that the Japanese government funded the trips of many artists to Germany, through to the late 1930s (Son, "Korean Dance," 102 and 111). Van Zile states Ishii studied with Wigman and identifies aspects of her expressionist dances filtered through Baku in some of Ch'oe Sünghüi's 1930s dances ("Performing Modernity in Korea: The Dance of Ch'oe Sünghüi," *Korean Studies* 37 [2013]: 132–133). In Germany, Wigman certainly invited Ishii to her studio, but his later book, *Watashi No Kao* (1940) indicates he did not take up the offer. However, Kolb notes that he appeared twice alongside her students in the 1925 film *Wege zu Kraft und Schönheit* (Ways to strength and beauty) (Alexandra Kolb, "Wigman's Witches: Reformism, Orientalism, Nazism," *Dance Research Journal* 48.2 [2016]: 36–37). And, to Wigman as an influence on Ishii we should probably add Rudolf Laban (1879–1958), who Wigman worked with from 1913 on and who is usually considered the founding father of the *Ausdruckstanz* style, for which, see Evelyn Doerr, *Rudolf Laban: The Dancer of the Crystal* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007), pp. 99–101.
7. As noted by Van Zile, "Performing Modernity," p. 128, citing Anthony Giddens and Shmuel Eisenstadt.
8. Taylor Atkins, *Primitive Selves: Koreans in the Japanese Colonial Gaze, 1910–1945* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2010), p. 171.

9. Judy Van Zile, "Performing Modernity in Korea," p. 136. See also Van Zile, "Blurring Tradition and Modernity: The Impact of Japanese Colonization and Ch'oe Sŭng-hŭi on Dance in South Korea Today," in *Consuming Korean Tradition*, edited by Laurel Kendall (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), pp. 169–194.
10. Emily Wilcox, *Revolutionary Bodies: Chinese Dance and the Socialist Legacy* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2019), p. 67, lists the countries Ch'oe visited and performed on during her tour. Wilcox bases her list primarily on an Arirang TV documentary directed by Won Jongun (*Choi Seunghee: The Story of a Dancer* [Seoul: Arirang TV, 2008]). For an exploration of Ch'oe's activities while in the United States, see Van Zile, *Perspectives on Korean Dance*, pp. 185–219, and for Ch'oe's performances in Mexico, see Alfredo Romero Castilla, "Choi Seunghee (Sai Shoki): The Dancing Princess from the Peninsula in Mexico," *Journal of Society for Dance Documentation and History* 44 (2017): 81–96.
11. O Sejun, "Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi ūi wŏlbuk yŏin'gwa namp'yŏn An Mak ūi yŏngnyang," *Han'guk muyong kyoyukhak hoeji* 26.2 (2015): 87–99.
12. Charles Armstrong, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945–1950," *Journal of Asian Studies* 62.1 (2003): 77.
13. According to former Hungarian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Mózses Csoma. "A Mosaic Tracing the Unknown Years of Choi Seung-hee," *JoongAng Daily*, 20 August 2020. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2020/08/20/national/diplomacy/Choi-Seunghee-icon-ic-dancer/20200820164000423.html> (accessed 16 May 2022).
14. Emily Wilcox, "Locating Performance: Choe Seung-hui's East Asian Modernism and the Case for Area Knowledge in Dance Studies," in *The Future of Dance Studies*, edited by Susan Manning, Janice Ross and Rebecca Schneider (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), p. 509.
15. Emily Wilcox, "Locating Performance," and *Revolutionary Bodies*, pp. 48–77.
16. This was recalled by the former deputy Minister of Culture Chŏng Rŭul, when interviewed by Tatiana Gabroussenko in exile in Kazakhstan. Gabroussenko, in her *Soldiers on the Cultural Front: Developments in the Early History of North Korean Literature and Literary Policy* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press), 2010, hints that Ch'oe had an affair with Chŏng.
17. Yi Chŏlju, *Puk ūi yesurin* (Seoul: Kyemongsa, 1966), pp. 34–38; see also Gabroussenko, *Soldiers on the Cultural Front*, pp. 146–148.
18. Sŏ Manil, "Chosŏn ūl pinnae kojŏ, Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi ūi yesul kwa hwaltong (1–6)," *Chosŏn yesul* (1957.10): 64–75, (1957.11): 114–121, (1957.12): 90–95, (1958.1): 88–93, (1958.2): 73–79, and (1958.3): 80–89.
19. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon* (Seoul: Tongmunsŏn, 1991 [originally, Pyongyang: Chosŏn yesul ch'ulp'ansa, 1958]), and *Muyonggŭk taebonjip* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn yesul ch'ulp'ansa), 1958. Note that throughout this article page numbers reference the 1991 reprint of the first book.
20. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, "Sŭngnija taehwa rŭl apt'ugo: Chisang ragwŏn e taehan muyong sŏsasi <Taedong kangbanesŏ> rŭl ch'angjakhamyŏnsŏ," *Chosŏn yesul* (1961.6): 16–18.
21. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, *Chosŏn adong muyong kibon* (Pyongyang: Chosŏn munhak yesul ch'ong tongmaeng ch'ulp'ansa, 1963).
22. The early 1960s allowed some latitude in commentary, or relaxed control, since much the same as happened with Ch'oe and the journal *Chosŏn yesul* can be seen in the pages of the music journal, *Chosŏn ūmak*, where while articles on Soviet music disappeared for the last few years of the 1950s, they reappeared in 1961, and where the promotion of song culture was paused for a celebration of orchestral and instrumental compositions to mark the twentieth anniversary of liberation in 1965. See Howard, "The Evolution of Cultural Policy," pp. 257–259.

23. The North Korean honor system inherits Soviet practice but adds some distinctive elements (notably the premier award, the "Kim Il Sung Prize (*Kim Ilsŏng sang*).") Below the premier award but above "laudatory artist" (*kongmin paeu*), people's artists occupy eight ranks.
24. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, "P'yŏngnon: Yesulchŏk chŏnt'ong kwa yesulchŏk ch'angjo," *Chosŏn yesul* (1965.4): 37–39; "Muyong ch'angjak kyŏnghŏm: Tongmu 'P'ungngang ūl ttokko' e taehayo," *Chosŏn yesul* (1965.7): 38–42; "P'yŏngnon: Muyong sop'um ūi sasang yesulchŏk nop'i rŭl wihayŏ," *Chosŏn yesul* (1966.9): 41–45.
25. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, "Rodongdang sidae e ch'allanhi kkotp'in muyong yesul," *Chosŏn yesul* (1965.10): 24–29 and 32.
26. Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, "Inmin ūi aeguk t'ujaeng ūl panyŏngghan uri nara muyong yesul," *Chosŏn yesul* (1966.11): 23–27.
27. Chŏng Pyŏnggho, *Ch'umch'unŭn Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi, segye rŭl hwaŏjabŭn Chosŏn yŏja* (Seoul: Ppurikip'un namu, 1995), p. 214; Hwang Kyŏngsuk, "Pukhan muyong ūi t'ŭkching e kwanhan yŏn'gu" (PhD diss., Sungmyŏng yŏja taehakkyo, Seoul, 1994), p. 119.
28. Han Kyŏngja, "Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi yesuri Han'guk ch'angjak ch'um e kkich'in yŏngnyang," *Nambuk munhwa yesul yŏn'gu* 3 (2008): 251.
29. Among the Korean-language studies on Ch'oe published in South Korea since 2000 which I have consulted are: Chŏng Su'ung, *Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi* (Seoul: Nunbit, 2004); Han Kyŏngja, *Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi muyong hwaltong ūi pyŏnch'ŏn kwajŏng* (Seoul: Han'guk ch'eyuk hakhoe, 2006); Kim Ch'anjŏng, *Ch'umkkun Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi* (Seoul: Han'guk pangsong ch'ulp'an, 2003); Kim Chiŭn, "Chaeil 2 sedae minjok muyongga Im Ch'uja-ga pon Pukhan ūi minjok muyong," in *Pukhan ūi minjok muyong*, edited by Kim Hŭisŏn (Seoul: Kungnip kugagwŏn, 2018), pp. 155–187; Kim Yuyŏl, "Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon tongjak ūi wŏlli wa ihae," in *Pukhanŭi minjok muyong*, pp. 133–153; Yi Aesun, *Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi muyong yesul yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn), 2002; Yu Mihŭi, *20-segi majimak p'eminsit'ŭ Ch'oe Sŭnghŭi* (Seoul: Minsogwŏn), 2006.
30. After Hyung Il Pai, "The Politics of Korea's Past: The Legacy of Japanese Colonial Archaeology in the Korean Peninsula," *East Asian History* 7 (1994): 25–48; Hyung Il Pai, "The Colonial Origins of Korea's Collected Past," in *Nationalism and the Construction of Korean Identity*, edited by Hyung Il Pai and Timothy R. Tangherini (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 13–32; Taylor Atkins, *Primitive Selves*, pp. 81–143.
31. For an insightful study of how this impacted writers, see Janet Poole, *When the Future Disappears: The Modernist Imagination in Late Colonial Korea* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 2014.
32. Chong-Sik Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963), p. 9. See also Marshall Pihl, "Contemporary Literature in a Divided Land," in *Korea Briefing 1993*, edited by Donald Clark (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 94.
33. The four intellectual and political factions have been widely discussed by, for example, Scalapino and Lee, *Communism in Korea*; Dae Sook Suh, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press), 1988; Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–1960* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press), 2003; Charles Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*; and, in respect to literature and art, by Myers, *Han Sŏrya*, and Gabroussenko, *Soldiers on the Cultural Front*, pp. 134–166.
34. Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*, p. 18.
35. Myers, *Han Sŏrya*, p. 151.
36. In Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works* 1 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), pp. 582–606.
37. For example, Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 413.

38. Brian Myers, “The Watershed That Wasn’t: Re-evaluating Kim Il Sung’s ‘Juche Speech’ of 1955,” *Acta Koreana* 9.1 (2006): 89–115.
39. Kim Hiyŏl, “Sahoe chuŭi sasil chuŭi wa ūmak yŏnju,” *Chosŏn yesul* (1956.9): 18–19.
40. Ch’oe Sŭnghŭi, “Segye e charang ttŏlch’in uri ūi muyong yesul,” *Chosŏn yesul* (1957.10): 52–53.
41. Kim Wŏn’gyun, “Chuch’e rŭl hwangnip hanŭn kil esŏ – 5-wŏl ūmakhoe rŭl chungsim ūro,” *Chosŏn ūmak* (1958.7): 24–29.
42. Hyŏnji p’agyŏn yesurin p’yohyŏnggwŏn, “Sahoe chuŭi nongch’ŏn ūl norae ro kkot p’iugoch’yŏ,” *Chosŏn ūmak* (1959.6): 47–49.
43. Guangxi Jin, “‘The August Incident’ and the Destiny of the Yanan Faction,” *International Journal of Korean History* 17.2 (2012): 47–74; Charles Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution*, pp. 79–111.
44. Brian Myers, *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves—And Why It Matters* (New York, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2010), p. 41.
45. Cheehyung Harrison Kim, *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953–1961* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 109.
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47. Peter Moody, “Chollima, the Thousand Li Flying Horse: Neo-traditionalism at Work in North Korea,” *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 13.2 (2013): 220. In respect to the Chinese novel, Moody cites Rafe De Crespigny, *A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to the Three Kingdoms (23–220AD)* (Leiden: Brill, 2007): 189. Also, Keith Howard and Saparbek Kasmambetov, *Singing the Kyrgyz Manas: Saparbek Kasmambetov’s Recitations of Epic Poetry* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), reflects on horses in the Central Asian epic tradition.
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49. Frank Dikötter, *Dictators* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), p. xiv.
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56. Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 261–264.
57. Sin Tosŏn, “Taejung kayo ch’angjak ūi poda nop’ŭn paljŏn ūl wihayŏ! Taejung kayo ch’angjak ūi hyŏnsangt’ae – hyŏbŭihoe esŏ han t’oron,” *Chosŏn ūmak* (1959.6): 6–10.
58. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*.
59. Szalontai, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era*, pp. 40–42.
60. Mun Chongsang, “Kim Sunnam ūi ‘Sŏyang ūmak kwa tongyang ūmak kwa ūi ch’ai’ e taehayŏ,” *Chosŏn ūmak* (1956.2): 58–65; Wŏn Hŭngnyong, “Kim Sunnam ūi kwagŏ kayo ch’angjak esŏ nat’anattŏn pandongjŏk purŭjyoa sasang,” *Chosŏn ūmak* (1956.3): 65–79.

61. Boris Krasin’s 1918 report to the Moscow Proletkult, as translated in Marina Frolova-Walker and Jonathan Walker, *Music and Soviet Power, 1917–32* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2012), p. 16.
62. As Ri Ch’anggu sets out in his *Chosŏn minyo ūi chosik ch’egye* (Pyongyang: Yesul kyoyuk ch’ulp’ansa, 1990). See also Howard, *Songs for “Great Leaders,”* pp. 35–42.
63. Sŏ, “Chosŏn ūl pich’nae kojŏ” (1957.10): 64–75, (1957.11): 114–121.
64. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, pp. 10–66.
65. The term used here for “school” was adopted from a Japanese term (*ryū*). It has become a standard term in both Korea, used particularly to delineate the “schools” of the instrumental genre of *sanjo*.
66. This had to be the case, because Kim Il Sung had described folksongs as soft and lyrical. Kim Jong Il kept this description, later describing folksongs as “gentle and yet beautiful and elegant,” “light and clear” (Kim Jong Il, “On the direction which musical creation should take,” talk to creators given on October 25, 1968. <http://www.korea-dpr.com/lib/Kim%20Jong%20Il%20-%201%20ON%20THE%20DIRECTION%20WHICH%20MUSICAL%20CREATION%20SHOULD%20TAKE.pdf>).
67. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, pp. 127–158.
68. As Van Zile notes, the ephemeral nature of dance makes it challenging to discuss evolution over time; titles of Ch’oe’s dances are sometimes given in English, or translated and retranslated in various sources, making it “difficult to know if dances are, in effect, ‘the same,’ or are actually difference dances” (Van Zile, “Performing Modernity,” p. 126).
69. Reproduced in Van Zile, *Perspectives on Korean Dance*, p. 192.
70. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, pp. 105–125.
71. “For this same reason, Kim is given credit for inspiring its creation in the score, published in 1988 and featuring the then new dance notation.
72. Developed by the Korean People’s Army Ensemble as the second opera, Kim Jong Il criticized it in a speech after its premiere on October 28, 1971: “This opera does not have a plot-line of reverence for the Great Leader ... this opera contains many instances of the lives of characters not being depicted truthfully ... [it] includes many songs whose words have not been poeticized.” Hence it was reworked, and because of this, publications often position it as the fourth revolutionary opera to be created.
73. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, pp. 159–179.
74. Chaewon Kim, “Dance,” in *Performing Arts of North Korea. Korean Musicology Series 10*, edited by Keith Howard, pp. 209–211 (Seoul: National Gugak Center, 2019). For a more detailed account, see the same author, Kim Ch’aewŏn, “Pukhan ūi sinjŏn t’ongch’um chaenggangch’um ūi pyŏnhwa wa chŏnsŭng,” *Kongyŏn’gwa Ribyu* 25.1 (2019): 48–62.
75. Ch’oe, *Chosŏn minjok muyong kibon*, pp. 181–206.
76. Ri Hŭngsu, “Ssangmu (Pich’ŏndo) ūi hyŏnsangsŏng,” *Chosŏn yesul* (1966.1): 27–29; Wi Pyŏngt’aek, “Nongak mu,” *Chosŏn yesul* (1989.8): 72–73.
77. Chongsŏng Pak, *Chosŏn minsok muyong* (Pyongyang: Munye ch’ulp’ansa, 1991): 60.
78. Pak, *Chosŏn minsok muyong*, p. 100.
79. Pak, *Chosŏn minsok muyong*, p. 105.
80. Han, “Ch’oe Sŭnghŭi yesuri,” p. 238.
81. For example, Anon, “K’al ch’um,” *Chosŏn yesul* (1985.11): 35; Han T’aeil, “Koguryŏ mudŏm pyŏkhwa rŭl t’onghayŏ pon ‘k’al ch’um,’” *Chosŏn yesul* (2003.6): 74–75.
82. An Pyŏngju, Min Hyŏnju and Pae Suŭl, “Sin muyong kyeyŏl ūi Nam-Pukhan kŏmmu pigyo.” *Han’guk muyong kidok hakhoeji* 3 (October 2002): 21–33.
83. Ch’oe Sŭnghŭi, *Muyonggŭk taebonjip* and *Chosŏn adong muyong kibon*. A chronological table of Ch’oe’s known choreographies and performances is given by Han, “Ch’oe Sŭnghŭi yesuri,” pp. 238–244.

84. Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1991), p. 17.
85. Ri Hirim, Ri Hwail, Chu Yöngsöp, Han Ŭngman, Han Pyönggak, and Mun Chongsang, *Haebanghu Chosön ũmak* (Pyongyang: Chosön chakkokka tongmaeng wiwönhoe), 1956. Note that a second edition of this title published in 1979 offers very different coverage, reflecting the post-juche constellation of North Korean music and dance and omitting all mention of non-compliant works.
86. Gabroussenko, *Soldiers on the Cultural Front*, p. 167.
87. Gabroussenko, *Soldiers on the Cultural Front*, pp. 76–79.
88. Vladimir Lenin, “Party organisation and party literature,” in *Lenin Collected Works* 10 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House 1962), pp. 47–48.
89. Mussolini, Dikötter writes, “not only surrounded himself with mediocre followers but also frequently replaced them. The worst, by most accounts, was Achille Starace ... ‘Starace is a cretin,’ one follower objected. ‘I know,’ Mussolini replied. ‘But he is an obedient cretin!’” (Dikötter, *Dictators*, p. 13, citing Roberto Festorazzi, *Starace. Il Mastino Della Rivoluzione Fascista* (Milan: Ugo Mursia, 2002), p. 71.
90. Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski, eds, *States of Violence* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), pp. 3–6.
91. Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle* (Detroit, MI: Black and Red, 2010): 64.
92. Richard Taruskin, *Defining Russia Musically* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 89.
93. As De Ceuster writes in respect to fine arts (Koen De Ceuster, “To be an Artist in North Korea: Talent and then Some More,” in *Exploring North Korean Arts*, edited by Rüdiger Frank (Vienna: University of Vienna/MAK, 2011), pp. 69–71. See also Koen De Ceuster, “South Korea’s Encounter with North Korean Art: Between Barbershop Paintings and True Art,” in *De-Bordering Korea: Tangible and Intangible Legacies of the Sunshine Policy*, edited by Valérie Gelézeau, Koen De Ceuster and Alain Delissen (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 160–162.
94. Susan Manning, *Ecstasy and the Demon: Feminism and Nationalism in the Dances of Mary Wigam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 2, 8 and 85; see also Scott Venters, “‘Would you Die for the Fatherland?’ Disciplining the German Commemorative Body,” *Theatre History Studies* 35 (2016): 39–71.
95. For a discussion of possible influences from Laban and other notations on the North Korean notation system, see Howard, *Songs for “Great Leaders,”* pp. 190–194.
96. After Karl Toepfer, *Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German Body Culture 1910–1935* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 1997.
97. George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1975; Karen Petrone, *Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 2000; Malte Rolf, *Das Sowjetische Massenfest* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, HIS Verlag), 2006.
98. Clark, Katerina, *Moscow, the Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2011.
99. Song Mo Kim, Song Il Thak and Chol Man Kim, *Mass Gymnastics in Korea* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2002), p. 6; Han, “Ch’oe Sünghüi yesuri,” p. 38.
100. As given in the title of the *Chosön yesul* issue, although elsewhere written as “*kangbyön esö* (강변에서)”.

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Cross-Cultural Adjustment of Indonesian Expatriates in South Korea

NUR AISYAH KOTARUMALOS¹ Seoul National University Asia Center²

Abstract

This study examines the cross-cultural adjustment of Indonesian expatriates working in South Korea. Specifically, it focuses on Indonesian expatriates’ experiences and ways to adjust to the Korean workplace setting. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with nine Indonesian respondents, this study follows the adaptation model by Milton Bennet and moves beyond the antecedents of cross-cultural adjustment. It elaborates the expatriates’ practices in dealing with and negotiating cultural differences in the face of Korean working culture. The findings demonstrate that adjustment entails the acquisition of new norms and modes of behaviors as well as maintenance of old practices. Further, the sense of foreignness has been found constructive for cross-cultural adaptation.

Keywords: cross-cultural adjustment, work adjustment, adaptation, Indonesian expatriates, South Korea

Introduction

With respect to the production of cross-cultural adjustment scholarship, South Korea (henceforth Korea) has been portrayed as an unpleasant and frustrating place to work.³ This study aims to explore the cultural adaptation and negotiation of Indonesian expatriates to the new cultural repertoires within the Korean working context. It examines the experiences of Indonesian expatriates in dealing

and negotiating with cultural differences. Those experiences provide insights into the development of the adaptation process. As Korea continues to gain competitive advantage by tapping into the global talent pool, a study to address the challenge of foreign talent in negotiating cultural difference is needed particularly from the experiences of Southeast Asians.

The global war for foreign talent, a term first coined by the management consultancy firm McKinsey in 1997, has become a substantial strategy for countries to bolster their economic competitiveness.⁴ Korea however has lagged behind in global talent attraction in contrast to traditional immigrant countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada.⁵ Even among the newly emerging developed countries in Asia, Korea ranked 27 out of 132 countries, lagging behind Malaysia (26), Japan (19), and Singapore (3), according to the 2020 Global Talent Competition Index.⁶ Korea scored quite low both in external openness (70) and tolerance to minorities (78), which denotes that the nation has struggled with cultural diversity and ethnic heterogeneity. The foreign talent inflow is significantly low at approximately 5,400 annually, which equates to 0.1 per thousand inhabitants.⁷

Further, Seoul is perceived by expatriates as an unpleasant city in which to work and live. Based on the Expat City Ranking 2020, Seoul (ranked 64 out of 65) was voted the second worst city worldwide.⁸ The city performed poorly in the categories of work-life balance, settling-in, working hours, and job security. Despite that, expatriates were satisfied with the city's public transportation infrastructure, personal safety, and medical care. Expatriates reported finding it difficult to adjust to the local culture and having received an unfriendly attitude from the locals. This correlates with past research indicating that cultural adaptation has been the main motive for expatriates working in Korea to end their job contract early.⁹ For example, Kraeh, Froese, and Park in their study of 211 foreign professionals working in Korean multinational companies point to the work culture that led to the expatriates' dissatisfaction.¹⁰ Expatriates struggle to adapt to Korean working culture with different styles of leadership, long working hours, strict hierarchy, and language problems.¹¹ Similarly, a study by Bader, Froese, and Kraeh reveals that the German expatriates in Korea were under pressure to conform to work-life integration.¹² In addition, Korean communication style, which can be characterized by indirect and ambiguous meaning, often frustrates American expatriates in understanding interaction cues.¹³ Furthermore, foreigners often experience xenophobia, social bias, and discrimination either at the workplace or in everyday life situations.¹⁴

This study is crucial in terms of providing insights and nuance, since a growing body of literature about cross-cultural adjustment has been dominated by the experiences of Western expatriates. By focusing on Indonesian expatriates in

Korea, this study provides a voice for those who are marginalized both in studies of expatriates and in the Korean context.¹⁵ Existing scholarship tends to identify the antecedents of cross-cultural adjustment, cultural intelligence, and aspects that affect cross-cultural adjustment.¹⁶ Using a framework provided by Bennet, this study contributes to scholarship on the expatriate experiences by considering the notion of foreignness, which offers new possibilities for a smooth cultural adjustment.¹⁷

Theorizing cross-cultural adjustment

Extensive literature on the expatriate community has mushroomed in recent decades. Despite the expansion of information, this field of study is relatively untheorized when compared to categories of transnational subjects such as migrant workers, both documented and undocumented.¹⁸ Within the scholarship on expatriate experiences, studies on cross-cultural adjustment have been the subject of attention due to the nature of expatriates' work, which is often centered on dealing with people in new cultural contexts. Expatriates who are able to adapt to the culture of a host country are likely to perform well.¹⁹ Cross-cultural adjustment is defined as the degree to which expatriates become familiar and feel comfortable living and working in their new host country.²⁰ Various factors are identified as antecedents of cross cultural adjustment, ranging from individual-level dimensions, such as personality traits,²¹ motivation and goal orientation,²² local language proficiency,²³ gender,²⁴ cultural similarity²⁵ to institutional-level dimensions, such as cross-cultural training²⁶ and family support.²⁷

Recent studies have indicated different cross-cultural adjustment between the company-assigned expatriates and self-initiated expatriates, the latter exhibiting higher levels of adaptation to the host society.²⁸ Self-initiated expatriates who "relocate voluntarily to a foreign country, without assistance, and are hired under local, host-country contract" are relatively well-adapted to the new culture in comparison to those expatriates who are assigned and sponsored by their companies.²⁹ Studies by Von Borell de Araujo et al. and Froese and Peltokorpi found that the higher adjustment among the self-initiated expatriates is not surprising due to the fact they are highly motivated, less critical of the host culture, stay longer, have better language skills, and have developed social networks prior to expatriation.³⁰ The local language proficiency allows individuals with self-initiated overseas work experience to interact with host country nationals, and thus, these expatriates become more familiar with the culture.³¹ Froese and Peltokorpi suggest that language competency and country-specific work experience are more significant than general cultural competence or overseas

working experience in enhancing cross-cultural adjustment.³² Furthermore, expatriates who generally find the host culture fascinating are more likely to do better when it comes to adjustment.³³

The cross-cultural adjustment model proposed by Black has three features: general, working, and interaction adjustment.³⁴ This study focuses on working adjustment due to the fact that the Korean workplace has been reported by expatriates in the country as the most culturally difficult place with which to deal.³⁵ Working adjustment centers on the degree of adaptation of individuals in navigating the cultural differences at the workplace. Difference in beliefs, meanings, values, and behaviors may lead to disruption in the interpretation of social cues. Understanding the different business practices provides better adjustment and minimizes misunderstanding and tension. Culturally adjusted expatriates demonstrate the ability of expatriates to learn which behaviors are appropriate or inappropriate in order to mitigate job tension and stress.

This study draws upon Bennet's framework examining cultural adjustment. Bennett's model focuses on the experience of exposure to cultural differences, which he divides into two stages: ethnocentric (denial, defense, and minimization) and ethnorelative (acceptance, adaptation, and integration).³⁶ Ethnocentrism denotes a state where one's own culture is superior and central to all reality whereas ethnorelativism takes other cultures as equal to one's own worldview.³⁷ Within the ethnorelative model, acceptance to difference means an acknowledgement as well as respect that lead to behavioral changes. Individuals may become experts in identifying cultural contrasts and simultaneously embracing non-judgmental values in assessing other cultural worldviews. Bennett notes a pivotal point that cultural understanding is not sufficient if it does not generate culturally appropriate behaviors. However, it does not mean that the old culture will be completely replaced with a new one. Rather, individuals are expected to balance between the established worldview that they have asserted and the new cultural perspective. Within this state, individuals are able to assess which cultural aspect is the most appropriate and necessarily adjust their behavior in a culturally appropriate way. In this process, Bennet divides adjustment into two stages: adaptation and integration. Theoretically, the state of adaptation can be distinguished from integration, yet empirically it is challenging to detach those stages.³⁸ Bennet's framework offers valuable insights into the nature of negotiation in which the old culture is constantly being destabilized. Individuals critically examine the cultural settings and act appropriately. These individuals go through different modes of adjustment whether modifying, retaining, or providing new alternative values and practices. By applying Bennet's framework, this study argues that a sense of foreignness helps expatriates in the development

of cross-cultural competency. Their awareness includes when they have to draw the line as foreigners or conform to the mainstream. A sense of foreignness helps the expatriates to be reflexive about the distinctiveness and meanings that attach to cultural norms. Such awareness becomes a source of behavioral skills to reconcile diverse cultural environments and to secure the maintenance of self. In what follows, this study shall deal with a range of examples of how expatriates navigate unfamiliar cultural settings and develop adjustment practices when necessary and how they maintain their own self.

Cross-cultural adjustment in South Korea

South Korea has a higher expatriate failure rate. The failure rate can be seen from early terminations of working contracts.³⁹ Culture shock is the most frequent reason for declaring an unsatisfactory outcome of a Korea-based working assignment.⁴⁰ Foreigners often experience great difficulties in adjustment due to language and cultural problems.⁴¹ Korea's working environment has been identified as the most challenging for expatriates.⁴² The Korean working culture stresses strict hierarchy, devotion, loyalty, and harmony, all greatly influenced by Confucian tradition.⁴³ Among the East Asian nations, Confucianism has left the greatest imprint on Korean traditional culture.⁴⁴

The relationship between Confucianism and the Korean working culture has been rigorously studied. Scholars have long acknowledged the importance of examining the Confucian cultural values that shape Korean organizations and their workplaces into something unique, and yet Confucian cultural values have also been part of the transformation of the country into a great success.⁴⁵ Various academic projects have further confirmed and elaborated characteristic features of Confucianism that are closely related to distinctive practices in the Korean workplace. To date, however such studies reveal conflicting conclusions regarding the influence of Confucianism over Korean organizations.

The impact of Confucianism has been seen as negative, manifesting especially in human resource management models of interpersonal relationships, but the impact has also been seen in communication style. In the Confucian ethic, human relationships are regulated through social status, gender, age, and position, and every individual has to observe the basic principles.⁴⁶ Women's roles are defined as inferior or defective under the influence of Confucianism and as argued by Son, Korean women are at risk of being forced to fill positions as subordinates.⁴⁷ Top positions in Korean organizations are commonly distributed to those individuals who have long service and distribution favors male rather than female individuals. A work by Pak and Sohn found that the Korean leadership style is highly

authoritative and decision making is primarily made by the top management level.⁴⁸ Subordinates are obliged to accept the decisions made by their superiors without question. In Korean multinational corporations, human resources management is approached by control in order to stimulate desirable behavior, instead of motivating the workers as in American companies.⁴⁹ Maintaining harmony or *kibun*, a preferred state where individuals are expected to submit to authority and pay respect to superiors, is encouraged within Confucian ethics, and traditionally, Korean firms reward employees who are obedient and conform to the organizational culture of the company.⁵⁰ Additionally, lifetime employment is an embodied management practice that can be found in the largest Korean companies as an incentive for loyalty and high levels of commitment.⁵¹

Turning to the work-life balance, Korea has been known for its very long working hours. A number of researchers have noted the despair, stress, and disadvantage among the professionals who work overtime and participate in various bonding activities.⁵² For example, a study by Kang and Wang reveals that Korean women are victims of work-life imbalance, which leads to a reduced level of career advancement as they have to juggle between motherhood and career prospects.⁵³ To improve work-life balance, the government has recently reformed the maximum working hours from 68 to 52 in total per week between 2018 and 2021.⁵⁴ The new regulations are intended to put an end to an extremely long work-hours culture and provides legal reassurance for workers seeking harmony between their work and family life. Working very long hours has been normalized. As revealed by Lee, Chang, and Kim, long hours are not seen as intrusive to personal life nor a conflict with work-life balance, because in collectivist societies the separation between family and work is not recognized.⁵⁵

Alongside the negative aspect of Confucianism that shapes Korean organizations, several researchers draw attention to the positive effects of Confucian tradition for organizational culture. Kim, in his article on Confucian ethics, refutes the assumption that the modern workplace is not compatible with the values of Confucianism, given the fact that workers' rights are discouraged and group harmony is prioritized.⁵⁶ His argument lies in leveraging the use of rights in order to enhance a harmonious relationship, a manifestation of Confucian moral ideals. Kim and Park note that Confucian values, such as emphasis on diligence, loyalty, and education, are believed to be the key behind the remarkable success of Korea's capitalistic modernization.⁵⁷ The country exemplifies an alternative model of economic development that relies on collectivist norms and authoritarian leadership and management, a contrast to Western capitalist countries with their individualistic values and institutions.⁵⁸ In regards to gender-based Confucian culture, Koh contests the tendency in mainstream discourse to essentialize the

relationship between male and female in Confucianism and to make the broad assertion that Confucian ideology has no room for gender equality.⁵⁹ She suggests that the Confucian canon exhibits aspects that position women as equal to men, yet it is the male-dominated interpretation of them that produce gender injustice and sexual bias.

In contrast to the previous work examining the positive and negative dimensions of Confucianism, this study goes beyond this binary perspective. In addition, previous studies on differences in working culture rooted in the legacy of Confucianism are constituted through a binary representation contrasting Asian and Western people's experiences. This study, however, considers how Korean working culture is experienced by professionals coming from Southeast Asia countries and therefore offers new insights on ethnic and racial differences between migrants and local populations. While Confucianism provides the cultural basis for Korean society, the religion of Islam has become a significant cultural identity, particularly among Muslim Indonesians. Yet, both countries share similar norms and moral values such as respect for elders, a high sense of collectivism, and the avoidance of or hesitation in giving direct criticism.

Methodology and data generation

Existing studies in cross-cultural adjustment have been generated through a quantitative approach in which participants were asked how they would behave given different sets of situations.⁶⁰ This study employs a qualitative approach in order to discover cultural encounters and gain a sense of how expatriates fit into the workplace. Qualitative methodology offers more detailed and insightful information to capture and understand human behavior and experiences.⁶¹ Semi-structured interviews were used to provide greater flexibility for the subjects in responding to the questions posed by the researcher.⁶² Questions were asked around the theme of expatriates' characteristics, migration history, working experiences, job responsibilities, cross-cultural encounters, Korean language competency, and working environment.

The data of this study was generated from in-depth interviews with nine Indonesian highly skilled migrants in South Korea. Of these, six were males and three were females who had worked for more than six months in Korea. The interviews were conducted from April to December 2020 and consisted of face to face and Zoom video interviews due to social distancing guidelines in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Zoom video interviews allow the researcher and subjects to interact just like in-person interviews, yet the Zoom video interviews offer the opportunity to save travelling time. The interviews took one to two

Expatriates' Profile

Name	Gender	Age	Education	Length of stay in Korea	Type of industry	Length of work (current company)	Type of expatriates
Marie	Female	29	Bachelor's, Indonesia	3 years	Clothing	7 years	Company-assigned
Linda	Female	24	Bachelor's, Korea	5 years	Foreign talent	6 months	Self-initiated
Talitha	Female	25	Bachelor's, Korea	6.5 years	Medical aesthetic	2 years	Self-initiated
Andrew	Male	26	Bachelor's, Korea	7 years	Broadcasting	1 year	Self-initiated
Hery	Male	35	PhD, Korea	8 years	Engineering	3 years	Self-initiated
Iwan	Male	33	Master's, Korea	10 years	Pharmacy	7 years	Self-initiated
Rudy	Male	49	PhD, USA	3 years	Academia	2 years	Self-initiated
Atib	Male	27	Bachelor's, Korea	8 years	Digital comic	3 years	Self-initiated
Rio	Male	25	Two-years Diploma, Korea	5 years	Law firm	2.5 years	Self-initiated

hours and in-person interviews were conducted in local café shops suggested by the participants. These interviews were audio-recorded with their consent and transcribed in their entirety. The data was then analysed using grounded theory through the process of coding, categorization, and identification of patterns and relationships.⁶³

Research subjects were recruited through personal networks and all the interviews were done in the Indonesian language and the participants were selected based on their profession. The expatriates in this study are defined as individuals whose profession required higher degree credentials.⁶⁴ Within the scholarship on expatriates, it has been noted that migrants who had graduated from university frequently experienced underutilization of their skill set or downgrading of occupations available to them.⁶⁵

Findings and discussion

All the participants were of Indonesian nationality and held various visa categories, e.g., F-2 (residential visa), E-1 (Professor visa), and E-7 (specialist). They have been living in South Korea for quite some time as most of them came to Korea as students. Once they completed their studies, they decided to develop their career path in the country in a way that reaffirmed previous studies that found that international students become the source of foreign talent.⁶⁶ All these participants were stationed in Seoul and its surrounding area. They worked in various industries including pharmaceuticals, medical aesthetics, universities, broadcasting, digital comics, clothing, law firms, recruiting foreign talent, and engineering. The size of the industries was middle-size up to chaebol enterprises, which have Indonesian or Southeast Asia-focused interests. Participants were all employed by Korean companies or institutions with various roles such as business consultant, IT specialist, lecturer, and researcher. These institutions were mostly emerging onto the global market and the Indonesian expatriates' role was to help the companies connect with the global market. The participants said that their workplaces had become more aware of the importance of recruiting foreign professionals, which would enhance the company's performance and minimize uncertainty when dealing with the international or home country market. Yet, the number of expatriates was still limited and many of them were the single foreign professional in the workplace. Eight out of nine were classified as self-initiated expatriates as they landed jobs from the local labor market. One participant was transferred from a Korean company based in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The participants were university graduates and included two PhD holders, one with a Master's degree, and six Bachelor degree holders. One possesses a Diploma

of Higher Education. The two PhDs had no Korean language competency, and the rest were relatively fluent in speaking the language. All the participants could speak English, which gave an additional advantage for the companies, particularly for those who were trilingual speakers. They could communicate across borders, understood the local, home, and global market and thus could support the expansion of the company, given the fact that many of their Korean colleagues were unable to speak English. Seven out of nine were still single and two were married to Indonesian women. Most had graduated from Korean universities and only two graduated from non-Korea universities: one completed in Indonesia and the other gained his degree in the USA. The majority of the participants were in their early careers and passionate about developing their career trajectories in South Korea.

Korean working culture: navigating cultural differences

Work–Life Balance

Generally, all participants expressed a sense that they valued segregation between work and personal life. According to them, this boundary was implemented in their workplace. Working hours were quite regular. There was no pressure, either from the company or from supervisors to prolong their working hours at the workplace. They enjoyed a personal autonomy given by the companies to balance their professional and personal life. They had five days a week and nine hours each day to work. Weekends were the time that they usually spent doing something they enjoyed, such as spending time with friends, shopping, sleeping, cleaning their apartment, and many other things. They did not find any trouble taking their vacation as long as they had informed their supervisor. This included taking leave due to sickness. When on vacation, they were rarely interrupted to do office work.

On average, full-time employees in Korea work nearly five hours longer than employees in OECD countries.⁶⁷ The Korean government has been serious in reducing the long working culture, which is reflected through Marie's narrative. Marie, who worked as an IT specialist, stated how her workplace was committed to achieving balance between work and personal life.

The regulation states that workers are only allowed to work a maximum of 52 or 55 hours per week. I forget the exact maximum number of hours. The work-life balance, if I am not mistaken, was legislated by the Korean government in 2018, but I am not sure. The government demanded that all companies follow the new regulation. Companies who are not in compliance with the law will be fined and my workplace takes necessary steps to observe the regulation. In the

beginning, many people did not take seriously the labour standards specified by the law. They kept working very long hours. So, the company posted the names of the people who worked more than 52 hours on the company website. They were also given a penalty. Many people were scared and they followed the regulation.

Marie's narrative illustrates that her company takes a major role in the promotion of work-life balance. Traditionally, Koreans regard long working hours as something positive for their job performance and professional career.⁶⁸

All participants understood that at certain periods they had to work beyond the regular office hours, particularly when projects were due or the company had a higher volume of workload. Yet they found the overtime was still acceptable as they did not have to overwork every day. One participant, Rudy, who worked as lecturer reflected that his workload was doable if compared to working at the university back home. In Indonesia, he explained that he faced greater challenges with day-to-day responsibilities that included teaching, administration, and research projects. Professional tasks were relatively similar between Korea and Indonesia, and yet he was burdened with administrative duties that made his workload significantly greater in Indonesia when compared to Korea.

During periods of excessive workload, it was not necessarily that the Indonesian expatriates had to stay back in the office. Some companies had regulations for overtime pay, which encouraged them to do the extra work in the office. Other business enterprises that did not recognize overtime pay offered flexible work options. Employees were free to choose whether they wanted to spend extra hours after work in the office or bring the work home. Such a mechanism provides the employees an opportunity to independently manage their time and thereby create a culture supportive of work-life balance.

Hoesik Culture

Hoesik (company dining out) practice has been identified as one of the work-life imbalances about which foreign employees have been complaining.⁶⁹ It involves both dining and drinking at different bars. Sponsored by the company, the *hoesik* practice is an important workplace culture for Korean organizations.⁷⁰ It provides a platform for employees to develop solidarity and maintain social relationships since business enterprises are perceived as an extension of family institutions.⁷¹

Hoesik practice also helps to break the coldness of the working environment among the employees. It is the place where employees have a chance to socialize, share valuable information, and even articulate whatever he or she wishes while relaxing beyond the workplace setting.⁷² The Korean workplace landscape, based on the participants' narratives, can be best described as a high level of power

distance, seriousness, and alienation. Linda, a BA holder who could speak Korean fluently, shared her observation of the Korean workplace that she encountered:

In Indonesia, the workplace is a place where we can work and make friends. Sometimes, we can even joke around with our boss. Here, the relationships are very rigid. Very formal. I do not talk a lot in the office, because my Korean officemates are also not chatty. We just completely stay quiet for the whole day except just saying *annyeong haseyo* when we meet in the morning or simply smiling. They behave like that not because they do not like foreigners or me personally but rather, it is naturally their character. Koreans do not develop relationships with someone that they perceive has no direct connection with their job roles, despite that we shared the space together. We meet everyday; we may sit next to each other, but our interaction is formal and superficial. In Indonesia, such a workplace situation would be considered weird. Regardless of our job roles, we may chat and perhaps nurture our relationship into friendship. (Linda, female, recruiting foreign talent)

Similarly, Marie shared her cultural encounter once she was transferred from the Jakarta-based Korean company. She found a dramatic cultural contrast between Jakarta and Seoul daily working life. She said that the working style of Indonesians was more relaxed, which brought more human interaction, compared to the Korean style of working. Her morning routine started with having breakfast and drinking coffee, engaging in conversation with co-workers, sharing gossip, or just random talking. This was followed with day-to-day tasks on the job.

Here in Korea, people are heavily preoccupied with their job tasks. They come to work. That's it. They rarely talk to each other. Just work, work, and work. My office room is super quiet. I can even hear the sound of people typing. I felt lonely and isolated despite sharing my office space with other IT-ers. In the beginning of my employment in Korea, I used earphones, since I found the office vibe was too serious. I felt headaches whenever I heard people talking in Korean and my Korean was still pretty basic at that time. We work as support for IT systems so sometimes clients often call us to fix their IT issues. Yet, my style of using earphones was perceived negatively. My IT team people said wearing earphones while working showed that I was not serious with my work. It was not only about seriousness but also about being impolite by using earphones. While working, I should concentrate and give my full attention. Back in Indonesia, using earphones was not an issue. (Marie, female, clothing industry)

Linda's and Marie's narratives demonstrate that Korean working life involves a high level of absorption that led to limited interaction among the employees during office hours. Their depiction of the Korean workplaces is also commonly expressed by other participants. One participant, Atib, had experienced an even worse workplace before he landed his job in a digital animation company. He

explained that his previous workplace was horrible, since people were working during deadlines. He felt like a machine. Interaction in the workplace was limited as people only talked when necessary. There was no meaningful conversation nor deeper connection with co-workers. The everyday working life created a feeling of tension, stressfulness, and anxiety. The *hoesik* practice, according to the Indonesian participants, provides opportunities to develop closer relationships with colleagues.

Based on the narratives of Indonesian expatriates, the *hoesik* practices were not organized frequently but rather occasionally. Usually when they had just completed a project or during the year end, *hoesik* practices were a small celebration for a team's achievement. They said that their workplaces were not the type for organizing *hoesik* quite often and thus, most of them felt acceptable with a once-in-a-while get together for dining. For the Muslim participants, they usually joined the dinner and expressed their concern regarding food restrictions. They usually ordered non-pork meals as halal food was not widely known among the general Korean society. Halal food consumption was not practical for the Muslim participants, because they needed to negotiate with the given situation where halal-certified restaurants or halal-friendly restaurants were still limited. In addition, pork was the most popular meat, which meant that many Koreans people loved to eat it. Due to its affordability, nearly all restaurants in the country provided a culinary experience that included various elements of pig meat. To find eateries that only provided non-pork cuisine was arduous, so most of the time, the Muslim participants just chose any meal that had no pork or pork-related ingredients. For Koreans, seeing their Indonesian colleagues abstain from pork cuisine was compelling. Yet, the Koreans respected such dietary restrictions and did not push them to eat pork in order to experience authentic Korean cuisine.

The abstinence from pork-related products also applied to alcohol as *hoesik* entails liquor or beer consumption. For the Muslim participants, many of them would just leave and return home after dining together. Yet, some could not avoid alcohol. Talitha, who worked in medical aesthetics, could not avoid the drinking sessions. She had to join even though she was uncomfortable. Her reluctance not only derived from religious prohibition but also the atmosphere and interaction in the drinking sessions. Abstaining from alcohol was acceptable for her Korean supervisors. However, during drinking sessions, she was expected to pour alcohol for her superiors, sit intimately among them, and flirt with them. She found such socialization demoralized her as a Muslim and as a woman. She did not like the way they treated her as if she was a prostitute.

Despite the fact that she had been willing to attend the *hoesik* activities, her refusal to behave as they desired far outweighed her intention to adapt to the

organizational culture. The *hoesik* practice was the most devastating, which drove her to quit the job as soon as she completed her project. At this time, she just had to survive and compensate by performing well.

Talitha's narrative confirms the report issued by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family indicating that workplace sexual harassment often happened in the after-business hours (*hoesik*).⁷³ Women are likely to be more vulnerable to gender discrimination and sexual assault in the workplace due to a lack of legal enforcement and the strong acceptance of such cultural traditions. Like the Japanese women in the studies conducted by Villa and Freiner, working women in Korea are perceived as individuals who are not capable of delivering the job well, since their presence is simply for the purpose of entertaining males.⁷⁴ While evidence from the Confucian canon show that women are as capable as men, the continued stories of sexual harassment or gender discrimination experienced by women in the Korean workplace has helped to perpetuate a patriarchal image of Confucianism.⁷⁵

Hierarchy

Job titles present in every organization demonstrates where one's role and responsibilities sit within its structure. An entry-level individual may know his or her position in the organization and to whom she or he has to report. In the Korean context, a job title also generates a strong hierarchical interpersonal relationship where a subordinate has to be mindful of his or her performance as well as behaviors against the colleagues who are even slightly higher rank. A job title functions as a way of addressing each other as individuals. People do not refer to their colleagues or superiors by their first name. This applies to both in-person and written communication. In the Indonesian context, hierarchical workplace culture also exists where everyone should display a degree of respect, especially to those who are in power, but there are differences with Korea. The use of gender honorific forms such as *Bapak* (Mr.), *Ibu* (Mrs.), *Mas* (elder man), and *Mba* (elder woman) is an example of displaying respect for job hierarchy and seniority, but job titles in Indonesian organizations are barely used.

For the Indonesian expatriate participants, the use of formal address terms by job titles was curious, despite the fact that they shared similar concepts of politeness and respect for job positions and organizational practices. In the Korean workplace, job titles such as *sawŏn* 사원 (regular staff), *chuiim* 주임 (manager), *taeri* 대리 (assistant manager), *kwajang* 과장 (section chief), *ch'ajang* 차장 (deputy head of department), *pujang* 부장 (department head), and others were not only an expression of organizational structure but also a cultural practice. Job hierarchy

governs which speech styles are used to convey politeness, respect, power distance, and degree of relationship. The Indonesian expatriates who spoke Korean were aware of such practices and certainly followed the social conventions. They had to memorize the name of the person as well as his or her title, a display of courteous behavior in the Korean context. Those who did not speak the language were relatively freed from the hierarchical working culture.

However, several participants stated that their workplaces started to adopt an egalitarian way of addressing people, an influence of Western norms. The job title was removed and personal names were used. Nevertheless, the practice was not easy and was adapted to Koreans customs. The Koreans felt awkward, especially when addressing superiors. In Korean culture, the usage of given names is only applicable for people who are in the same age and have a close relationship, or given names are used by an older person to address a younger person. This practice was similar to Indonesian working culture. To overcome these cultural hurdles, the Koreans adopted Western names or used their three syllable names as their given names, which created an impersonal and sense of distance from Korean culture. The novel form was effective to mitigate feelings of impoliteness, embarrassment, and rudeness.

The notion of hierarchy was also reflected in the decision-making process in which some participants often felt frustrated with the mechanism. One participant expressed that his feedback to improve the company performance was often overlooked merely because he was at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. Another participant said that her workplace was eager to receive criticism from all levels of employees; however, the process was time-consuming. Business meetings were set to gather employees from the same rank, and yet the meeting's outcome was often annulled at a higher management level. She believed that if the meeting practices were aimed to bring together all the stakeholders, the meeting would be effective and productive. Other workplaces gradually moved to adopt global standard practices by promoting egalitarian values. Business meeting practices were organized to pull together the best ideas and solutions for the organization. Hierarchical relationships in the meeting were observed but not as strictly so that all employees were free to raise their thoughts on the decision making of the senior management.

Celebrating cultural difference: "the joy of being a foreigner"

Generally, all the Indonesian participants have relatively adjusted well to the Korean working environment. Indonesia and Korea share similar values and

norms, such as respecting elder people, collectivism, and politeness, yet those behaviors that are deemed as disrespect, impolite, and individualistic can be different between Korea and Indonesia. One participant, Andrew, who worked in broadcasting was once shocked when he was given change with the left hand in a mini market. While Korean and Western culture may consider such behavior as normal, Indonesian people deemed it rude and impolite.

Several participants with whom I talked had gone through more stressful phases which led to depression. They reflected that their professional life was much better compared to student life, particularly when they were studying in a Korean university. Physically and mentally exhausted, they suffered from a lack of sleep as they had to struggle with the heavy academic load and high demanding supervisors. One of them had even nearly decided to quit his study, because he could not endure the amount of stress and desperation. Once they completed their studies and secured jobs, these expatriates felt that they had more time to enjoy life.

As time progressed, the Indonesian expatriates became more culturally competent. They followed the rhythm of Korean work-life culture and learned which behaviors were appropriate and inappropriate for certain cultural contexts. Their acquisition of culturally appropriate behaviors was shaped through a series of experiences that entailed observation and reflection. They observed which behaviors were deemed culturally conflicting between Indonesia and Korea and developed more tolerance and empathy to the differences. They adapted or renegotiated when necessary. Cultural mistakes and misunderstandings often happened and observation of Korean cultural norms was sometimes not sufficient, because deep cultural differences were not easy to spot.⁷⁶ The participants often had to learn the hard way when inappropriate behaviors were corrected by their Korean colleagues. Yet, they reflected that the Korean people were more tolerant of the foreigners even if they were culturally inappropriate, which demonstrated that the success of cross-cultural adjustment was also supported by the flexibility and tolerance of the locals.

The Indonesian expatriates have been undergoing cultural transition, recognizing the similarities and differences between Korean and Indonesian cultures and successfully blend both cultures. Writing on migrants' mode of incorporation, Tambiah notes that as migrants integrate successfully in terms of economic circumstances and education, their cultural and religious distinctiveness are asserted and celebrated.⁷⁷ Markers of difference become more visible and the Indonesian expatriates learned how to appreciate the local culture and navigate through cultural terrain. They became more flexible in their adaptation to the local culture

and simultaneously understood when they have to detach from Korean cultural demands.

During my fieldwork, I was struck with the remarks from the participants saying how lucky they were as foreigners or Indonesians. They reflected that the Koreans have been more tolerant toward them compared to how the Koreans treat their fellows in regards to working culture. Studies have reported that many Korean employees have been the victims of workplace bullying, a result of a strong hierarchical system and a highly collectivized society.⁷⁸ Several participants have noticed that many Korean co-workers often cried in the office restroom indicating the struggle to bear such harsh treatment. In the following, Linda shared her experience stressing the privilege of being non-Korean:

One day, I received an email. The email was in the Korean language. In that email, actually my boss felt annoyed and he used very rude words. I did not understand it until my supervisor explained it. I could not sense his anger and rudeness. I could not notice the difference when someone displayed anger through writing. Korean is not my first language, so I did not speak and write naturally like the Koreans. However, on the bright side, I was glad I could not pick up the sense. If I were a Korean, I would be even more stressed. (Linda, female, recruiting foreign talent)

Linda's narrative helps us to understand that at a certain point she embraced her foreignness, which had helped her not to sense the rudeness. She could relax and move on with her job responsibilities. Other Indonesian participants also demonstrated foreign practices that helped them to be freed from cultural pressures and wrongdoings. For example, accounts such as the work-life balance practice that had been supported by the companies often became less relevant as the Korean employees still perpetuated the ideal type of working long hours. For the Indonesian participants, they could understand why these Korean co-workers behaved the way they did. At the same time, the Indonesian expatriates did not feel obliged to behave in the same way as the Koreans. When I further probed them whether they would be perceived as disloyal, they did not agree with such a view. For them, as long as they could perform well, the perception that they were disloyal would be ruled out. Staying late without doing any work was even worse, especially if it was only to convey the image of loyalty. This raises the importance of the sense of foreignness that contributes to the Indonesian expatriates' smooth adjustment to work. The Indonesian expatriates asserted a boundary of self as non-Koreans which supported them to reconcile various cultural norms and assessed which behaviors were acceptable for certain cultural settings. For them, the sense of foreignness became a source of comfort in workplace cultural conflicts. Their sense of foreignness helped them to harmonize superior and

subordinate relations and develop positive cross-cultural adjustments, despite many of the expatriate studies portraying foreignness in negative terms such as exclusion and feelings of isolation. The notion of foreignness opens a new possibility to interpret the unknown social cues and moderates unpleasant cultural experiences or cultural workplace conflict. The Korean colleagues, however, were unable to avoid such protocols. As much as they envied their foreign co-workers, they felt trapped by social convention and were left with no choice except to submit to their home culture for fear of repercussion and social pressure. As the Indonesian expatriates reported, the Koreans had more cultural barriers to reset norms and conventions, which had been practiced for a long time.

Using Bennet's framework, the Indonesian expatriates developed an adaptation stage where their experiences of cultural differences do not aim to transform them into Koreans and discard their cultural background. Rather, the adaptation process increases their cultural awareness and entails negotiation of behavioral changes. They became experts in navigating a world that is different from them, in accepting various cultural worldviews, and in reconciling them and performing their jobs. Kim argues that the Indonesian participants have acquired an intercultural skill that is "open-ended, adaptive and transformative self-orientation."⁷⁹

Conclusion

The experiences of the Indonesian expatriates presented here provide insight into and nuances on the cross-cultural adjustment process. Drawing upon Bennet's model, this study contributes to the cross-cultural adjustment scholarship, particularly in dealing and negotiating across cultural boundaries. It offers more than just an assessment of cross-cultural adjustment's success or failure, and takes account of the sensitivity of cultural differences, the acquisition of culturally appropriate behavior, and the strategy for work adjustment. The experiences of the Indonesian expatriates show that their cultural adjustment has been developed through continuous encounters, deep observation of cultural conventions, and self-reflection on cultural contexts as well as meanings. Their ability to shift between different cultural norms and practices reveals an ethnorelative stage where they may conform to the dominant cultural worldviews without losing their own.⁸⁰ Developing a sense of foreignness becomes experientially significant in the ethnorelative stage and is a means for celebration of cultural diversity. Foreignness appeared to be related to an understanding of home and host culture and created a more positive attitude when encountering cultural differences.

As cultural adjustment is closely linked to the expatriates' country of origin, this study hopes to develop an initial understanding of cultural adjustment practices as it focuses on a single cultural property.⁸¹ Particularly, the launch of the new "Southern Policy" by the South Korean government to build closer relationships with countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the increasing number of ASEAN students in South Korean higher education institutions may boost the opportunities for expatriates coming from Southeast Asia to work in South Korea. Considering that the sample size of this study is small, the result and implications may not reflect general trends across the Korean peninsula. Future studies may benefit by focusing on the relationship between the notion of foreignness and cultural adjustment that serves as both advantage and disadvantage.

Notes

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A Comparative Synthesis of American and Korean Parricidal Mass Murders¹

PHILLIP SHON Professor, Ontario Tech University

Abstract

Contemporary studies of mass murder have examined attacks carried out by current or former students in educational settings or disgruntled employees at former places of work. Recently conceptualized as “active shooter events,” this type of public mass killing has eclipsed the most pervasive one throughout the twentieth century: mass killings within the family. The dearth of scholarly work on mass killings in the context of parricides in other national and cultural contexts is notable given the salience of family killings in the homicide literature. Using previously published findings on parricides in nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Korea, this paper provides a comparative synthesis of parricidal mass murders—mass killings that occur during the course of parricides. Notable points of convergence and divergence are discussed relative to culture and offense characteristics.

Keywords: parricide, mass murder, parricidal mass murder, Korean homicide, family killing

Introduction

Parricide is defined as the killing of parents and stepparents by biological or step-offspring in the United States and elsewhere in the West,² while it is defined in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”) as the killing of superordinate relatives such as

parents, parents-in-law, grandparents, aunts, and uncles by subordinate relatives within the family, such as offspring, nephews, and nieces.³ Mass murder is defined as the killing of three or more victims in one incident and time period.⁴ A combination of the two offenses into a single category constitutes one of the rarest classes of murder to date. There are good reasons to examine this atypical form of homicide in a cross-cultural comparative context.

Mass murder has been discussed primarily as an extension of intimate partner violence in the family, carried out by despondent heads-of-household who kill their family members for putatively altruistic reasons;⁵ killings perpetrated by adolescents who have been victims of bullying in schools;⁶ or disgruntled employees who carry out revenge attacks against co-workers and supervisors.⁷ Although some have noted the occurrence of mass killings that transpire in the course of extended parricides, typically carried out by angry young men who target one or both parents,⁸ this explanation only reifies the adolescent pathologies related to parricide and overlooks the adult character and its variegated sources of conflict.⁹

There is a cultural reason why an examination of mass killings that occur in the context of parricide is warranted. Previous works have noted that firearms tend to be commonly used in mass murders. That guns are used in a significant portion of mass killings illustrates the salience of firearms in the US, a tacit acknowledgement of the role of guns in the production of mass casualty incidents in a country where gun ownership is prevalent and encoded in its national laws. It makes intuitive sense to deploy guns against multiple victims in a single incident as the lethality of such attacks is facilitated by rapid gunfire. However, the prevalence of firearms in one cultural context is an accidental character of history and cannot be adduced as a final cause of violence.¹⁰ This blindly accepted assumption about the import of guns cannot be extended to all national and historical contexts. In most countries across the world, access to guns is heavily regulated and restricted. Consequently, ordinary citizens do not have access to lethal weapons that are liable to produce mass casualty incidents. For example, recent work on homicides in Korea suggests that knives, hammers, and rope are used in 75% of killings, not guns.¹¹ This pattern is applicable to parricides as well, for a study of Korean parricides found that over 75% of parricides was committed with non-guns.¹² How mass killings are organized given the absence of firearms in Korea warrants an examination in its own right.

An examination of parricidal mass murder—mass killings that originate during the course of parricides—in American and Korean contexts is also important as the factors that are deemed to be responsible for the high rates of violence in the US, such as the prevalence of guns, violent culture,¹³ and cultural ideologies that celebrate self-interest and individualism, are not applicable to Korea. In fact, the opposite is true. Numerous scholars have noted the protective factors

against violence that belief systems such as Confucianism provide. For instance, Korean society is highly stratified and hierarchical; it is an ideological system that confers status and right to age.¹⁴ This obedience is embodied in cultural practices such as filial piety that necessitate the use of honorifics in linguistic behavior toward elders and in worship of one's deceased ancestors.¹⁵ According to Kim and Park "morality and virtue must be reflected in a person's behavior and actions" in Confucianism.¹⁶ Such moral and social constraints should militate against violence against superordinate elders as parricide is considered one of the most heinous crimes according to Confucian ideology and treated harshly in Korean law.¹⁷ Violence that is directed against multiple elders in one setting ought to be even rarer. Consequently, a comparison of the two national contexts in different temporal periods using an atypical offense category provides an unusually titillating opportunity to compare the social and cultural factors that shape the atypical homicide in both countries.

This paper asks the following research questions: how are parricidal mass murders similar to and different from one another across two national and temporal contexts? Such an examination is important as the offense characteristics of parricidal mass murders in Korea may illuminate previously overlooked variables that are significant in the commission of the offense. Given the absence of guns in Korean society, how might the mass killings that occur during the course of parricides be explained? Moreover, how might such findings be interpreted against the plethora of research on mass murder that has emerged from the US that imputes the victim counts to high-capacity magazines and bullet caliber? An examination of mass murders that occur in the course of parricides provides an opportunity to answer such questions. This paper synthesizes the extant literature on mass murder as a way of answering the preceding questions.

This paper draws on two published studies of parricide—US (1847–99) and Korea (1948–63)—and a methodological study of the validity of archival data. The three previous studies used an identical coding scheme to classify and categorize the offense characteristics in parricides.¹⁸ Although a study of American mass murder was completed for a prior study,¹⁹ a similar analysis has not been conducted using the Korean data. One reason that a separate analysis of Korean data has not been conducted is the sheer rarity of parricidal mass murders in a Korean context. Consequently, this paper analyzes Korean cases of parricidal mass murder by foregrounding the similarities in the offense characteristics related to the analysis of past mass murder incidents, such as weapons used, intent, and the dynamics of the incidents themselves. I argue that parricidal mass murders reflect a unique form of contagious violence within the family that involve different actors and offense characteristics that are socio-culturally shaped.

Review of the literature

Mass murders have recently been conceptualized as active shooter events that occur within confined spaces,²⁰ carried out by aggrieved individuals who execute the attack in public spaces or former places of work against those who have wronged them in actual or perceived ways.²¹ While previous research has shown that mass killers transform their actual and perceived grievance against the world and against certain institutions into righteous anger in public settings,²² the modal mass killing in the twentieth century involved fathers who killed their wives and children at home.²³

Mass murderers were once characterized as people who “go berserk,” “run amok,” or “go postal.”²⁴ Recent works, however, suggest that mass murderers share parallels to assassins and terrorists in that they plan their actions in advance, leak their intentions to others, and draw their inspiration from previous killers who have achieved notoriety through their publicized killings.²⁵ While it has been found that terrorists and mass murderers have a record of prior contact with mental health providers and the police, they are not considered people with a history of violence.²⁶ Instead, they tend to be individuals who, in a “downward spiral” in their lives amidst various precipitating crises, view killing as an adaptive problem-solving strategy.²⁷ Mass killers tend to be persons who become “unglued” from society and lose their tenuous grip on social life.

One offense characteristic that has been consistently found in previous research is the weapons that are used in the attack, and the cultural factors that facilitate their usage. For example, several researchers have noted that mass killings occur in cultures that celebrate hypermasculinity and warrior ethos.²⁸ Some have shown that prosocial attitudes toward guns are learned from offenders’ fathers.²⁹ The offenders also tend to be avid consumers of violent media, immersing themselves in books and films that glamorize killing and the killers;³⁰ media products such as *Rambo*, *Taxi Driver*, *Basketball Diaries*, and *The Turner Diaries* have been purported to be sources of inspiration for mass killers.³¹ Others have noted that mass killers have a near obsessive fascination with guns, encapsulated in one of the central typologies of mass murderers—the pseudo-commando.³² Guns are significant because they tend to be the principal weapons that are used in mass murders.³³ For example, Petee and Padgett’s (1999) study of 106 mass murder incidents found that 88% of the killings were carried out with firearms.³⁴ Similarly, Lankford’s (2016) study of 308 mass killers found that 76% of the offenders had used guns in their offenses.³⁵

While some have advocated a complete ban on assault weapons as a way of reducing gun violence, others have pushed for insurance and taxation as a

violence reduction strategy;³⁶ these proposed changes have shown modestly positive results.³⁷ Such bans and zero-tolerance policies have been argued to be ineffective, especially in the US,³⁸ given that close to 90% of mass killers obtained their guns in legal ways.³⁹ That the mass killers procure their weapons in lawful ways should not be surprising, for they do not see themselves as criminals. Rather, their actions are the logical extensions of those who see themselves as victims of injustice; if viewed with such assumptions in place, then the actions of mass murderers can be seen as behaviors that are intended to administer justice for wrongs experienced.

Limitations in the Previous Literature

Despite advances made in the study of mass murder, previous works contain several shortcomings. One, the literature continues to frame mass murder as public killings motivated by revenge or altruism in the context of family killings carried out by male heads-of-household. It neglects to include mass killings that originate from the bottom up (i.e., offspring to parent), analyzing them as objects of inquiry in their own right. Two, while violent movies, music, and books have been reported to be sources of inspiration for mass killers, a form of mimesis that leads to imitation, such preceding factors would not have been implicative in nineteenth-century America or mid-twentieth-century Korea. What other factors might be related to mass killings that occur in the context of parricides? Three, although guns have been significant correlates of parricides and mass murder in nineteenth- and twentieth-century US, such findings are not applicable to Korea since access to guns was and is severely limited. How might mass killing of family members in the context of parricides be organized given the absence of guns in Korea? Finally, given that recent mass killings have been attributed to bullied students who kill their peers in educational settings, disgruntled employees who target coworkers, or despondent husbands who kill their families, how might mass killings that occur in the context of ascending violence directed at superordinate elders be explained? These shortcomings warrant a comparative synthesis of parricidal mass murders in America and Korea.

Sources of archival data and synthesis

The current paper draws upon three prior studies of parricide in two different countries and three different time periods for synthesis. Due to space limitations, additional details about the research site, data collection process, and validation procedures have been omitted as they have been described in an

earlier publication.⁴⁰ For both American and Korean studies of parricide, cases were included as mass murder if an offender attempted or successfully killed three or more victims in one time period. Although there is variation in the number of victims that have to be killed in order to be defined as an incidence of mass murder, from two⁴¹ to four,⁴² three has been the most widely accepted definition of mass murder that previous researchers have used.⁴³ In addition to the victim count, intent was compared because the contexts in which parricides arose were tied to the way the crime originated. Hence a parricide was coded as being (1) “premeditated” if the offender planned the crime in advance; (2) “spontaneous” if the parricide was not planned; (3) “accidental” if the killing was an unfortunate accident; (4) “hit” if the offender used a hitman to carry out the attack; and (5) “unknown” if intent could not be discerned. The amount of detailed information collected was explained by the coverage a particular case received. For instance, parricides that contained bizarre details generated tremendous news coverage. Parricides that involved the mentally ill received a paragraph at best.

Nineteenth-century American parricides were similar to homicides and parricides in the twentieth century in that the vast majority of offenders and victims were also men. Out of the 231 incidents of parricide, only ten incidents (4%) met the inclusion criteria. In the Korean parricide study, most of the victims and offenders were also men, and five incidents (5%) met the inclusion criteria out of the 92 parricide incidents. Mass killings which originated out of parricides thus represented a relatively minor portion of all parricides in both national contexts.

American parricidal mass murders had a matricidal bent in that such cases generally originated during the course of matricides, which then turned into mass killings. Korean parricidal mass murders almost exclusively began as patricides, which then morphed into mass killings of family members and others who were present at the scene. In the following sections, a synthesis of the notable offense characteristics related to American and Korean parricidal mass murders are examined in greater narrative detail. Excerpts that best illustrate the analytical category being discussed are proffered as examples.

The situational emergence of parricidal mass murder

One of the notable characteristics of nineteenth-century American parricidal mass murder is its spontaneous character. This body of work demonstrates that mass killings within the context of family homicides could also be understood as post-offense behaviors that are extensions of the on-going situational violence.⁴⁴ Parricidal mass killings began and unfolded during the course of a frenzied attack on the principal disputant, attacks that usually began during social intercourse.

Consider the following account of one of the most atypical scenes of violence in the nineteenth-century America:

Excerpt 1 (July 1899)

The Chicago Tribune reported that “hot words were exchanged during the morning between Mrs. Foss and her daughter, and Treider also became involved in the discussion.” Mrs. Treider and her mother, Mrs. Foss, argued over “long-standing family troubles” regularly, and the morning of the murder was no different. According to the *Tribune*, the quarrel began anew after dinner. Mrs. Treider “stepped into the bedroom and appearing immediately with a revolver, opened fire on her mother. The first shot was fatal, and the husband, springing forward to disarm his wife, received three wounds that sent him from the house in retreat. After leaving the house he heard two more shots, the ones that killed his wife.” The husband lived but the two women did not.

There are notable offense-related characteristics in excerpt 1. There is a well-established history of domestic discord between the victim and the offender, discord that is rooted in the past which is resurrected on the day of the killing. Whether the dispute is related to long-rooted tension or anger that emerges endogenously from drunken arguments,⁴⁵ it is this long-standing domestic difficulty that rekindles during a household event as one disputant escalates the encounter. Although we do not know who started the argument, we are told that the offender momentarily walks away from the scene to fetch her weapons to deploy it against the principal target; the attack on the principal disputant turns this homicide into a matricide. The attacker then turns the gun on her husband, but only after he injects himself into the fray; this attempted disarmament leads to him being shot. That Mr. Treider (husband) survives is solely a matter of luck, for others who received far less serious wounds succumbed to their deaths.⁴⁶ The attacker kills herself after the two targeted shootings, turning the matricide and attempted domestic homicide into a mass killing. That the offender is a woman also made this parricidal mass murder one of the most unusual and rare incidents of parricide in nineteenth-century America.

The situationally emergent nature of parricidal mass killings in Korea is also evident, for the mass killing of family members emerged from the ongoing violence and spread across relations. Consider the following:

Excerpt 2 (June 1957)

Kang Dae-song (33) and Eoh Sang-geum (25) were married, but due to financial difficulties, Kang had to work away from home. Eoh and Kang’s mother, Hwhang Bok-deuk (78) lived together. Kang returned from work and accused his wife of having an affair with another man, and stabbed her to death. He then blamed his mother for not watching over his wife and stabbed her to death. He also stabbed his father-in-law in the head who was sleeping in the next room.

In excerpt 2, there are several offense characteristics that shape the scene of parricidal mass murder in ways that the cultural fingerprints are inscribed onto the incident characteristics. First is the multigenerational character of the household. Several generations are gathered under one roof, even the in-laws. Such living arrangements were common in mid-twentieth-century Korea due to patrilocal marriage customs. That the husband is absent from the household is indicative of the employment patterns brought about by the industrial economy as men found work in urban centers.⁴⁷ Second is its similarity to American mass killings in that it begins as an unplanned event. Excerpt 2 begins as a domestic argument between two spouses. As prior scholars have shown, sexual jealousy and proprietariness lead to violence that cuts both ways as men and women kill one another in the context of intimate partner disputes.⁴⁸ In excerpt 2, the wife is the principal target. Third is that the violence does not stop with intimate partner violence; it jumps across relations and the offender's own mother becomes the second target, thus turning a domestic homicide into a matricide. The offender's mother and father-in-law become secondary targets after the primary attack on the principal target is successfully completed.

In the two excerpts above, we can see the contagious seeds of situational violence across two distinct time periods and national boundaries. The killing of bystanders, witnesses, and other family members on the scene in the course of a primary attack against a principal disputant illustrates a feature often attributed to modern mass murders: "going berserk" and "running amok." The two excerpts also corroborate the "transactional" character of mass killings that originate from domestic squabbles and incrementally transform into mass casualty incidents, for the offense characteristics are consistent with previous language used to describe offenders who become carried away during the course of their attack, offenders whose uncontrollable violence spills over and results in unplanned violence. It also illustrates the fact that the situational dynamics of parricidal mass murders may be influenced by the seductive and contagious character of violence in general.⁴⁹

That is, assaults and killings carry a momentum of their own, enticing the aggressor into the aural and sensuous dialectics of physical violence that highlights the significance of foreground variables. Although sources of the conflict that ignited the argument differed; although the primary targets that were selected for the initial attack diverged; and although the weapons that were used to execute the killings varied, parricidal mass killings in America and Korea culminated with the deaths of multiple victims in one setting in ways that emanated from the on-going mundane violence in the home. That a higher percentage of in-laws appeared as victims in Korean parricides overall illustrates how patrilocal marriage patterns

amplified an entirely different category of victims in scenes of parricidal mass murders in ways that diverged from the ones noted in the West.

The banal roots of parricidal mass murder

Familicides—killing of family members—were equally likely to begin spontaneously or as premeditated criminal events in American and Korean contexts. Spontaneous mass killings of family members carried out by sons occurred in the home, and similar to typical homicides, began as an argument with another family member which then escalated into a physical confrontation. The reasons that ignited the arguments, then fights, are best described as sources of conflict. The sources that led to conflicts in parricides were usually related to trivial arguments, finances, or discipline and abuse that morphed into killings.⁵⁰ Mass murders that transpired within the family sprung from this source of conflict, in similar ways to prototypical homicide incidents. Consider the following parricide-turned-mass murder in America:

Excerpt 3 (January, 1893)

On January, 1893 the *New York Times* reported that Thomas Rodgers shot both parents and his sister. The incident began after a meal, when Thomas's father "reprimanded him for his laziness, declaring he must work. Thomas answered 'you can't put me out' and going up stairs secured his brother-in-law's revolver." Thomas's sister and mother witnessed that Thomas had secured a gun and attempted to save the senior Rodgers, but Thomas pushed them aside and pumped two rounds into his father at close range. One struck him in the thigh; the other his heart. Thomas then kicked his fallen father in the face. The mother attempted to flee the scene through the back door only to be shot in the back; the sister made it out to the front door and onto the street, but Thomas stood by the front door and shot his sister in the shoulder as she was running. He then fled the scene, and barricaded himself in the Alderman's office, only to be arrested later.

One of the recurrent offense characteristics that emerged from a prior examination of American parricidal mass murders was that they often originated during the course of arguments, which then turned into fights, fights that ended when a lesser drunk disputant fired the more accurate shot. As criminologists have shown, homicides originate as banal arguments that transform into unpremeditated killings.⁵¹ Excerpt 3 is no exception. Thomas Rodgers kills both parents and shoots his sister as the initial verbal argument escalates into a physical altercation and ends in a fatal assault. In countless cases, those who survived the attack related that the attackers killed in a state of frenzy, even those who just happened to be

on the scene. Consider how typical conflicts that emerged in family life led to spectacular acts of violence in Korea:

Excerpt 4 (June 1963)

Pastor Lee Han-goo (33) and Deacon Lee Bo-bae (43) of Chun Ahn City Methodist Church were visiting the home of Kim Chung (age unknown) for a prayer service. After the prayer meeting was finished, Kim Chung, his concubine, Do Go-soon (38), Pastor Lee and Deacon Lee were sitting and chatting when Kim Jung-soo (28), Kim Chung's son, stabbed the elder Kim multiple times and his concubine six times who subsequently died from her wounds. Kim then stabbed Pastor Lee and Deacon Lee, both of whom received critical wounds and were transported to the hospital. He then followed his eleven-year old stepbrother who was hiding in fear and stabbed him in the abdomen and shoulder. He then stabbed himself in a suicide attempt. According to neighbors, Kim was angry that his father had lived a lavish and extravagant lifestyle while neglecting him.

In America and Korea, offspring killed their parents during trivial arguments as one of the disputants escalated the verbal fight into a physical one. Criminologists have shown that almost anything can be interpreted as an affront—a glance, burnt dinner, or unkempt house—which then becomes detritus for an assault.⁵² American and Korean sons and parents also argued with one another over trivial matters; in America and Korea, adult offspring constructed elaborate ploys to defraud their parents of estates and insurance money.⁵³ One key difference that emerged between American and Korean parricides, however, centered around the notion of abuse.

In an American context, abuse was physical punishment that adolescents interpreted to be excessive and killed their parents in revenge-motivated, premeditated attacks; in a Korean context, however, abuse was embodied in two forms: in the first, it was directed against daughters-in-law who were criticized for being lousy household managers, usually by their mothers-in-law, which erupted into argument-turned-parricides.⁵⁴ In the second, sons killed their fathers in scenes of chastisement as fathers denigrated the status of their adult sons, and they killed in response to the ontological debasement that such verbal berating brought about. Adult sons who lived profligate lives exhorted more allowance money from their fathers, to spend on alcohol and gambling; this cultural characteristic was facilitated by the special place sons occupied in Korean households, as the family lineage and estate was traced through male heirs, especially eldest sons. Sons who felt entitled to a lavish lifestyle often demanded continued special treatment, and when they were not accorded such accommodation, they behaved in ways similar to offspring who felt maltreated and neglected by their parents: they forcibly took what they thought was theirs.

Korean sons who remained in the home and received allowances from their parents even as adults bore a striking similarity to life-course persistent offenders who killed their parents at the apex of their offense trajectory.⁵⁵ That is because those who are pampered by their parents seek its continuance and demand special treatment while those who perceive themselves to have been neglected and abused demand compensation for their suffering. The psychology of criminality thus converges on offenders who feel entitled to special treatment, from those who are indulged and those who are neglected by their parents. Korean sons who demanded more allowances than they were allotted and killed to procure it for profligate ends mirrored this antisocial personality structure that has been well noted in the criminal psychology literature.⁵⁶

It is this source of conflict in the preceding parricide that has to be taken into account in order to make sense of the parricidal mass killings in America and Korea. Sons who felt left out of their fathers' inheritances and spending money felt aggrieved and felt as if they had been denied what was rightfully theirs. The sequence of attack in excerpt 4 is significant for he targets his father and his concubine first; then he attacks the witnesses and audience at the scene, the pastor and the deacon. In an American context, continuity of violence occurred in numerous ways: as violence that was directed at the principal target in the form of overkill—use of force that is more than necessary to kill a target; as violence that was directed at others on the scene in post-parricidal mass murder; and as violence that was ultimately turned on oneself.⁵⁷ Parricides in America and Korea were mundane events that bloomed out of the dross of social life, irrelevant to the intrapsychic battles that Freud hypothesized them to be. If the conflicts that led to parricides and parricides that turned into mass murder were rooted in humdrum quotidian conflicts, one of the key variables that shaped the outcome of parricidal mass murders was the weapons that were deployed in the killings. There, the cultural differences became unmistakable.

Victim behavior and weapons usage

Guns were the most commonly used weapons in homicides and parricides throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in America.⁵⁸ They were used in American homicides and parricides because almost everybody had them; but just as importantly, using guns was a culturally accepted and normative way of resolving disputes in the US across social and gender relations.⁵⁹ The surprising point is that guns were used in Korean parricides as well. Consider the following:

Excerpt 5 (January 9, 1960)

Army Captain Lee Dong-duk (30) was home on leave. He had been raised by his uncle, Lee Hee-cheol (56), and his wife, Lee Soon-yi (60), after his parents had passed away. While he was home, he had a “difference of opinion” that led to an argument with his two of his uncles—Lee Hee-cheol and Lee Sun-goo (46)—about a family matter. He went out and came home drunk. He shot both of his uncles with his service pistol; he then shot his aunt in the chest after she had witnessed the shootings. Captain Lee then shot himself in a suicide attempt. The army’s criminal investigation division was contacted to conduct the inquiry.

In nineteenth-century America, guns were used in 42% of 231 parricide cases; in Korea, guns made up only 3% of 92 incidents. The origins of the guns illuminated significant cultural characteristics as well. One Korean offender crafted his own handgun from scratch after deciding to kill his parents. The remaining two cases involved soldiers who were on leave from the army, and brought their guns home with them, which they then deployed against parents and other family members. Thus, aside from the innovative gunsmithing skills of one unique individual, guns were the purview of a particular class of offenders who had access, training, and knowledge of firearm usage. In mid-twentieth-century postwar Korea, that class was made up of military personnel.⁶⁰ The use of guns in Korea thus represented a modernized form of killing, carried out by a soldier-bureaucrat who embodied its technological advancements.

The Korean parricidal mass murder in excerpt 5 closely mirrors American scenes of mass murder. The offender comes home drunk and kills other family members as a way of resolving a previous dispute. Excerpt 4 is significant because it represents the incident with the highest victim count in the Korean dataset, and involved the use of a non-gun weapon.

Targeting multiple victims is facilitated by the use of firearms which enables the killing of several people from a distance, reducing the possibility of victim resistance or bystander intervention; it also creates psychological distance which mitigates the aversion to killing as well as the guilt suffered afterwards, unlike hand-to-hand combat, stabbings, or bayonet attacks.⁶¹ The use of guns becomes a liability only during those moments when shooters have to pause and reload their weapons—the most vulnerable and susceptible point of physical interdiction from bystanders.⁶² Guns are equalizers in a sense because it allows weaker persons to kill stronger opponents without being overpowered. The use of guns is consistent with the “physical strength hypothesis,” which predicts that weaker persons (i.e., adolescents, women) will use guns to overcome structural discrepancies in strength to execute the killing.⁶³ Hence, that a woman was able to shoot two people and kill herself in America (excerpt 1) illustrates the equalizing effects of guns on violence.

Despite the presence of a gun used in parricidal mass murder in Korea, it is mass murders committed with knives and other intimate contact methods that have the potential to advance the literature as they may illuminate the dynamics of mass killings that affect the victim count in significant ways. As already noted, guns do not pose analytical challenges toward understanding the lethality of such incidents, but knives represent an analytical dilemma: how to kill multiple people when the mechanics of knife attack make it almost impossible to target several people at once. How are mass killings possible with knives and other intimate contact methods?

In excerpt 4, Kim Jung-soo (28) kills five people with a knife—the incident with the highest victim count in the Korean parricide data. The newspaper sets the context of the incident, but does not offer additional offense details. Moreover, the internal rules of access at the National Archives of Korea made it almost impossible to locate official records to explore the offense characteristics in greater detail. How might the victims have behaved while the offender was slashing, hacking, and slicing victims on the scene? Would the victim count in scenes of Korean parricidal murder be affected by non-gun weapons, and if so, how? For the answer, we may look to contemporary legal records where greater details are provided and access is possible. Consider the following details of a parricide in a recent sentencing verdict:

Excerpt 6 (August, 2012)

Seo (male, age 42) suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions of persecution. He thought that his father Mr. A (age 81) and his brother Mr. A-1 (age 56) were using rifles, machine guns, and pistols to shoot and kill innocent people as well as attempting to kill the defendant. Consequently, Seo went to an office supply store and bought several knives used for crafting. Using the yellow craft knife (blade length 15cm; overall length 18cm), he stabbed his brother in the upper neck area until the blade broke and he fell; Seo then pulled out a red craft knife (blade length 16cm; overall length 18cm) from his pocket and attacked his father who had been attempting to intervene; the blade broke again so he retrieved a pink craft knife (blade length 7cm; overall length 20cm) from a nearby drawer and continued to stab his father, but could not use it due to its short length. As a result, he went to the kitchen and grabbed a kitchen knife (blade length 17cm, overall length 30cm) and continued to attack both victims. The blade broke again, so Seo went to the kitchen and grabbed a paring knife (blade length 12cm, overall length 24cm) and stabbed both victims in the neck until both of them died.

Excerpt 6 contains notable victim behaviors that shape the parricide in significant ways. For one, it illustrates the practical exigencies that an offender faces in a knife attack. Offenders frequently cut themselves from the lack of a hand guard;⁶⁴ or

blades break when they come into contact with bones.⁶⁵ Those difficulties have to be managed by using multiple knives, as the excerpt shows, or change weapons. However, what is meaningful to the analysis is the victim's behavior. In excerpt 6, the offender is able to kill two family members because one of the victims stays on scene. He attempts to stop the offender; he does not flee. In multiple court records which were accessible, the reports detailed how victims froze on the scene as the attacker stabbed and hacked family members to death; others attempted to dash out the door, only to be stabbed from the back.

We might speculate that the victims in excerpt 4 may have attempted to stop the attacker or intervene somehow; or some of them may have attempted to flee the scene only to be overtaken by the attacker. We know that as Kim Chung's son stabbed the elder Kim and his concubine, Pastor Lee and Deacon Lee did not immediately flee the scene as evidenced by their wounds; moreover, the killer's eleven-year-old stepbrother also did not flee for he was discovered hiding in fear and subsequently attacked. How might such high victim counts be explained in Korean mass killings within the family?

As happened in American incidents of parricidal mass murder, the chaos of the scene—screaming, blood, shock—may have militated against a rational course of action by the victims: fleeing the scene. In a previous study of one-on-one killings, fleeing the scene represented the most common course of action chosen by killers.⁶⁶ A prior study of mass murders, however, showed that victims, offenders, and witnesses behave in ways that are not predictable. Some offenders were brought to their senses by the sight of blood of their victims while the sight of blood compelled some to lash out against bystanders who were present. The scenes of death brought some offenders to their senses, and led to the administration of cardio pulmonary resuscitation against a dying parent while others engaged in cannibalism. Available archival records enable us to reconstruct scenes of mass killings using knives, and the details suggest that mass killings are feasible not due to the physical prowess and knife wielding skills of attackers, but due to the behavior of victims on the scene, victims who may be immobilized from the shock and trauma of witnessing a murder or attempting to physically intervene.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper has analyzed the handful of parricidal mass killings that occurred in Korea, and compared them to previously published works on nineteenth-century America and to the robust literature on contemporary mass murders. Parricidal mass murders represent a small fraction of parricides in the US and Korea, 4% and 5% respectively. A cautious comparative synthesis of the findings from Korean

and American parricidal mass murders suggests notable points of convergence and divergence in ways that contribute to the understanding of the nexus between culture and violence.

Parricidal mass murders in Korea diverge from typical familicides noted in the Western criminological literature. Prior works have noted that familicides are committed by male heads-of-household who kill putatively for altruistic reasons, to save their family from a life of misery, in ways that are highly premeditated. A cautious synthesis of American and Korean data suggest that parricidal mass murders are similar to typical domestic homicides in that they begin like other domestic incidents, over trivial matters before morphing into something else; hence it tends to be spontaneous and not premeditated. This banal character of parricidal mass murder represents a unique contribution to the study of family violence and mass murder, for this offense characteristic cuts across national and temporal boundaries, demonstrating the universality of certain offense characteristics. I have argued that parricidal mass murders are guided by the internal logic of its own dynamics. Across two different time periods and across two vastly different cultural contexts, parricidal mass killings converged on the factors outlined in this paper.

Parricides in America and Korea emerged from the confluence of alcohol and intimate partner violence. As noted elsewhere, intimate partner violence shapes parricides as sons come to the defense of their mothers who are being battered during recurring scenes of domestic violence. As noted here, this scene of domestic violence also morphed into scenes of mass killings directed at witnesses, audiences, and other family members. In this sense, parricidal mass murder in America and Korea share close parallels with one another as intimate partner violence extends its influence into additional categories of violence: defensive parricides and mass killings. No other category of violence in the family affects the ecology of violence in the home more than the violence between intimate partners.

I have argued that parricidal mass murders reflect a unique form of contagious violence within the family that are socio-culturally shaped. Recent works suggest that mass murderers share parallels to assassins and terrorists in that they plan their actions in advance, leak their intentions to others, and draw their inspiration from previous killers who have achieved notoriety through their publicized killings. The prevalence of mass killings in the US has been attributed to cultural factors that celebrate hypermasculinity such as fascination with guns, and the violent media that have served as sources of inspiration for a generation of mass killers from Columbine to the Oklahoma City bombing. This trend in the literature on mass murder has been brought about by the accessibility of guns in America

as well as the proliferation of mass media content that has served as a source of identification and legitimacy for those who want to emulate such violent acts. However, I have argued that preceding factors lose significance when interpreted in the context of Korean parricidal mass killings as neither of the two forces would have been implicative in Korea circa mid-twentieth century. Instead, men and women in nineteenth-century America and twentieth-century Korea simply acted out their violent impulses as they were carried away by the currents of their own violence. Or they could very well have been inspired by a textual source; that remains to be addressed in future works.

The parricidal mass killings discussed in this paper illustrate other factors that are just as implicative in the commission of mass murder. For one, the sheer planning and premeditation that is indexical of contemporary mass murders is not so evident in nineteenth-century America or mid-twentieth-century Korea. The mass murders were spontaneous and expressive in character, meant to hurt other people. Hence, the spontaneous character of mass killings that originate from parricides adds another dimension to mass killings that have been overlooked in the literature. The situationally emergent character of mass killings is common to both national and temporal contexts. This finding suggests that there very well may be cross-cultural and universalizable aspects of killing that extend across national and cultural boundaries.

Although guns have been the primary weapons used in mass killings in the US and other Western nations, and the lethality of mass killings has been explained as a function of police response time, weapon caliber, magazine capacity, shooters' tactical movements and proficiency, the analysis of parricidal mass killings in Korea suggests that victim counts may be influenced by other factors. Using newspapers and court records from Korea, I have argued that victim counts in parricidal mass killings that involve knives are primarily shaped by victims' behavior. For one, guns were used in a minority of parricides and parricidal mass murders in Korea; secondly, knives and other edged instruments made up the modal weapons used in parricides overall. As I have argued, however, using knives in mass killings requires victims' implicit cooperation in order to materialize. Victims must remain on scene or attempt to intervene; victims also died while attempting to flee the scene and offenders caught up to them. Although the concept "physical strength hypothesis" has been used to explain the selection and deployment of guns in homicidal incidents to explain their prevalence,⁶⁷ this explanation does not hold up in a Korean context, for it unduly privileges offenders' perspective based on a logic of firearms while overlooking the behaviors of victims. Parricidal mass killings that are carried out with knives ought to compel researchers to rethink the dynamics of mass murder by recalibrating the import of victim behavior in

these incidents. Victim counts may be pushed upward by the inability of potential victims to seek evasive maneuvers or flee the scene; that the lethality of such attacks is shaped by the victims' behavior which configures prominently into the resolution of attacks. Witnesses and bystanders who are attempting to intervene in a dispute that is directed against a principal target or are unable to flee the scene due to the shock of witnessing a killing may be providing attackers with additional time as well as supplementary targets to direct their violent impulses. Korean parricidal mass murders also diverge from American ones in that ordinary citizens were not able to secure access to guns as most Americans are able to do. I have argued that soldiers emerged as an elite class of killers who were able to kill with efficiency that is characteristic of modernity.

I have argued that parricidal mass murders diverge from the findings in contemporary mass murder literature in that the former tends to emerge from the quotidian conflicts of domestic life rather than the premediated and vengeful actions of disgruntled employees or bullied students. The recent shift in discourse, from "mass murder" to "active shooter" by American federal law enforcement organizations⁶⁸ does not accurately reflect the offense dynamics and characteristics of mass killings that occur during the course of parricides. Moreover, although motivation such as revenge and the role of mass media have been the analytical focus of contemporary post-rampage accounts, I have argued that parricidal mass murders are most cogently explained by the contagious character of violence rather than the mimetic effects of mass media. Rather than originating from exogenous sources, parricidal mass murders contain their own seeds of imitation as offenders become unglued from larger social structures and are overtaken by the uncontrolled anger and seductive allure of violence that is displaced against innocent bystanders. This contagion model of violence holds true even in a nation that is rooted in Confucian ideology that encodes respect for elders on all levels.

Despite the arguments made in this paper, there are notable shortcomings that exist. The comparative synthesis I have provided is based on a small number of cases. There were only ten incidents in nineteenth-century America and five incidents in Korea. Generalizing offense characteristics from such a small and non-random sample poses questions regarding generalizability. For future works, it may be worthwhile to compare parricidal mass killings to other mass killings in society as a point of comparison. Second, only newspapers were used as primary sources of information. It may be much more interesting to use detailed official records to infer conclusions.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time and efforts. Any flaws that remain in the paper, however, are entirely my own. This paper was written, submitted, and reviewed during the COVID-19 pandemic. I would like to thank Dr. Winstanley-Chesters for shepherding this paper throughout the chaos of the past two years.
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A Case Study on South Korean Mobile Payment Applications: Samsung Pay vs Kakao Pay

HASAN TINMAZ Woosong University

VIET PHUONG DOAN Il Shin Auditing Co., Ltd, Hanoi, Vietnam¹

Abstract

This study describes users' perceptions regarding Samsung Pay (n=25) and Kakao Pay (n=25), the two popular mobile payment applications in South Korea. The survey included fifteen questions; eleven questions were about general uses and perceptions about mobile payments and the final four questions specifically branched between the payment systems. Overall, South Korean users have a very high usage of mobile payments on a regular basis. Subsequently, mobile payment applications in South Korea have been well developed in terms of both services and securities. This leads to a high satisfaction level of South Korean users regarding Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay.

Keywords: Samsung Pay, Kakao Pay, South Korea, mobile payment, online payment

Introduction

The smartphone adoption rate has been increasing rapidly in recent years. According to O'Dea,² the number of smartphone users in 2019 was more than

three billion. Given that the world population in 2019 was almost eight billion,³ this means that nearly half the global population has access to and uses a smartphone.

Many debates have been structured around the subject regarding whether smartphones have positive or negative influences on people's lives. On the one hand, many studies have pointed out the drawbacks of smartphones, for example, Li, Gao, and Xu find that smartphone addiction was a problematic issue that caused dysfunctional behaviors, such as procrastination, when college students deal with difficult tasks.⁴ On the other hand, several studies have justified the advantages of using smartphones in multiple aspects of human lives, for instance, Vaterlaus, Aylward, Tarabochia, and Martin argue that smartphones have become the important tools to help build interpersonal communication skills for individuals in the adolescent stage of life.⁵ Although many debates will continue to develop on this topic, undoubtedly, the world today revolves around smartphones; at least with youngsters who are referred to as the smartphone generation.⁶

Smartphones can be used for many purposes. Other than for communication (messaging or calling), smartphones now can be used to access numerous sorts of information immediately, to seek fun, to help the user navigate terrestrially, and more. Recently, due to the advancement of technologies, users can now use smartphones to make financial transactions as well, through the online or mobile payment services. The first online payment service, PayPal, was founded in 1998, but it was not until 2011 that Google became the first major company to release a mobile wallet application—the Google Wallet.⁷ The use of mobile payment apps has been significantly increasing in the United States; the percentage of mobile users who make mobile payments has doubled in a one-year period.⁸ Further to this, O'Shea predicted that more than two billion consumers worldwide would use mobile payments by 2019,⁹ when around 36% of smartphone users would make in-store payment through apps at least once every six months.¹⁰ Indeed, mobile payment applications will become important tools to smartphone users.

The reasons mobile payment applications are being favored by consumers might come from the benefits and advantages that the apps deliver to users. When it comes to using public transport systems (for example, to board a public bus), Brakewood, Ziedan, Hendricks, Barbeau, and Joslin indicate that using mobile payment applications benefited both buyers (for purchasing tickets) and operators (for collecting fares).¹¹ That is, the mobile payment applications enabled both buyers and operators to spend less time on purchasing tickets or collecting fares, which reduces the time for boarding. As a result, the satisfaction levels of mobile payment users were significantly high; New Jersey Transit users who have been paying fares through mobile apps report high levels of satisfaction.¹² From the perspective of finance and economy, Meifang, He, Xianrong, and Xiaobo draw

the conclusion that the existence of mobile payment apps increase the money turnover rate for businesses rather than causing liquidity risk.¹³ Specifically, mobile payment apps were positive influences on the financial status of businesses (raising earnings growth and rate of investment returns and creating higher values and higher wealth for shareholders). Meifang, He, Xianrong, and Xiaobo thus concluded that the mobile payment apps were critical incentives in the new economy.¹⁴

On the other hand, since these apps directly store users' financial information on a smart device, users are sometimes discouraged in trying the apps¹⁵ and using a mobile payment system.¹⁶ Cases of data breaches have been increasing in the last decades with a greater range and scale and have even impacted big corporations such as Alibaba, LinkedIn, Weibo, and Facebook.¹⁷ Thus, these leaks of information and security violations are of concern for users of mobile payment applications.

As one of the biggest economies, South Korea has long been a playground for technological innovations. Among all countries in the world, South Korea put great emphasis on the advancement of technology. For instance, in 2020, South Korea stood only second, next to Israel, on the percentage of GDP spent in technological research and development.¹⁸ Additionally, South Korea has been at the top of Bloomberg's most innovative economies index for seven years, out of the nine years that the index has been published, holding its current first place from 2021.¹⁹ Furthermore, various aspects of South Korean lives are heavily integrated with technology: education, wireless internet, virtual reality, digital textbooks, and other advanced methods are used by individuals, teams, and classrooms at all levels.²⁰

Thus, in parallel to all the technological developments, South Korea is one of the most innovative countries for the development and utilization of mobile transaction applications, with the examples of Kakao Pay (2014), Naver Pay (2014), and Samsung Pay (2015). In South Korea, the number of mobile payment application users has surged to more than 82 million as of 2020.²¹ In fact, mobile transactions in South Korea might have had the biggest impact in placing it as one of the leading cashless countries in the world; in 2019, cash payment only accounted for around 17% of total transactions while the country witnessed a fintech adoption rate of 67% with payments services accounting for the majority.²² Hence, South Korea is indeed experiencing massive changes in society due to the existence of mobile payment applications.

In order to elaborate more about the impacts of mobile payment applications in general, this paper concentrates on two mobile payment apps (Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay) that have been functioning in South Korea for a while. The aim

of this study is to examine how users in South Korea perceive mobile payment applications in general and Samsung Pay or Kakao Pay in particular.

Literature review

Overview of Samsung Pay

Samsung Pay is a mobile payment and digital wallet application that was developed by the Samsung Group. Samsung Pay was first released in South Korea in 2015, and it was built to support online payments for Samsung users. Samsung Pay embraced both traditional and modern transaction technologies when enabling users to make payments in traditional payment terminals or card machines and NFC-enabled payment terminals. Other than that, Samsung Pay can be used for online payments, in-app payments and can be used as an electronic wallet. When using Samsung Pay, gift cards can be sent among family members and friends.²³

In order to use Samsung Pay, users must have a supported device, which is from the Samsung Galaxy series produced by the Samsung Group and a supported bank account, which is limited to the countries that Samsung Pay supports. According to Abhijeet,²⁴ Samsung Pay is supported in up to twenty-five countries: Canada, China, Germany, South Africa, Thailand, the United States, United Kingdom, Vietnam, and others. Next, users must register a Samsung Pay account, link the bank account to their Samsung Pay account, and choose one of the security methods (fingerprint, PIN number or iris verification) in order to make payments.²⁵ Samsung Pay also enable users to register multiple bank accounts into the app; thus, in order to help users manage their cards where the last four digits of a card number will be displayed in the card image. Moreover, Samsung Pay reduces customers' risk in using the app; for instance, Samsung Pay will lock customers' transaction account in case they lose their mobile phone.²⁶ Figure 1 shows the Samsung Pay interface.

Up until 2019, Samsung Pay has more than fourteen million subscribers with a total transaction volume worth forty trillion Korean Won (USD \$33.7 billion). The app accounted for 80% of the South Korean offline simple payment market in 2018, in which online payments contributed one-fourth of total payments. Additionally, Samsung Pay is looking forward to integrating other financial features into the app, such as overseas remittance and currency exchange services.²⁷

Overview of Kakao Pay

Kakao Pay is the online payment function that was integrated into KakaoTalk messenger in 2014. KakaoTalk is an all-in-one function application (e.g., calling



Figure 1 Samsung Pay user interface

a cab, finding hair shops, bus or subway mapping) that is owned by the Kakao Corporation. KakaoTalk is also the number one messaging app in South Korea, since the app covers more than 90% of South Korean messaging users.²⁸ With Kakao Pay, KakaoTalk users can make payments and transfer money online, which includes QR code or barcode payments, NFC payments, online payments, and in-app payments. KakaoTalk users can earn multiple sale promotions in the form of discounts or bonus money when paying at specific locations using Kakao Pay (for instance, in some convenience stores or some department stores). Additionally, users can utilize Kakao Pay as a digital wallet and can also pay utilities bills by using Kakao Pay or invest in the KakaoTalk account to earn back profit.²⁹

In order to use Kakao Pay, users must first register for a KakaoTalk account (which will require a functioning mobile number). Then, users need to link the KakaoTalk account to their bank accounts, which will allow online banking. After some verification steps that include choosing the security methods (fingerprint or PIN number), users can make transactions and payments on Kakao Pay, for example, transferring money to another friend's account. Although Kakao Pay has only been supported in South Korea, the app is aiming to extend cross-border payment services starting from Japan.³⁰ Additionally, Kakao Pay supports payment services for different online stores and social networks, for instance, Apple App Store, Google Play Store, YouTube Premium, South Korea's Coupang, and China's AliExpress.³¹ Figure 2 shows the Kakao Pay interface.




Figure 2 Kakao Pay user interface

In 2018, more than twenty-six million South Koreans used Kakao Pay monthly (more than half of the South Korea population). Additionally, twenty trillion Korean Won (USD \$17.7 billion) worth of transactions was made through Kakao Pay in 2018. Beside messaging and transportation services, payment services are the most successful function of KakaoTalk.³² KakaoTalk has been developing its payment sections to bring more convenience to users, most recently with the issue of the Kakao credit card service in collaboration with multiple South Korean banks.³³

Research Studies on Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay in South Korea

Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay have been extensively used in the South Korea market. According to Kim M., Kim S., and Kim J. (2019),³⁴ South Korean consumers mostly preferred payment methods without money. That is, South Korean consumers were keen on using bank cards and mobile or biometric payment methods over using cash. South Korean consumers perceived that the convenience, or lack of physical cash, for payments was the most important factor, while the possibility of the disclosure of personal information, the check-out time, or the cost of use only had a minor impact on the adoption of mobile payment methods (with the cost of use being the least important). However, due to the limited infrastructure for mobile or biometric payments in offline stores, the usage rate for mobile apps in offline payments was low. Kim et al. also pointed out that consumers' trust in technology linked directly with the incorporation of mobile or biometric payments.³⁵

Many studies have shown different reasons for the acceptance and rejection of Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay in South Korean society. For example, according to Lee J., Ryu, and Lee D. (2019),³⁶ the service network range played an important role in consumers' adoption rate of mobile payment apps, especially Kakao Pay. Since the Kakao Pay service network was limited when KakaoTalk first launched the function, users have often given up on Kakao Pay and changed to other payment services. Thus, Lee J., Ryu, and Lee D. argue that network externalities in operating mobile payment apps directly affected users' satisfaction.³⁷

On another point, Nan, Kim Y., Park, and Kim J. (2020)³⁸ discovered that users' satisfaction level on mobile payment apps in South Korea was the major reason for intentional prospective usage. That is, when users perceive that a mobile payment app is deeply useful (perceived usefulness), users were more likely to be satisfied with the app and will be loyal to the app. Another reason regarding satisfaction level was perceived security, which was positively linked with users' decision on the use of the type of application. Security issues of mobile payment apps in South Korea have been highlighted by other studies previously.³⁹

There are other attributes of mobile payment apps that have been attractive to users. Choi, Park, Kim, and Jung (2020)⁴⁰ argue that consumers looked for incentive bonuses (discounts or bonus money) when using mobile payments. It is suggested that Samsung Pay users were loyal to the app due to the incentive programs that Samsung Pay offered to users (for instance, allowing users to receive reward points that were worth a percentage of the total transaction when paying with the app). Different verification methods were also engaging attributes. Particularly, biometric authentications (fingerprint, iris scanning, or voice recognition) are widely used as South Korean consumers become more familiar with advanced technologies. Although the biometric authentications brought more advantages, the traditional verification method—PIN number—was still the most favored by users in South Korea. At the same time, Choi, Park, Kim, and Jung pointed out that users would always be uncertain with mobile payment apps' safety even though the apps guaranteed the highest level of assurance.⁴¹

Additionally, ease-of-use may have drawn South Korean consumers to the mobile payment apps. For instance, Nan, Kim Y., Park, and Kim J. (2020)⁴² indicate that ease-of-use has been prioritized in the South Korean mobile payment apps. An example of this was the user-friendly interface that Kakao Pay developed for its users. As a result, Kakao Pay users were familiar with using the app and did not see any difficulty in setting up and managing their accounts. Table 1 demonstrates the features of Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay mobile payment apps.

It is important to understand how the users of the mobile payment applications perceive the technologies. Unfavorable user perceptions will clearly lead to a

Table 1 Features of Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay mobile payment apps

Features	Samsung Pay	Kakao Pay
Supported devices	Galaxy smartphones only	Smart devices supporting Android and iOS
Compatibility with other apps	Not possible	To KakaoTalk
Payments	Gift/ membership In-store In-app Online Visa checkout	Credit card In-store (limited) In-app Online (limited) Wire transfer
Securities authentication	Iris scanning Fingerprint Pin number Tokenization	Face scanning Fingerprint Pin number
Other	Nearby deals viewer Anti-thief protection	Bills management Barcode scanning

lack of use or churn effect on the applications. Hence this research concentrates on unfolding the users' perceptions of the two mobile payment apps most highly used in South Korea.

Method

The Participants and Data Collection

Since the major aim of the study is to describe the most common mobile payment apps in South Korea, the researchers selected Samsung Pay (19.8%) and Kakao Pay (11.8%) based on their usage percentages in 2019 (Statista, 2020).⁴³ In the second step, the researchers had to select the study sample. To serve that purpose, the researchers utilized non-random purposeful sampling where participants' specific characteristics are inclusion criteria for the study.⁴⁴ For the current study, the researchers used one important criterion: "currently having only that specific app (Samsung or Kakao) on their mobile phone," which helps the researcher to know that the participant did not use both apps at the same time. The researchers did not want the participants to become confused about the features of the payment apps.

The researchers set up a table in the most crowded cafeteria of their university (located in Taejon at the geographical center of South Korea; a private and middle-categorized international higher education institution) and announced that they needed volunteers for a study on payment systems. On the banner, it

Table 2 The participants' demographics

App			Citizenship		Total
			Korean	Non-Korean	
Kakao Pay	Gender	Female	13	4	17
		Male	8	0	8
	Total		21	4	25
Samsung Pay	Gender	Female	5	4	9
		Male	8	8	16
	Total		13	12	25

was specified that the volunteer participant must use only one of the apps at the current time. Once the volunteer participant approached the table, she or he was asked whether they use only one app. After the confirmation, the participant was given the survey and a coffee gift card. At the end of the week, the researchers collected 50 surveys, equally from each app user—25 Samsung Pay users and 25 Kakao Pay users.

Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the study participants: 68% Korean and 32% Non-Korean, 52% female and 48% male.

Study Instrument and Data Analysis

The researchers developed their own study survey based on literature review findings and the features of both mobile payment apps. When the draft survey was ready, the researchers asked their colleagues to collect their comments for content validity reasons.⁴⁵ Moreover, one English language expert and holder of a PhD proofread the survey. Lastly, the researchers randomly asked two students to fill in surveys themselves and make comments on the draft survey. These two students were not included in the final number of participants.

The final survey form included fifteen major questions where the first three questions ask about demographics (citizenship, gender, and type of app). The following five questions focus on different issues for using mobile payment apps (device ownership, the frequency of use, purpose of use, additional fees, and security authentication). Question nine provides twelve sentences that would be answered on a five-level Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Question ten tries to unfold the possible drawbacks of mobile payment apps. Question eleven provides a table of features regarding the mobile payment apps and ask the participants to state their satisfaction level on each of the features.

The survey has two branches after this point: two questions for Samsung pay users and two questions for Kakao pay users. The first group of questions of each branch gives a list of app-specific tools and asks the participants to state their satisfaction level. The second group of questions of each branch focuses on the general usability of the app on a five-level Likert scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

The collected data was entered into SPSS at the end of each day. The final dataset was taken to descriptive analyses initially where the necessary frequencies and percentages were calculated for all the survey questions, except question number nine. The mean scores and standard deviations of twelve sentences in question nine were calculated and tabulated accordingly.

The researchers decided to conduct comparison tests on these twelve sentences for question nine. Thus, they implemented a normality test to the dataset. The result showed that the data was not normally distributed, which guided the researchers to non-parametric tests. Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significantly differentiated items for the citizenship variable and showed only one item for the gender variable.

Results

In question four, the participants were asked to choose whether they owned a smartphone or a tablet device. The participants were given six options, in which the first four options were products of iOS and Android (“iPhone,” “iPad,” “Android Smartphone,” or “Android Tablet”); the fifth option was having no smartphone or tablet and the sixth option was “other.” In the results, the participants chose neither the fifth nor the sixth option. Table 3 shows that all the participants owned at least an iOS or Android—smartphone or tablet. More than half of the participants owned an Android smartphone (64%), while iPhone owners only accounted for around one-third of the people (36%). Simultaneously, tablet devices were not a popular choice since only 12% of participants reported an iPad and 8% of participants had an Android tablet.

In the following question, participants were asked to mark their usage frequencies on Mobile Payment Applications—MPAs (Samsung Pay or Kakao

Table 3 The smartphones and the tablets of the participants

Item	n	%	Item	n	%
iPhone	18	36	Android smartphone	32	64
iPad	6	12	Android tablet	4	8

Pay). As Table 4 shows, most participants were using MPAs at least once a week (48%); several people even used it frequently on a daily basis (44%). Only a few participants claimed that they used MPAs monthly (2%) and rarely (6%), which showed high frequencies for MPAs usage.

Question six asked how the participants spent their money on MPAs. Table 5 depicts that most of the participants used MPAs for purchasing everyday items such as groceries (60%). Additionally, paying for special occasions (holidays, birthdays, events, or meals out) were also a popular choice among the participants. Nonetheless, using MPAs for transportation payments (public transport, taxi) were not as common since only around 34% to 40% of participants chose these categories.

In the next question, participants were asked whether the MPAs that they were currently using charge additional fees for utilization (for example, a fee for transferring money, buying tickets to events, and other fees). Some 60% of the participants claimed that the apps did not charge any utilization fee, in contrast to 4% of the participants who replied positively. There were 18 participants (36%) who were unsure about the utilization fee.

Question eight was about participants' preferred security authentication when using MPAs (Table 6). Among the six options that were given, half of the participants chose fingerprint authentication as their most favorite tool. PIN number verification was also favored by the participants (40%). Barcode (6%), iris scanning (2%), and voice recognition (2%) were also chosen by a few participants, while none of the participants chose token as the favorite security tool.

Table 4 Frequencies of using MPAs

Frequency	N	%	Frequency	n	%
Daily	22	44	Monthly	1	2
Weekly	24	48	Rarely	3	6
			Total	50	100

Table 5 Purposes of using MPAs

Option	n	%	Option	n	%
Everyday items such as groceries	30	60	Meals out (restaurants/ takeaways)	22	44
Holiday/ birthday presents	29	58	Taxi fares	22	40
Event tickets	24	48	Public transport	17	34

Table 6 Preferred MPAs security authentication

Option	n	%	Option	n	%
Fingerprint	25	50	Iris scanning	1	2
Pin number	20	40	Voice recognition	1	2
Barcode	3	6	Token	0	0
			Total	50	100

Table 7 Survey of MPA use

Survey item	M	SD
1. It is easy to download the Mobile Payment App.	4.52	0.58
2. It is easy to set up the Mobile Payment App.	4.12	0.90
3. It is easy to start the transaction.	4.22	0.84
4. It is easy to receive the transaction details.	4.24	0.82
5. There are few steps required to complete the transaction.	3.94	0.93
6. Documentation or instructions are helpful and clear.	3.96	0.78
7. Customer service is easily available.	4.08	0.88
8. I enjoy using the app.	4.36	0.78
9. I can personalize the system.	3.60	0.88
10. Using this mobile payment app improves social interaction.	3.44	0.99
11. Using this mobile payment app gives me status.	3.50	1.04
12. It is fashionable to use the mobile payment app.	3.46	1.05

In the following question, the participants were asked to state their level of agreement toward twelve given sentences that were related to MPA use (Table 7). The level of agreement was on a 5-point Likert scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Overall, most of the participants agreed that MPAs were very easy to download, set up, and use; thus, participants had high satisfaction with the apps. The participants were also happy about the easiness of transactions. At the same time, the participants felt neutral about the connection between using MPAs and their social status.

In the next part of the survey, the drawbacks of MPAs were brought into the discussion. According to Table 8, the participants were mostly afraid of losing their mobile phones (56%). Security issues were the second concern (42%).

Table 8 Main drawbacks of MPAs

Drawbacks	N	%
Fear of losing mobile phone	28	56
Security concerns	21	42
My preferred retailers do not offer this payment option	9	18
Cost	9	18
Too complicated / confusing	5	10

In question eleven, the participants were asked to state their satisfaction level on different features of MPAs, on a 5-point Likert scale from “very satisfied” to “very dissatisfied” with an additional “unaware” option. The results were presented separately in two tables (Table 9 and Table 10) for the readability.

As presented in Table 9, Kakao Pay users were very satisfied with the app’s features. Most importantly, the users were most keen on the password authentication feature of Kakao (14 out of 25 people). In addition, some users were unaware of several features of Kakao Pay. Critically, the wire transfer feature seemed to be somewhat unknown to Kakao Pay users.

Table 9 Satisfaction level with Kakao Pay features

Features	Unaware	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total
Credit and Debit Card Payment	3	10	11	1	0	0	25
Rewards within app	4	7	7	6	1	0	25
Online Security	3	8	11	2	1	0	25
In-Store Payments	6	7	8	3	0	1	25
In-App Purchases	3	11	9	1	0	1	25
Password Authentication	4	14	7	0	0	0	25
Wire Transfer	9	8	6	2	0	0	25
Total	32	65	59	15	2	2	175

Table 10 Satisfaction level with Samsung Pay features

Features	Unaware	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total
Credit and Debit Card Payment	4	12	9	0	0	0	25
Rewards within app	3	9	6	6	1	0	25
Online Security	3	9	11	2	0	0	25
In-Store Payments	1	14	8	1	1	0	25
In-App Purchases	1	10	11	3	0	0	25
Password Authentication	1	14	9	0	1	0	25
Wire Transfer	5	10	6	4	0	0	25
Total	18	78	60	16	3	0	175

By the same token, users of Samsung Pay were also very satisfied with the app (Table 10). Password authentication and in-store payment were favorite features. Likewise, Samsung Pay users were also somewhat unaware of the wire transfer function. However, Samsung Pay received a higher satisfaction level comparing to Kakao Pay. Moreover, the number of Samsung Pay users who were unaware of the apps' functions was also fewer than those who used Kakao Pay.

In the next section, question twelve and thirteen were specifically directed at Samsung Pay users only (n=25). In question twelve, participants were required to reflect on their satisfaction level toward particular features of Samsung Pay, on a 5-point Likert scale from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied" with an additional "unaware" option. As can be seen from Table 11, the users were most satisfied with digital tokenization (14), followed by membership card or gift transactions (13), and fingerprint authentication (12). Iris scan authentication and Visa credit card checkout functions also received positive feedback from the participations, despite some users being unaware of these two features.

In the following question, Samsung Pay users were asked whether the listed features in Table 10 improved the usability of the app on a 5-point Likert scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." In brief, the participants mostly

Table 11 Samsung Pay features

	Unaware	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total
Digital Tokenization	3	14	5	3	0	0	25
Membership card and gift transaction	3	13	7	2	0	0	25
Fingerprint Authentication	3	12	10	0	0	0	25
Iris Scan Authentication	6	7	7	5	0	0	25
Visa Checkout	5	7	6	5	2	0	25
Total	20	53	35	15	2	0	

agreed about these features' contribution to the usability of the app (M=4.29, SD=0.46).

The final two questions (questions fourteen and fifteen) were specifically given only to Kakao Pay users. In question fourteen, the participants were asked about their satisfaction level toward particular features of Kakao Pay on a 5-point Likert scale from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied" with an additional "unaware" option (Table 12). In general, the users were most satisfied with Kakao Pay's authentication feature. Barcode scanning and Kakao Pay bill features also received positive satisfactory impression from the users.

In the final question, Kakao Pay users were asked whether the listed features in Table 11 improved the usability of the app on a 5-point Likert scale from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." In brief, the participants agreed about these features' contribution to the usability of the app (M=4.09, SD=0.49). Thus,

Table 12 Kakao Pay features

	Unaware	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Total
Barcode Scanning	3	8	10	4	0	0	25
Kakao Pay Authentication	3	13	6	3	0	0	25
Kakao Pay Bill	2	9	10	3	1	0	25
Total	8	30	26	10	1	0	

comparing with the results of Samsung Pay users (question thirteen), Kakao Pay received less agreement on the improvement of usability of the app.

Comparative tests

After the descriptive statistics, the researchers decided to conduct further comparison-based analysis to have detailed results. Once the survey was checked, only the items in Table 7 (Survey of MPA use) seemed to be appropriate for comparative tests. Yet, the researchers had to choose between parametric and non-parametric tests. To serve that purpose, the researchers separately implemented normality tests to twelve questions around three independent variables: citizenship (Korean versus non-Korean), gender (female versus male), and the type of MPA (Samsung Pay versus Kakao Pay).

According to the Shapiro-Wilk test (a better fit when the sample size is smaller than 50), none of the items was greater than 0.05, which shows that the data was not normally distributed (Table 13). Therefore, the researchers selected non-parametric tests.

When Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted on the “citizenship variable” on these twelve items in Table 7, the results showed no statistically significant differences ($p > 0.05$) (Table 14).

Another group of Mann-Whitney U tests were implemented on the “gender variable” (26 females and 24 males) for around twelve items in Table 7. The results (Table 15) yielded only one statistically significant item differentiating the gender variable: item five (“there are few steps required to complete the transaction”). When the mean ranks were checked for this item, it seems that male participants agreed more than female participants.

Lastly, for Mann-Whitney U tests on “type of MPA,” the results showed no statistically significant differences ($p > 0.05$) (Table 16).

Discussion and conclusions

This study explored South Korean users’ perceptions regarding two popular mobile payment systems: Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay. Most participants claimed a high usage of Samsung Pay or Kakao Pay on a regular basis. Additionally, many participants agreed that both Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay were easy to set up on their smartphones. Overall, the participants were very pleased with the services provided by both Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay.

Our participants reported high frequencies of using the mobile payment applications (MPAs) for daily payments (groceries) and special occasion’s

Table 13 Shapiro-Wilk normality test results on citizenship, gender, and MPA types

Item #	Citizenship	Shapiro-Wilk			Gender	Shapiro-Wilk			MPA type	Shapiro-Wilk		
		Statistic	df	Sig.		Statistic	df	Sig.		Statistic	df	Sig.
1	Korean	.718	34	.000	female	.735	26	.000	Kakao	.728	25	.000
	Non-Korean	.638	16	.000	Male	.629	24	.000	Samsung	.671	25	.000
2	Korean	.815	34	.000	female	.847	26	.001	Kakao	.836	25	.001
	Non-Korean	.741	16	.000	Male	.716	24	.000	Samsung	.757	25	.000
3	Korean	.721	34	.000	female	.791	26	.000	Kakao	.685	25	.000
	Non-Korean	.736	16	.000	Male	.683	24	.000	Samsung	.815	25	.000
4	Korean	.773	34	.000	female	.749	26	.000	Kakao	.705	25	.000
	Non-Korean	.759	16	.001	Male	.799	24	.000	Samsung	.800	25	.000
5	Korean	.844	34	.000	female	.873	26	.004	Kakao	.848	25	.002
	Non-Korean	.884	16	.045	Male	.777	24	.000	Samsung	.773	25	.000
6	Korean	.851	34	.000	female	.812	26	.000	Kakao	.865	25	.003
	Non-Korean	.807	16	.003	Male	.853	24	.003	Samsung	.808	25	.000
7	Korean	.822	34	.000	female	.788	26	.000	Kakao	.815	25	.000
	Non-Korean	.859	16	.019	Male	.851	24	.002	Samsung	.846	25	.001
8	Korean	.708	34	.000	female	.740	26	.000	Kakao	.680	25	.000
	Non-Korean	.715	16	.000	Male	.762	24	.000	Samsung	.794	25	.000
9	Korean	.871	34	.001	female	.883	26	.007	Kakao	.887	25	.010
	Non-Korean	.887	16	.050	Male	.880	24	.008	Samsung	.858	25	.003
10	Korean	.875	34	.001	female	.883	26	.007	Kakao	.887	25	.010
	Non-Korean	.896	16	.069	Male	.864	24	.004	Samsung	.882	25	.008
11	Korean	.880	34	.001	female	.863	26	.003	Kakao	.878	25	.006
	Non-Korean	.880	16	.039	Male	.876	24	.007	Samsung	.878	25	.006
12	Korean	.874	34	.001	female	.869	26	.003	Kakao	.871	25	.005
	Non-Korean	.870	16	.027	Male	.875	24	.007	Samsung	.876	25	.006

payments (holidays, birthdays, events, or meals out). This demonstrates the high-level of acceptance of MPAs in the South Korean market, in which South Korean consumers were keen on using MPAs for multiple purposes. Lee J., Ryu, and Lee D. (2019)⁴⁶ have shown that South Korea consumers will adopt an MPA based on the app’s network externalities range. Thus, the MPAs’ owners,

Table 14 Mann-Whitney U tests based on citizenship variable

Items	Group	n	Mean rank	U	Z	P
1. It is easy to download the mobile payment app.	Korean	34	25.26	264.000	-0.191	0.849
	Non-Korean	16	26.00			
2. It is easy to set up the mobile payment app.	Korean	34	25.90	258.500	-0.303	0.762
	Non-Korean	16	24.66			
3. It is easy to start the transaction.	Korean	34	27.75	195.500	-1.751	0.080
	Non-Korean	16	20.72			
4. It is easy to receive the transaction details.	Korean	34	25.41	269.000	-0.068	0.946
	Non-Korean	16	25.69			
5. There are few steps required to complete the transaction.	Korean	34	26.76	229.000	-0.942	0.346
	Non-Korean	16	22.81			
6. Documentation or instructions are helpful and clear.	Korean	34	25.79	262.000	-0.223	0.823
	Non-Korean	16	24.88			
7. Customer service is easily available.	Korean	34	26.15	250.000	-0.489	0.625
	Non-Korean	16	24.13			
8. I enjoy using the app.	Korean	34	26.62	234.000	-0.873	0.382
	Non-Korean	16	23.13			
9. I can personalize the system.	Korean	34	24.87	250.500	-0.473	0.636
	Non-Korean	16	26.84			
10. Using this mobile payment app improves social interaction.	Korean	34	25.65	267.000	-0.110	0.913
	Non-Korean	16	25.19			
11. Using this mobile payment app gives me status.	Korean	34	24.69	244.500	-0.593	0.553
	Non-Korean	16	27.22			
12. It is fashionable to use the mobile payment app.	Korean	34	26.78	228.500	-0.937	0.349
	Non-Korean	16	22.78			

in this case the Samsung Group and the Kakao Corporation, have successfully extended the network services in all levels, from regular to premium stores. Especially when it comes to Kakao Pay, the Kakao Corporation has gone to exceptional lengths to make the payment function available to a high percentage of South Korea's population, though users have abandoned Kakao Pay for other mobile payment apps with more capabilities.⁴⁷ This finding suggests that better multiple services providing capability and wider connection of access to

Table 15 Mann-Whitney U tests based on gender variable

Items	Group	n	Mean rank	U	Z	P
1. It is easy to download the mobile payment app.	Female	26	24.58	288.000	-0.534	0.593
	Male	24	26.50			
2. It is easy to set up the mobile payment app.	Female	26	23.62	263.000	-1.027	0.305
	Male	24	27.54			
3. It is easy to start the transaction.	Female	26	26.40	288.500	-0.502	0.615
	Male	24	24.52			
4. It is easy to receive the transaction details.	Female	26	28.17	242.500	-1.473	0.141
	Male	24	22.60			
5. There are few steps required to complete the transaction.	Female	26	21.35	204.000	-2.209	0.027
	Male	24	30.00			
6. Documentation or instructions are helpful and clear.	Female	26	24.62	289.000	-0.479	0.632
	Male	24	26.46			
7. Customer service is easily available.	Female	26	28.02	246.500	-1.359	0.174
	Male	24	22.77			
8. I enjoy using the app.	Female	26	26.06	297.500	-0.311	0.756
	Male	24	24.90			
9. I can personalize the system.	Female	26	24.50	286.000	-0.534	0.593
	Male	24	26.58			
10. Using this mobile payment app improves social interaction.	Female	26	21.88	218.000	-1.923	0.054
	Male	24	29.42			
11. Using this mobile payment app gives me status.	Female	26	22.42	232.000	-1.611	0.107
	Male	24	28.83			
12. It is fashionable to use the mobile payment app.	Female	26	22.92	245.000	-1.347	0.178
	Male	24	28.29			

different platforms or information might be the key for companies to build their MPAs.

Additionally, our participants have moderately used MPAs in paying for transportation. The use of MPAs for transportation in South Korea is expected to be more popular among consumers due to its advantages in comparison with traditional methods.⁴⁸ Also, the result of high frequencies of using MPAs in South Korea in offline stores is different from the result which Kim M., Kim S., and Kim J. (2019)

Table 16 Mann-Whitney U tests based on MPA type

Items	Group	n	Mean rank	U	Z	P
1. It is easy to download the mobile payment app.	Kakao Pay	25	23.58	264.500	-1.068	0.286
	Samsung Pay	25	27.42			
2. It is easy to set up the mobile payment app.	Kakao Pay	25	24.18	279.500	-0.691	0.490
	Samsung Pay	25	26.82			
3. It is easy to start the transaction.	Kakao Pay	25	26.92	277.000	-0.758	0.448
	Samsung Pay	25	24.08			
4. It is easy to receive the transaction details.	Kakao Pay	25	27.86	253.500	-1.250	0.211
	Samsung Pay	25	23.14			
5. There are few steps required to complete the transaction.	Kakao Pay	25	22.50	237.500	-1.533	0.125
	Samsung Pay	25	28.50			
6. Documentation or instructions are helpful and clear.	Kakao Pay	25	23.56	264.000	-1.010	0.312
	Samsung Pay	25	27.44			
7. Customer service is easily available.	Kakao Pay	25	26.48	288.000	-0.508	0.611
	Samsung Pay	25	24.52			
8. I enjoy using the app.	Kakao Pay	25	28.24	244.000	-1.469	0.142
	Samsung Pay	25	22.76			
9. I can personalize the system.	Kakao Pay	25	24.44	286.000	-0.544	0.587
	Samsung Pay	25	26.56			
10. Using this mobile payment app improves social interaction.	Kakao Pay	25	25.30	307.500	-0.102	0.919
	Samsung Pay	25	25.70			
11. Using this mobile payment app gives me status.	Kakao Pay	25	26.80	280.000	-0.654	0.513
	Samsung Pay	25	24.20			
12. It is fashionable to use the mobile payment app.	Kakao Pay	25	25.82	304.500	-0.161	0.872
	Samsung Pay	25	25.18			

reported.⁴⁹ This contradictory result could come from either the sample size or the geographical location in South Korea. Therefore, more studies should be conducted to understand mobile payment in offline stores. Overall, the question of the impact of convenience on the actual usage of MPAs' users requires more research.

Regarding MPAs and different security authentication methods, half of the participants claimed that they were using fingerprint verification when making transactions, while PIN number verification was only the second favorite option.

Subsequently, bar-code scanning, iris scanning, voice recognition, and token authentication were not known or familiar to the participants. This result contradicts Choi, Park, Kim, and Jung's (2020)⁵⁰ findings that the South Korean consumers favored the PIN number method over other biometric identity authentications. We found that the usage rate of biometric identity authentications would probably rise if consumers were more familiar with the advanced technologies.⁵¹ It seems that South Korea consumers have been more familiar with fingerprint technology and favored fingerprints due to the advantages they brought, being more secure and more convenient. Thus, we can assume that other modern identity authentications (iris scanning and voice recognition), will eventually be accepted by the users when the advanced technologies are more common and simple to use.

In our study, more than half of the participants were afraid of losing their smartphones, the main access to the MPAs, which will create opportunities for theft. Simultaneously, many participants listed security concerns as a major drawback of the MPAs, despite the advanced security technologies that the apps have integrated. This result is similar to Choi, Park, Kim, and Jung's (2020)⁵² indication that South Korean users will always be concerned about security matters regarding MPAs. Thus, South Korean consumers perceive security an important aspect of the MPAs.⁵³ Integrating with the research of MPA usage in India by Pal, Herath, De, and Rao (2021),⁵⁴ it is possible that security is a critical concern for general users. Thus, we recommend further research into the relation between social traits and security.

In minimizing drawbacks, Samsung Pay seems to be more secure than Kakao Pay. That is, Samsung Pay has four security authentication methods with an anti-theft protection function as compared with only three security authentication methods for Kakao Pay (Table 1). Additionally, as only a small group of participants think MPAs are complicated to use, it is clear that the MPAs in South Korea have achieved ease-of-use attributes. This result is similar to Nan, Kim Y., Park, and Kim J.'s (2020)⁵⁵ study, which concluded that the MPAs in South Korea were user friendly.

Furthermore, Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay participants were highly satisfied with the apps and their functions. Nan, Kim Y., Park, and Kim J. (2020)⁵⁶ discovered that users' satisfaction level on mobile payment apps in South Korea were the major reason for usage. Therefore, it can be seen that Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay will achieve more growth in the market as these apps are regarded as pleasing to use. Although Samsung Pay received a higher satisfaction level comparing to Kakao Pay, the satisfaction differences are not significant.

In short, South Korea consumers have a high use of MPAs regularly for multiple payment types. Additionally, fingerprint verification is the most popular security

authentication method to users, followed by PIN numbers, and other biometric identity authentications. Subsequently, security is an important factor that decides the adoption rate of MPAs of South Korean consumers. Note that Samsung Pay has done better than Kakao Pay in term of security. It can be concluded that Samsung Pay and Kakao Pay will reach even higher growth in the South Korea mobile payments market. Indeed, all the findings provided guidelines that can be considered for future studies.

The present findings propose some practical suggestions. Although this research did not compare all other MPAs in the world, it is statistically obvious that mobile payment platforms are becoming more prevalent and their penetration into the dynamics of our lives is becoming more visible. More and more countries have begun to use MPAs, for example, Google Pay and Android Pay in the UK and EU, or Apple Pay in the US, and WeChat Pay and Ali Pay in China.

Since South Korean consumers adoption of MPAs is based on the network externalities of the app, it is recommended that MPAs that want to function in this market need to set the development of service network range as their priority. In addition, it is important to upgrade the security services continuously, by integrating advanced technologies into the transactions process and by providing customers with different authentication methods. Since there is much more high-tech theft in the world these days, it is important to ensure the security of the MPAs by identifying loopholes in each system, from both the developers and the customers' perspectives. Thus, any company marketing MPAs should popularize a familiarity with the advanced security technologies to users.

Lastly, this research has limitations. First, the sample size is not large enough to make different statistical tests and generalizations. Secondly, the research is based on users' answers and not their real-life practices. In another words, the participants' experiences and answers might not fully overlap. The reliability of the study depends on the honesty of the participants.

Acknowledgments

This research was funded by Woosong University Academic Research, 2022.

Notes

1. Hasan Tinmaz PhD, AI & Big Data Department, Endicott College of International Studies, Woosong University, Daejeon, South Korea, ORCID: 0000-0003-4310-0848, Email: htinmaz@endicott.ac.kr and Viet Phuong Doan, Il Shin Auditing Co., Ltd, Hanoi, Vietnam, ORCID: 0000-0002-7295-2356, Email: vietphuongdoan168@gmail.com.

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The Anti-Chosun Movement: Journalism, Activism, Politics, and Historical Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea, 1998–2002

PATRICK VIERTHALER¹ PhD Student, Kyoto University

Abstract

This article reconstructs the origins and development of the so-called Anti-Chosun Movement, a (progressive) movement to curb the power and shed light on the history of (conservative) mass media, from its origins in the mid-1990s to its politicization in the 2002 presidential elections. The development of Anti-Chosun reveals the intertwinement of journalism, activism, and politics in post-authoritarian South Korea. Further, Anti-Chosun constitutes the first movement originating in cyberspace, demonstrating the centrality of online journalism. Finally, Anti-Chosun must be evaluated as an omen of Korea's "history wars," its discourse taking place firmly within a framework of historical fact-finding and transitional justice.

Keywords: Korea, Anti-Chosun, *Chosun ilbo*, historical memory, *chinilpa*, Roh Moo-hyun, *Ohmynews*, activism, New Right

South Korean society since the mid-2000s has repeatedly experienced at times fierce clashes over its history. Not just the context of textbooks or the nature of memorial days, even the writings of academics were at times the object of disputes

taking place not only among members of civil society, but reaching far into the realms of media, politics, and even the judiciary. As a result, scholars speak of present-day South Korea as a society in a “psycho-historical fragmentation,”³ experiencing not only bilateral, but also domestic “history wars.”⁴ These “history wars” are both rooted in, and a manifestation of post-authoritarian South Korea’s institutional and ideological polarization. Within the existing literature, the intensification of disputes over history, or rather historical memory—i.e., “history as it is remembered” as opposed to “history as it happened”⁵—into “history wars” is commonly connected to the rise of the so-called New Right movement since 2004, which ultimately was successful in influencing official policies during the Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) administrations.⁶ However, to center the emergence of historical disputes solely on the New Right neglects the structural and institutional continuities before and after 1987.⁷ While democratization entailed a free press, continuities in the realms of politics, academia, or mass media are crucial in understanding post-authoritarian South Korea.⁸

In what is referred to as the “1987-System” by some scholars,⁹ a polarization commonly referred to as “conservatives” and “progressives” within South Korea diffuses into the country’s politics, media, civil society, and academia. Politically, for the first three decades following democratization, this institutional divide has manifested itself in a strong regionalism,¹⁰ reflecting the legacy of the South Korean state’s establishment and its developmental policies of the 1960s–1970s, favoring economic development in the southeastern regions of Yōngnam (Pusan, Taegu and the Kyōngsang Provinces) at the expense of the southwestern regions of Honam (Kwangju and the Chōlla Provinces). This regionalism is further reflected in the history of state violence after 1945, with the Honam region and the island of Jeju having witnessed brutal massacres in the name of anti-communism, which the Jeju April 3 Incident of 1948¹¹ and the Kwangju Massacre of 1980¹² exemplify. As a consequence, this regional divide is visible in election results. Since 1987, “conservatives” are often defined as the successors to the autocratic period’s ruling elite, while “progressives” trace their genealogy in opposition to the establishment. Ultimately, in the 1990s and early 2000s, this polarization is reflected in the country’s media landscape, with the three large media conglomerates of *Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, and *Joongang ilbo* generally said to fall into the “conservative” spectrum, while newly established media such as the *Hankyoreh* (1986), the monthly *Mal* (1985), in addition to the center-progressive *Kyunghyang sinmun*, are regarded as “progressive.”¹³

Through shifting the focus to the 1990s, the present study aims to expand the historical focus beyond the mid-2000s, examining a hitherto overlooked, crucial

cause for the increasing polarization that ultimately led to the emergence of the New Right Movement and the outbreak of the South Korean “history wars,” namely the relationship between mass media (= journalism), civil society, politics, and historical memory up until 2003/04. The 1990s were pivotal for several reasons. First, in relation to its history, South Korea in the 1990s was undergoing a transitional period from authoritarianism to democracy. Light was shed on past state violence, and new findings enabled more nuanced understandings of Korean modern and contemporary history.¹⁴ Partial openings of Soviet and Chinese archives led to new understandings into the process of division and war on the Korean peninsula,¹⁵ and a growing interest in oral history led to a boom in history from local and individual angles. Amidst political and institutional continuities, the historical memory of South Koreans began to shift towards an elite-critical, “progressive” memory, in which the discourse on pro-Japanese collaborators, so-called *ch’inilp’a*,¹⁶ and their role in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its political crimes, took center stage.¹⁷ Second, despite numerous institutional continuities—especially the National Security Law (NSL)—the post-Cold War era marks a rift in South Korean society. Besides political democratization, on a psychological level, shifting geopolitics during the 1990s, the inclusion of both North and South Korea into the United Nations in 1991 and Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy (1998–2003), signaled a break with the past. For South Koreans, the rivalry of systems was all but over; the South had emerged as the clear winner. These shifts, ultimately, would redraw political and social coordinates within the South—mostly along existing lines, however.¹⁸ With the conservatives still firmly in power,¹⁹ the 1990s marked a period in which progressive ideals, especially progressive historical consciousness, now represented by actors within institutions, gradually became mainstream.²⁰ Third, the digital turn was significant in transforming South Korean life in the late 1990s. South Korea was among the earliest nations to expand broadband internet connections, leading to changes in all areas of society.²¹ By 2000—long before the advent of smartphones, portal sites, and fake news became issues—so-called citizen’s journalism emerged as an alternative to the existing media landscape.²² Social activists, too, began to assemble online, and before too long, the internet had played a decisive role in the outcome of the 2002 presidential election.²³ Finally, while civic activism of the 1980s²⁴ and 2000s²⁵ has received a significant attention within English-language scholarship in recent years, the mid-1990s remain an under-researched field.

Examining the so-called Anti-Chosun Movement in this context is significant, because the movement and its origins exemplify the transitions that South Korean society went through in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As I will argue, neither

the origins nor the development of the Anti-Chosun discourse would have been possible without the transformations mentioned above. Crucially, Anti-Chosun's influence on both progressives and conservatives uncovers, as I will argue, a significant cause for the emergence of the New Right movement in late 2004. In this context, I evaluate the Anti-Chosun Movement as an omen to South Korea's "history wars," as a discourse incorporating all the characteristics that were later visible in disputes over high-school history textbooks,²⁶ memorial days,²⁷ museums,²⁸ and even in defamation lawsuits surrounding academic writings on contested historical topics.²⁹

Existing studies on the Anti-Chosun Movement suffer from two shortcomings: either they were written by activists involved at a time the movement was still in its heyday, and as such constitute primary sources rather than existing studies³⁰ or they were inconsistent in their use of sources. In English-language scholarship, Song Yeunjee is the only available study discussing the topic.³¹ In her dissertation on the *ch'inilp'a* discourse, Song mentions the Anti-Chosun Movement, albeit without going into much detail. Song's study is significant in that it has drawn my interest to the subject, but suffers from an incomplete citation of primary sources. In Korean-language works, the essayist, activist, and blogger Han Yun-hyŏng has published a massive, 500-page monograph on the history of Anti-Chosun, but his work suffers from a lack of focus.³² Han's monograph belongs to the realm of journalistic account rather than academic study. Nevertheless, Han's study is significant in that it includes, albeit in a highly unsorted fashion, a large number of details regarding the development of the Anti-Chosun Movement. Therefore, Han's monograph serves as an orientation of where to start and what to look into for further research.

With the above shortcomings in prior studies, the goal for the present research is to write a well-structured chronological account of Anti-Chosun supported by a meticulous use of primary sources. For this paper, I trace the origins and development of the Anti-Chosun discourse through the lens of a historian. Reconstructing its history through the use of primary sources from both involved parties and media, I aim to exposit an account of the *Chosun ilbo* issue from the mid-1990s to the emergence of the New Right movement. As it is impossible to write a definitive history of the movement and its branches, I focus on the most important developments and actors in order to provide a foundation for further study into individual aspects of the movement as analyzed in the pages below.

Early attempts at highlighting the Chosun issue, 1992–1998

Kang Chun-man: An Outsider's Voice in Calling Attention to the Chosun ilbo Issue

The emergence of the *Chosun ilbo*³³ newspaper as a disputed issue (*nonjŏm*) in South Korean society is closely tied to Kang Chun-man (강준만 姜俊晩), a professor of media studies, essayist, and political commentator.³⁴ Having studied in the US,³⁵ Kang saw himself neither as a progressive nor a conservative. His early work was grounded in the logic of Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Hermann's *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (1988). Thus, Kang approached *Chosun ilbo* in the belief that media discourse, influenced by special interests of media proprietors and advertisers, continued to underpin the rule of the conservative establishment in South Korea.³⁶ In 1995, a monograph in which Kang traced how Korean mass media had repeatedly attempted to paint a negative image of Kim Dae-jung became a best-seller, turning Kang into a famous writer overnight.³⁷ In the foreword, Kang heavily criticized how, among the media conglomerates in the ROK—the *Chosun ilbo* in particular—as the country's best-selling newspaper, are shaping public opinion in South Korean society. To Kang, *Chosun ilbo* was constituting "not just the country's best-selling newspaper (but) the newspaper that is setting the agenda in our society,"³⁸ a newspaper that was at the same time "fundamentally ideological (and) commercial," pretending "to ride on the train of democratization," while at the same time remaining a hardline, Cold War stance on the North Korea issue.³⁹ Firmly in the ownership of the Pang dynasty,⁴⁰ Kang also criticizes how the owners praise themselves as constituting a constant, unchanging shadow presidency as opposed to the elected presidents who came and went.⁴¹

Already three years prior, Kang went much further in a February 1992 essay entitled "Dismantling all aspects of *Chosun ilbo*," setting the agenda for his later crusade against the newspaper. Despite Kang's emphasis on pointing out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* in post-authoritarian South Korea, namely in the role the newspaper played in deciding the 1992 presidential elections, Kang also calls attention to *Chosun's* role in Korea's modern and contemporary history, in particular to the relationship between the newspaper and the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan.⁴² By praising Chun Doo-hwan and the state's actions in Kwangju, Kang argues, *Chosun ilbo* was able to achieve its dominant position within the South Korean media landscape after the 1980s.⁴³ Kang supports his argument with *Chosun* articles from 1980 reporting on the Kwangju Massacre. On 28 May 1980, for example, *Chosun ilbo's* editorial praised the military's take-over of the city, writing: "One thing is clear at the present. The

citizens of Kwangju need not feel any danger, fear or insecurity. ... We must not forget the hard work of the military and their cautious actions.”⁴⁴ In a strikingly similar fashion, Kang introduces, that *Chosun* welcomed Park Chung-hee’s coup d’état in 1961, writing that “this is an extraordinarily happy moment for the majority of our citizens.”⁴⁵ In this context, Kang already in this essay points out the issue of *Chosun ilbo* as a historically collaborationist newspaper fraternizing with the ruling elite, laying the discursive groundwork for later developments of the Anti-Chosun Movement.⁴⁶ At the same time, Kang refrains from criticizing the newspaper as “conservative,” instead stressing its nature as an “opportunistic” newspaper.⁴⁷ By doing so, Kang avoids falling into the discursive trap of simplification into progressive and conservative.

Kang’s interest in the *Chosun* issue was directly reflected in the editorial stance of his journal *Inmul kwa sasang*, established in May 1998, in the wake of the Kim Dae-jung’s election as South Korea’s first progressive president. From the first issue onwards, *Chosun ilbo* was prominent in the journal, with critique of the newspaper centering, for the months from May to October, on its political reporting and the editorials of Kim Tae-jung⁴⁸ and Ryu Kün-il.⁴⁹ In those years, Kang Chun-man was, despite the success of his 1995 monograph, mostly writing as a voice from outside the established intellectual spectrum. Kang’s views were a minority, but they were later taken on by Anti-Chosun activists. While Kang did also point out issues concerning the history and historical views of *Chosun ilbo*, his main interests were laying out the relationship between politicians and journalists, and the reliance of intellectuals on big media to gain a stage for discourse, and media reform.

KBS’s Reform Documentary and Chosun ilbo, April–September 1998

In addition to Kang and his pioneering role in the *Chosun* issue, an incident surrounding a documentary program at KBS (Korea Broadcasting Station) in April–September 1998 brought to light the newspaper’s difficult relationship with its own past. As part of a larger reform of Korea’s public broadcaster, the production of a three-episode documentary to shed light on the close relationship between politics and media during the Fifth Republic, titled *Ije nün mal handa* (이제는 말한다 Now speak about it), was in planning by a newly formed journalistic team. In addition to critically examining KBS’s own role during those years, a separate episode on *Chosun ilbo* was planned to air as part of this program on 3 May.⁵⁰




Figure 1 A caricature printed in the progressive *Hankyoreh* on 30 April 1998, following a week of events in which it was made public that a planned KBS documentary critically examining the history of *Chosun ilbo* during the autocratic period would not be aired.



Figure 2 An article in the November 1998 issue of *Wŏlgan chosun*, which caused the Choi Chang-jip Incident. In it, Choi’s scholarship is distorted and misquoted to paint him as a “pro-North” “leftist” and to undermine his credibility as a presidential advisor.

However, neither of the planned episodes did air. Instead, as an article in *Hankyoreh* from 21 April made public, pressure was put on the production team from both within KBS and from outside to change the title of the program.⁵¹ Only on 3–4 September, after a tumultuous back and forth, and repeated pressure from *Chosun ilbo*, did two episodes on KBS’s and *Chosun*’s past entanglement with politics during the autocratic period air, under the name of “Media and power, avoiding responsibility.”⁵² This was met, unsurprisingly, with opposition from *Chosun ilbo* and *Tonga ilbo*,⁵³ but no further actions from the newspaper(s)

followed. This incident reveals that concerning its history, *Chosun ilbo* was determined to suppress any criticism, and Korea's public broadcaster in mid-1998 was ready to succumb to such pressure.

The Ch'oe Chang-jip Incident and the Origins of Anti-Chosun

In the November issue of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn* (Monthly Chosun), an article concerning the scholarship of Ch'oe Chang-jip (Choi Chang-jip) (최장집 崔章集), a distinguished historian of the Korean War and a renowned political scientist,⁵⁴ who in 1998 was serving as advisor to President Kim Dae-jung, was published.⁵⁵ The article takes Ch'oe's scholarship out of context, quoting Ch'oe writing that Kim Il Sung's decision to attack the South in 1950 was a "historic step" (*yŏksajŏgin kyŏldan*), and that the biggest victims of the war were the people (*minjung*) in the North. This was taken as proof by the author of the article, as well as the journalist Yi Han-u (Lee Han-u 이한우 李翰雨)⁵⁶ in two follow-up articles in the daily,⁵⁷ that Ch'oe's historical views were damaging Southern legitimacy and constituting a "pro-North" stance—in other words punishable under South Korea's anti-communist National Security Law.⁵⁸ *Chosun ilbo* journalists went so far as to narrate the articles as a "thought inspection" (*sasang kŏmjŭng* 思想檢證), bringing back the darkest day of the Red Purge in authoritarian South Korea.⁵⁹

On 23 October, Ch'oe sued the newspaper for 500 million won in damages over distorting and misquoting his historical views, demanding a prohibition of the distribution of the November issue.⁶⁰ On 11 November, the Seoul District Court reached a verdict, forcing a prohibition of distribution for *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*'s November issue, for *Chosun ilbo* to delete all related articles from the internet, and arguing that *Chosun ilbo*'s actions constituted a defamation of Ch'oe's scholarship.⁶¹ The newspaper filed an appeal. On 19 January 2000, however, Ch'oe declared that he would withdraw his lawsuit, having reached a mediation with *Chosun ilbo*.⁶²

While the Ch'oe Incident appeared to have ended with the settlement between the two parties, criticism toward *Chosun ilbo* had been intensifying since November, centering on the two journals *Inmul kwa sasang* and *Mal*, in particular the writings of Kang Chun-man and Chŏng Chi-hwan (정지환), which intensified in the weeks after the Incident.⁶³ In one article, Kang introduces Yi as an academic with an expertise in Ch'oe's writings, astonished to read that Yi himself wrote the article from 26 October.⁶⁴ For Kang, Yi Han-u's case—similar to that of Yu Kŭn-il—exemplifies a "false consciousness" of *Chosun ilbo* journalists as "running the country."⁶⁵ The *Chosun ilbo* journalists Kang terms a "private army," who were shaken by the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung administration, which,

for *Chosun ilbo*, marked a watershed in which it lost its close relationship to the corridors of power.⁶⁶ In this context, Kang observes a shift to the right in Yi since joining *Chosun ilbo*, a "metamorphosis into a cold-hearted 'contractor' who runs a knife into the revered professor at his alma mater."⁶⁷ Chŏng Chi-hwan connects the controversy to a "*ch'inil(p'a)* complex," introducing Yi as an example of a "schizophrenic journalist." Acknowledging that, while Yi may be an outstanding thinker, "there are serious issues with his 'intellectual conscience,'" and, furthermore, highlights, just as Kang does, that Yi, even after he joined *Chosun ilbo* in 1995, had previously highly evaluated Ch'oe's scholarship and even quoted him within his own writings on Syngman Rhee.⁶⁸ Thus, to Chŏng, Yi's participation in the witch-hunt was schizophrenic, i.e., academically accepting Ch'oe's writings but, for the sake of *Chosun ilbo* and its negative reporting on the Kim Dae-jung administration, denouncing his "thoughts."

On 1 December, Yi Han-u filed a lawsuit in the Seoul District Court against Kang, Chŏng, and Kang Chun-u,⁶⁹ demanding one-hundred million won compensation for defamation from each for the two articles introduced above.⁷⁰ With public interest in the issue having faded after Ch'oe's settlement with the newspaper, Kang and Chŏng were forced to fight defamation lawsuits without significant media interest. Aggravating this difficulty was the fact that, aside from a number of articles in *Hankyoreh*, other newspapers were not reporting the developments.⁷¹

However, through the activities of Kang Chun-man fighting his defamation lawsuit, the *Chosun ilbo* issue gradually gained traction in the wake of the Ch'oe Incident. In April–June 1999, two books on the issue were published,⁷² assembling intellectuals (like Kim Tong-min or Yu Si-min) who later became central within the Anti-Chosun Movement. In addition, Kang launched a "Find-your-place-movement" (Che Mok Ch'ajajugi Undong 제 몫 찾아주기 운동), a movement to stop buying the newspaper. Already on 19 November 1998, he had established the Joint Measures Committee on Falsifying and Distorted Reporting in the *Chosun Ilbo* (*Chosŏn Ilbo Hŏwi*—Waegok Podo Kongdong Taech'aek Wiwŏnhoe 조선일보 허위·왜곡 보도 공동대책위원회).⁷³ However, as Kim Tong-min notes, these activities were seriously weakened when Ch'oe decided to settle with *Chosun ilbo*, leaving little room for further developments towards a *Chosun ilbo*-critical movement.⁷⁴ While Kang and Chŏng continued fighting their lawsuits, such "militant writings"⁷⁵ and focused activities began to make the *Chosun ilbo* issue gradually visible among (mostly progressive) intellectuals, laying the personnel foundations for Anti-Chosun as a movement.⁷⁶

Urimodu, “Sue me!”, and the birth of “Anti-Chosun”

One year after the Ch’oe Incident, on 19 November 1999, the Seoul district court reached a verdict in the three lawsuits against Kang Chun-man, Chŏng Chi-hwan, and Kang Chun-u, ordering Kang Chun-man and *Inmul kwa sasang* to pay seven million won of compensation and Chŏng four million won of compensation to Yi Han-u, whose honor had been, according to the court, defamed in the December 1998 articles.⁷⁷

The Establishment of Urimodu

Immediately after the verdict was made public, the bulletin board on the website of *Inmul kwa sasang* experienced a significant rise in posts, from approximately forty per day before to over two-hundred per day after the verdict.⁷⁸ Among the discussions, the idea of collecting the compensation fee through crowdfunding appeared, which was eventually accepted by Chŏng.⁷⁹ In another thread, a lengthy back and forth argument, the essayist Chin Chung-gwŏn (진중권) of *Inmul kwa sasang* and Yi Han-u clashed over the interpretations of the events since the Ch’oe Incident.⁸⁰ These heated discussions re-strengthened interest in the *Chosun ilbo* issue beyond progressive intellectuals. On 22 November 1999, only three days after the verdict became public, a new group emerged, marking the beginning of what was to turn into the “Anti-Chosun Movement”: Anti-Chosun Urimodu (안티조선 우리모두 “We are all against Chosun,” henceforth Urimodu).⁸¹ In early January 2000, a website with the same name opened its doors,⁸² becoming the discursive foundation for the Anti-Chosun Movement.⁸³

The creation of Urimodu marks the point in which the *Chosun ilbo* issue was—at the grassroots level—separated from the *Inmul kwa sasang* bulletin board.⁸⁴ With a dedicated space for discussing *Chosun ilbo*, Urimodu made the arguments of Anti-Chosun easily accessible—albeit limited to a (at this stage still) rather small number of people with access to PCs and an active interest in the issue. During these days—the exact date is impossible to verify due to technical issues—a user named “Ember” proposed the need for a more organized “Anti-Chosun” as a civic movement. In this context, the term “Anti-Chosun” (안티조선) appears to have been first used. With this, the *Chosun ilbo* issue had transformed into Anti-Chosun.⁸⁵

A column in the progressive *Hankyoreh* on 29 November further aggravated the visibility of *Chosun ilbo*-critical discourse. Reacting to the verdicts against Kang Chun-man and Chŏng Chi-hwan, Hong Se-hwa (홍세화 洪世和), a former underground activist involved in the Preparatory Committee for a National Front to Liberate South Korea (Nam-Chosŏn Minjok Haebang Chŏnsŏn Chunbi Wiwŏnhoe 남조선 민족 해방 전선준비 위원회),⁸⁶ who had lived in exile in France since 1979



Figure 3 “Chosun ilbo, sue me!,” a full-page ad in *Hankyoreh* (7 July 2000) paid for by Urimodu users. A high-resolution can be retrieved at <https://tinyurl.com/antichosun>.

(only returning to South Korea in 2002), contrasted the recent court rulings to a verdict in France. In the French case, the far-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen had successfully sued a critical journalist for defamation, only to outrage a large portion of the French left-wing as a result, who were crying “Sue me!” in unison. By introducing this example, Hong hoped to provide a rally call—“Sue me!” (*na rül koso hara!* 나를 고소하라!)—for intellectuals critical of the status quo in Korea:

My interest lies (neither in the honor of a *Chosun ilbo* journalist or the French far-right, but), to phrase it simply, in “Korea’s honor” (and) in overcoming the extremist camps in our society and their mouth piece, the *Chosun ilbo*. This is why I declare (...): “Sue me!”⁸⁷

Hong’s column resonated with the supporters of Urimodu. From the very start, the website featured a corner in which supporters could sign a petition entitled “Sue me!” The result of this campaign was a full-page ad paid by Urimodu users that was published in *Hankyoreh* in the 7 July 2000 issue under the name of “Urimodu, Citizen’s Assembly of those who Oppose *Chosun ilbo*.”⁸⁸

The ad stated, in large letters, “Hey *Chosun ilbo*, sue me!”, followed by a text explaining the main goals of the Urimodu activists and including the names and e-mail addresses of 1,748 signees over two thirds of the page. In the ad, Urimodu introduced the origins of Anti-Chosun in the Ch’oe Incident, further connecting it to the more recent developments of conservative media reporting in the 2000 general elections⁸⁹ and on the Sunshine Policy. In language highly evocative of historical events and memories, the text states: “The tragedy of a newspaper, which has repeatedly engaged in pro-Japanese, pro-dictatorship, and anti-democratic activities, calling itself the reasonable paper of the Korean people must now be corrected. (...) We must correct the wrong ways of communication (concerning inter-Korean relations and domestic polarization) and aim to condemn the arrogance of *Chosun ilbo*.”⁹⁰

The ad gave Urimodu visibility beyond its core membership. In two days, the number of signatures rose to 2,142,⁹¹ among them Ri Yōng-hŭi,⁹² an eminent figure among progressive intellectuals in contemporary South Korea. In the coming weeks, the momentum that the Anti-Chosun discourse gained out of these developments would prove crucial in transforming the issue into a movement.

The Hwang Sök-yōng Incident

Around this time, a controversy surrounding a literary prize sponsored by *Chosun ilbo* took place. In May–July, Hwang Sök-yōng (황석영 黄皙暎), a progressive novelist, got involved in the Anti-Chosun discourse. Hwang’s work has been shaped by opposition to military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s. He had

visited North Korea in 1989 and underwent voluntary exile in New York and Germany thereafter before returning to South Korea in 1993, where he was arrested on charges of violating the National Security Law (NSL) and sentenced to seven years in prison. Hwang was only released by a presidential pardon from Kim Dae-jung in 1998.

On 7 June 2000, *Seoul sinmun* reported a decision by Hwang to turn down interviews with *Chosun ilbo*.⁹³ This announcement was preceded by a dispute surrounding an interview of Hwang’s with *Chosun ilbo* published on 18 May (the anniversary of the Kwangju Massacre),⁹⁴ after which Hwang was heavily criticized by Urimodu users. Hwang’s public declaration to decline any further interviews with the newspaper was, according to the article, the first such public declaration by an intellectual. Over the next weeks, it was made public that Hwang’s novel *Orae toen chōngwōn* (오랫된 정원 The ancient garden), his first novel since the 1980s, would be nominated for the Tongin Literature Prize, an award sponsored by *Chosun ilbo*.⁹⁵

In an essay published in *Hankyoreh* on 19 July, Hwang announced that he would reject the nomination for the prize, citing *Chosun ilbo*’s “collusion with the fascist military dictatorship” and its influence as an “ideologue for the establishment” as his major reasons. He further assessed the newspaper as a “prime-example of reactionary media” whose reform is a “necessity for historical development in the context of our times.”⁹⁶ Placing his opposition to the newspaper (and the literary prize associated with it) in the context of settling past affairs, Hwang further emphasizes a need for a “detailed, mass movement for media reform that clearly lays out an alternative.”⁹⁷

Anti-Chosun as a civic movement

Against the above background, in the summer of 2000, the *Chosun ilbo* discourse significantly gained visibility, helping to transform Anti-Chosun into a civic movement. One contributing factor for this development lay in the First North-South Summit held on 15 June 2000. While progressives were unequivocally welcoming Kim Dae-jung’s policy of détente with the North, conservatives—and in particular the *Chosun ilbo*—rallied against any such attempts.

According to Kim Tong-min (김동민 金東敏), a central figure in the Anti-Chosun Movement after 2000, the atmosphere following the First North-South Summit was significantly different from that during the Ch’oe Chang-jip Incident two years earlier, with *Chosun ilbo* increasingly “opposing reforms (and) repeating confrontationist Cold War rhetoric.”⁹⁸ In order to spread awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue and ultimately re-shape the consciousness of Koreans regarding their media

landscape, an increasing number of intellectuals feel the need for establishing Anti-Chosun as a civic movement, continued Kim.⁹⁹ A second, not neglectable factor, was the establishment of new, progressive media based online—especially the internet-based newspapers *Ddanzi ilbo* (딴지일보) and *Ohmynews*. This progressive online media helped advance the popularization of Anti-Chosun ideas, as their reporting centrally featured the issue, much more so than established, progressive print media.¹⁰⁰

The Establishment of the Anti-Chosun Federation, August–October 2000

On 7 August 2000, a “First manifesto of intellectuals rejecting *Chosun ilbo*” (*Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hanŭn che-il-ja chisik’in sŏnŏn* 조선일보를 거부하는 제1차 지식인 선언) was made public, followed by three more manifestos on 11 October (2000), 4 March (2001), and 20 September (2001). These manifestos mark the point when the *Chosun ilbo* issue moved beyond a small circle of progressive intellectuals and Urimodu netizens. The language of the first, and all the following manifestos, places Anti-Chosun firmly within the language of transitional justice as a gradual, on-going process of settling the past:

South Korean society finally, at this time, has broken down the walls of autocracy and division and set off on a long journey towards democracy and peaceful unification. This is the time when we must, by reforming, settle the legacy that dictatorship, corruption, and irrationality have left us for this transitional period. Amidst the fact that not even the remnants of the Japanese Empire have been settled, there can be no bright future without setting straight the distorted history that dictators have committed. (...) Indispensable in this process is the element of mass-media.¹⁰¹

The intellectuals signing the manifesto were not only concerned about the form of institutional media, an issue that had been debated in post-authoritarian South Korea since at least the early 1990s, but also, and, especially, in raising awareness for the *Chosun ilbo* issue as one issue in an on-going process of democratization, of dealing with past affairs (과거사 정산 *kwagosa chŏngsan*), of setting history straight (역사 바로 세우기 *yŏksa paro seugi*), and of détente with North Korea.¹⁰²

Criticizing an anti-reform stance of “conservative” media, the manifesto goes on to brand *Chosun ilbo* as a “flunkeyist” (사대주의 *sadaejūi*), i.e., pro-US newspaper that “aims, without doubt, to turn back the wheel of history.”¹⁰³ Out of these reasons, the signees to the manifesto swear, as “reform-oriented or progressive intellectuals ... not to participate in this business model of *Chosun ilbo*,” ultimately demanding that *Chosun ilbo* “repents its past and apologizes in front of the citizens and the nation (minjok)” and announcing a boycott of any interview requests from

the newspaper until the first demand is met.¹⁰⁴ This first manifesto was signed by 154 people, among them historian Kim Tong-chun. The second manifesto, signed by 152 more people, also included the renowned historians Kang Man-gil, Han Hong-gu, and Chŏng Hae-gu among its signees. Together, the four manifestos were signed by 1,575 intellectuals. They were significant in opening up the *Chosun ilbo* issue beyond Kang Chun-man and *Inmul kwa sasang*, now drawing the attention of a large part of progressive intellectuals and activists.

Between late August and early October 2000, concrete plans were made to establish a civic organization dedicated to the *Chosun ilbo* issue. In this process, Kim Tong-min of the Citizen’s Council on Democratic Media (CCDM)¹⁰⁵ was a leading figure. At first, a name emphasizing the anti-reform and anti-unification stance of *Chosun ilbo* was considered.¹⁰⁶ Eventually, Federation of Citizens Opposing *Chosun ilbo* (*Chosŏn ilbo* Pandae Simin Yŏndae 조선일보 반대 시민연대, hereafter Anti-Chosun Federation or ACF) was adopted as the name of a new umbrella civil organization, assembling over 51 civic organizations under its roof, which itself was closely connected to the institutions of the CCDM. On 20 September 2000, the Anti-Chosun Federation was officially established.¹⁰⁷ On the same day, the second manifesto was released. While the basic contents of the second manifesto remained largely unchanged compared to the First Manifesto, the connection of the Anti-Chosun Movement—as the movement was soon referred to—to an on-going, transitional process of historical truth and reconciliation was apparent in this manifesto, basically the ACF’s inaugural declaration, in which the ACF emphasized *Chosun ilbo*’s “distortion of history” and its self-branding as a “conservative” newspaper.¹⁰⁸

Kim Tong-min was to serve as the ACF’s representative. As a federation, the ACF itself was rather loosely organized and closely connected institutionally to the CCDM. Even though the movement gradually broadened in scope and structure in the months after August 2000, the ACF remained a very loose organization. Unsurprisingly, its looseness sparked internal disagreements over the precise aims and ways to approach the issue. Discussions within the Anti-Chosun camp centered on: (a) progressive intellectuals publishing within the *Chosun ilbo*; (b) movements to stop buying *Chosun ilbo* or to make subscribers cancel their subscription; and (c) raising awareness through education.¹⁰⁹ For Kim, Anti-Chosun as a comprehensive movement constituted the “completion of democratization,” with the ACF taking on tasks differing from Kang Chun-man and his writing-centered activism.¹¹⁰ Despite internal discussions on the movement’s direction, raising awareness through education and other activities was to become central to the movement. Primary sources from the people involved reveal that a central motivation for Anti-Chosun activists did not lie in a “negation” of *Chosun ilbo*. Rather, in an

Table 1 Major activities carried out by the ACF between 2000 and 2004. Compiled by the author, source: ACF Homepage¹¹⁶ and CCDM.¹¹⁷

Date	Activity
2000.10.31–12.1	Public lecture. <i>Published as a monograph</i> . ¹¹⁸
2001.3.5	Assembly to demand an apology from <i>Chosun ilbo</i>
2001.3.26–5.18	One-man demonstrations in front of the <i>Chosun</i> main building
2001.9.18–21	Anti-Chosun cultural festival
2002.1.30	First civic tribunal. <i>Records published</i> ¹¹⁹
2003.4.7–9.30?	First issue of the <i>Weekly Anti-Chosun</i> . <i>Published within a monograph</i> ¹²⁰
2004.5.15	Petition for 10 million signatures demanding an apology from <i>Chosun ilbo</i> over its pro-Japanese collaborator past and ceremony to mark the beginning of an Anti-Chosun “general struggle” at the Kwangju May 18 Memorial Park
2004.10.15	Second civic tribunal against the “anti-national, pro-Japanese collaborator” <i>Chosun ilbo</i>

enlightenment fashion, involved intellectuals aimed to re-shape the consciousness of those Koreans who take the reporting of *Chosun ilbo* as “normal.” In the words of an editorial published in *Tangdae Pip'yŏng*, a progressive monthly, Anti-Chosun’s main aim lay in calling attention to the “reactionary Cold War that has been internalized as the ruling ideology by the people (*minjung*) in their daily life.”¹¹¹

The above-quoted editorial hints at a broader struggle not just against *Chosun ilbo*, but against a “Cold War reactionary establishment,” per se.¹¹² To Kim Tong-min, *Chosun ilbo* did not constitute an ordinary media outlet, but the “central organ of the reactionary political camp,” and, as such, was impossible to be reformed. It was only a subject to be overcome.¹¹³ At the same time, among Anti-Chosun activists, however, critical voices against any type of one-sided media—i.e., the *Hankyoreh* as an equally selective media for the progressive camp—were also voiced,¹¹⁴ revealing a plurality in the Anti-Chosun camp. Despite such internal factional struggles, Kim Tong-min evaluates the ACF’s establishment to have increased visibility of the *Chosun ilbo* issue not only among a large number of progressives, but also within the general public itself.¹¹⁵ However, he acknowledges that due to its nature as a federation closely tied to the CCDM, the ACF was tied by institutional constraints that prevented it from gaining more influence in the following years.

The activities in Table 1, although far from being a complete list, provide a picture into the activities of the ACF. The ACF aimed to spread its views through symbolic one-man demonstrations, but also hoped to increase its profile through

public lectures, a cultural festival, and a self-published weekly journal. As analyzed further below, the staging of two civic tribunals in 2002 and 2004 underlines how central the issue of settling past affairs had become within the Anti-Chosun camp at this stage.

With the establishment of the ACF, the Anti-Chosun Movement even started to receive attention from conservative media. The October 2000 issue of *Tonga ilbo*’s monthly *Sin tonga* featured a special focus on the Anti-Chosun Movement and its development, including a twenty-page interview with Kang Chun-man.¹²¹

The Okch’ŏn Struggle: Anti-Chosun’s Possibilities and Its Limits

While Anti-Chosun on a national level remained loose in its structure and organization, the movement was most successful on a local level, in Okch’ŏn County (옥천군 沃川郡), located just east of Taejŏn in South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. A week after the First Manifesto was proclaimed, O Han-hŭng (오한흥), president of the local newspaper *Okch’ŏn sinmun*, on 15 August 2000, formally declared “independence” from *Chosun ilbo*,¹²² establishing the Okch’ŏn Citizen’s Gathering to Properly Understand *Chosun ilbo* (*Chosŏn ilbo* Paro Pogi Okch’ŏn Simin Moim 조선일보 바로보기 옥천시민 모임) on the same day. The name was abbreviated deliberately to “Chosŏn Pabo” (lit. “*Chosun* idiots”).¹²³ The issue having first come to his attention in 1998–1999 when the CCDM had released a pamphlet to raise awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue in the wake of the Ch’oe Incident, O began to focus his actions to raise awareness of *Chosun ilbo* in the county, in particular in the context of the on-going collaborator discourse.¹²⁴

Activists involved in the Okch’ŏn group began referring to themselves as “*mulch’ong* (water gun) independence army” (abbreviated as *Mulch’ong* 물총). The local Anti-Chosun Movement was soon known as the “Okch’ŏn Struggle” (*Okch’ŏn chŏnt’u* 옥천전투) in the rest of South Korea. The language used in the local Anti-Chosun Movement in Okch’ŏn was militaristic and historical in its connotations and confrontational in its tone. O did proclaim “independence” (독립 *tongnip*) on 15 August, the day South Korea commemorates its liberation or independence from Japanese colonial rule. As such, the influence of *Chosun ilbo* on South Korean society was syntactically compared to being under colonial rule. A logo used on the *Mulch’ong* website in its early days features a dog urinating on *Chosun ilbo*.¹²⁵ This, Kim Tong-min argues, was no coincidence: instead, Anti-Chosun in Okch’ŏn was crucially connected to the collaborator discourse.¹²⁶ In Okch’ŏn, *Chosun ilbo* was primarily perceived as a pro-Japanese, i.e., anti-national, treacherous newspaper. With *ch’inilp’a* as its main slogan, Anti-Chosun was able to capture a significant amount of attention in the county. Kim asserts that the local

success of Anti-Chosun in Okch'ŏn was made possible only by the presence of a strong local newspaper—O Han-hŭng's *Okch'ŏn sinmun*. Unlike in most regions of South Korea, in which the big conglomerates dominate the market, Okch'ŏn possessed a strong local media and, on top of that, a newspaper owner who was heavily interested in the Anti-Chosun discourse from a historical perspective.

This primarily local Anti-Chosun Movement was quite successful, reducing the number of *Chosun ilbo* subscriptions from approximately 1,200 to 1,500 down to 370 in a county of roughly 60,000 inhabitants.¹²⁷ The local success was chronicled visually in a 77-minute documentary in 2001.¹²⁸ Furthermore, over the next years, events such as national Anti-Chosun gatherings, or “Anti-Chosun marathons” were held in the county. Although aims to form Mulch'ong on a national scale appeared,¹²⁹ the success of Okch'ŏn was not reciprocated elsewhere, despite similar organizations having existed—mostly in the form of netizens—throughout the country. The case of Okch'ŏn, with the presence of a strong regional newspaper and the intertwining with the *ch'inilp'a* discourse, reveals the prospects and limits of Anti-Chosun in early 2000s South Korean society.

Roh Moo-hyun and Anti-Chosun

In hindsight, “we now know”—as historian John L. Gaddis put it—that, after a tumultuous election year, Roh Moo-hyun, narrowly defeating Lee Hoi-chang (= Yi Hoe-ch'ang 이회창) of the Grand National Party, got elected as the ninth president of South Korea in December 2002. Despite Roh's eventual victory, however, until November the same year, even his candidacy on the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) ticket seemed unclear.¹³⁰

Roh Moo-hyun, a high-school graduate who had studied for the bar exam on his own, was an antithesis to South Korea's establishment. Although serving a single term as member of the national assembly from 1988 to 1992, Roh had not managed to re-gain a seat in the upcoming elections, despite his popularity among many ordinary voters. In 1996, he took the gamble of running against Lee Myung-bak, the later president and antithesis to Roh, in the prestigious seat of Jongno, and lost.¹³¹ In 2000, despite the possibility of successfully running in Jongno, Roh went (back) to run in Pusan, a staunchly conservative city, and lost again. In 2000, after he failed to get re-elected for parliament for a third time in a row, Roh's political future seemed unclear. At a time when the Anti-Chosun Movement was just emerging, the 2000 legislative elections were accompanied by the activities of the 2000 General Election Citizen's Federation (2000-nyŏn Ch'ongsŏn Simin Yŏndae 2000 년총선 시민연대, hereafter GECS), a nongovernmental organization (NGO) formed under the umbrella of People's Solidarity

for Participatory Democracy (Ch'amyŏ Yŏndae 참여연대, hereafter PSPD).¹³² The GECS released a list of candidates it hoped to get voted out in the elections, and support candidates they hoped were to assist in the process of political reform. At the time, it was formally illegal for civic organizations to voice support for a political candidate, leading conservative media to discredit the GECS as illegal or even as “terror” against the political establishment.¹³³ Although the conservatives emerged as the victorious party from the elections, the 2000 elections and the activities of the GECS are evaluated as having successfully politicized South Korean NGOs.¹³⁴

In the wake of Roh's defeat in Pusan, supporters of Roh Moo-hyun established the Assembly of Those who Love Roh Moo-hyun (No Mu-hyŏn ūl Sarang hanŭn Saram ūi Moim 노무현을 사랑하는 사람의 모임, abbr. as Nosamo / 노사모), an online-based political “fan club” for Roh and his ideas.¹³⁵ The first such organization of its kind, Nosamo was to prove crucial in the process of electing Roh to president in 2002. Meanwhile, Roh served as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries from August 2000 to March 2001. On 10 December 2001, Roh announced that he would run for president on a ticket for the MDP. In April–May 2002, the MDP was holding party-internal primaries—the first such in South Korean history allowing ordinary party members to participate in the electoral process. At that point, within the party, Yi In-jae or Chung Tong-yŏng seemed to be the likely candidates for the ticket. However, in the second and third primaries in Ulsan and Kwangju on 10 and 16 March, Roh managed to defeat his opponents. Particularly in Kwangju, Roh made a strong showing, and, despite Yi victories in Daejeon and South Chungcheong, Roh carried most of the remaining primaries. Rhetoric in the primary contests was at times fierce, and throughout the elections, an influence of Anti-Chosun discourse on ordinary party members, but also on Roh himself, was apparent.¹³⁶

On 6 April, in his speech for the Incheon primary (which Roh carried with 51.9% of the vote), Roh explicitly criticized *Chosun ilbo* (and other conservative media) in a speech that did not just heavily attack his party-internal opponent(s), but clearly reveals how Anti-Chosun had an effect on his political views:

Conspiracy theories. Red Purge. Unfounded schemes. Stop these now! It is tough to defend yourself against the badmouthing of the GNP and *Chosun ilbo* kissing each other's heads. (...) I never said, not now and not in the past, to nationalize media. (Yet,) I am attacked (by conservative media) because I am not bending to pressure to abandon owner share limitations. I must not become a president who (...) is submissive to the media. (...) *Tonga ilbo*, *Chosun ilbo*: keep your hands off the MDP primary!¹³⁷



Figure 4 A commemorative photo in front of a sculpture of the poet Chŏng Chi-yong taken to proclaim the “independence” of Okch’ŏn from *Chosun ilbo* in order to create a “beautiful world without *Chosun ilbo*.” 15 August 2000. Source: *Ohmynews*.

At the background of this speech lay a primary in which Yi, Roh’s major rival to the party ticket, denounced Roh as “red,” “leftist,” and “pro-North,” and in which the three major newspapers (*Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, *Chungang ilbo*) took a decisive pro-Yi, anti-Roh stance in their reporting on the MDP primaries,¹³⁸ a result of Roh’s stance on media since a tax investigation of media outlets in the first half of 2001.¹³⁹

Roh himself had, already in mid-November 2001, announced that he would boycott any interviews with *Chosun ilbo*, adopting one of Anti-Chosun’s key demands—boycotting the newspaper.¹⁴⁰ However, Roh’s strained relationship with *Chosun ilbo* dates back to his first term as lawmaker. As Yu Si-min, a later aide of Roh’s, pointed out, *Wŏlgan Chosun* published articles suggesting a hidden wealth in 1991, leading Roh to sue *Chosun ilbo* for defamation, a trial that he ultimately won.¹⁴¹ For *Chosun ilbo*—and other conservatives—Roh’s biography was repeatedly exploited to discredit him. For Roh, whose political agenda consisted of overcoming the country’s political regionalism, as well as strongly advocating for further historical fact-finding in regards to past state violence, this staunch opposition from conservative circles pushed him to, against all

odds, strengthen his ideals. Preceding his run for president, at an event on media reform and Korean politics in July 2001 in Taegu (organized by a “netizen school of journalism” including representatives of *Ohmynews*, *Hankyoreh*, *Inmul kwa sasang*, and the Taegu branch of Anti-Chosun), Roh spoke in the language of a transitional period, equating conservative media with an “on-living red purge,” urging for the need of both media reform and a “reform of history.”¹⁴²

However, Roh himself never publicly declared himself to support Anti-Chosun. Rather, Anti-Chosun played a significant role throughout the primary and election process on the grassroots level. Nosamo—which was not directly connected to Roh—was very close with the Anti-Chosun camp. Its first chairman Myŏng Kye-nam (명계남), a movie actor, attended an assembly of Anti-Chosun activists in Okch’ŏn in January 2002.¹⁴³ Already by April, the organization had called for the need to curb subscription numbers of *Chosun* and other conservative dailies.¹⁴⁴ Amidst the MDP primaries, the organization laid out “watching” *Chosun ilbo* (and *Donga ilbo*), intellectually attacking, and bringing down their subscription numbers as three crucial tasks for Nosamo during the upcoming election on 29 April.¹⁴⁵ During the primaries, Nosamo received over 1.9 million applications for membership, significantly growing in size. In May, Nosamo openly attacked *Chosun ilbo*. Not “seeing *Chosun* as media,” Nosamo excluded the newspaper from access to its activities, and stated that, besides the goals of press monitoring, lowering subscription numbers, and reforming the election law, Nosamo would declare media reform a number-one priority, more important than Roh becoming president.¹⁴⁶ Both the ACF and Mulch’ŏng highly welcomed Myŏng’s remarks, expecting to provide a foundation for a broader movement.¹⁴⁷ *Ohmynews* took this as an omen that Anti-Chosun was witnessing a second rebirth.¹⁴⁸ *Chosun*



Figure 5 Anti-Chosun fans distributed by Joase during the 2002 soccer world cup. Source: *Ohmynews*, 24 June 2002.



Figure 6 Joase activists handing out Anti-Chosun material in the streets of Seoul, September 2002. Source: *Ohmynews*, 19 September 2002.

ilbo reacted to these developments, decrying Nosamo as a “vulgar organization.” Myōng, on the other hand, defended his actions, defining Nosamo as a civic, not a political, movement.¹⁴⁹

In an interview with *Ohmynews*, Myōng explained that a movement to make people stop reading *Chosun ilbo* was ultimately a movement to “present our members with sources revealing the harmful effects of *Chosun ilbo*, and show them the pro-Japanese, anti-national actions of this newspaper.”¹⁵⁰ In other words, Myōng and Nosamo, at this point, were openly embracing the discursive foundations laid out by the activities of Kang Chun-man and the activists involved in Urimodu, the ACE, and Mulch’ong throughout Korea. Just as in these other developments, the *ch’inilp’a*-card—as a metaphor for past betrayal, opportunism, and state violence—became central to the opposition to *Chosun ilbo* within the pro-Roh camp during the 2002 elections.

Anti-Chosun as a mass-movement: the establishment of Joase (Choase)

At the same time that Anti-Chosun began to play a role in the presidential elections, another new stream of Anti-Chosun was beginning to form itself: “A Beautiful World Without *Chosun Ilbo* (*Chosŏn Ilbo Őmnŭn Arŭmdaun Sesang* 조선일보 없는 아름다운 세상, abbrev. Joase or 조아세). Unlike the Anti-Chosun groups so far, who remained largely centered within intellectuals, a local area, or the internet, Joase had from the start aimed at “taking Urimodu to the streets” as a broad civic



Figure 7 *Ttak*, a pamphlet produced by Joase, distributed roughly 400,000 times.

movement aiming to “transform and spread Anti-Chosun as a movement into daily life.”¹⁵¹ Acknowledging influence in the success of three recent grassroots communities—Urimodu, Nosamo, and Insamo¹⁵²—Joase hopes lay in uniting these camps and their shared interest for Anti-Chosun, thus raising awareness for the need of, and paving the way for a substantial media reform. Established in June 2002¹⁵³—during the 2002 football world cup—and led by Im Hyōn-gu (임현구), a website, www.joase.org, went online in July 2002. Joase’s name itself was certainly influenced by O Han-hŭng’s proclamation of “independence” on 15 August 2000. The same name—“a beautiful world without *Chosun ilbo*”—had been used at the one-year anniversary event in Okch’ōn and, by early November 2001, as the title of a pamphlet produced in Okch’ōn with the attempt to make the Okch’ōn Struggle a broader, more national movement.

One of Joase’s first activities was the distribution of roughly 220,000 Anti-Chosun round fans during the world cup.¹⁵⁴ While the South Korean team was showing a remarkable performance at the tournament, Joase activists seized the momentum to highlight how, in their eyes, *Chosun ilbo* was using its monopoly to spread its views into Korean society. In this case, activists emphasized how, just a few months prior, *Chosun ilbo* had held highly negative views towards Guus Hiddink, the Dutch coach of Korea’s national team.

However, from the start, Joase’s activities revealed—despite their goal of reforming the Korean media system—a centrality of the *ch’inilp’a* discourse. On 15 August 2002, the memorial day marking the liberation from Japanese colonial



Figure 8 A scene from a national Anti-Chosun gathering in central Seoul under the slogan of “*Chosun ilbo*, enemy of peace, enemy of the people,” involving activists from the ACF, Mulch’ong, Joase, and other organizations. Source: *Ohmynews*, 17 November 2002.



Figure 9 A Joase demonstration in front of the Independence Hall of Korea in Chŏnam City, South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province. The front banner reads: “An (Independence) Hall or a Collaborator Memorial?”. Source: *Ohmynews*, 1 March 2003.

rule, some 40 Joase activists together with members of the Kyŏnggi CCDM staged a demonstration in front of the Independence Hall of Korea in Ch’ŏnan.¹⁵⁵ At the gate, activists demanded the removal of a rotary press used by *Chosun ilbo* during the colonial period. Furthermore, Joase activists installed a temporary exhibition, highlighting the “pro-Japanese” past of *Chosun ilbo*. By doing so, Joase hoped to raise awareness about the nature of *Chosun ilbo* as a collaborationist newspaper,

as opposed to its official memory as an “ethnic newspaper” (*minjokji*)—a term that activists demanded the same day be omitted from school textbooks in reference to *Chosun ilbo*. In September, Joase released a booklet, *Ttak!* (딱! Like this!). Where previous activities by Kang Chung-man or the ACF had included a compilation of books or organized lectures, Joase put together its main arguments in an easily digestible form,¹⁵⁶ taking Anti-Chosun directly to the people by distributing *Ttak!* at busy places throughout Seoul: bus terminals, subway stations, or in front of sport events.¹⁵⁷ Just before the Ch’usŏk holidays, Joase activists gathered at bus terminals to spread the message beyond urban areas. By then, over 400,000 copies of *Ttak!* had been distributed in less than a month.¹⁵⁸ By this time, Joase had grown to roughly 1,500 members, of which 300–400 were heavily involved in the organization’s activities.¹⁵⁹ In a relatively short span of time, Joase had thus emerged as a third major stream of Anti-Chosun activism, taking a prominent spot at events like a national assembly of Anti-Chosun groups held on 17 November 2002 (figure 8), or the demonstration mentioned above in front of the Independence Hall of Korea on 1 March 2003 (figure 9).¹⁶⁰

The success of Joase and its activities garnered a reaction from *Chosun ilbo*. On 23 October, *Chosun ilbo*’s head office formally sued Joase for, among others, obstruction of business and defamation of honor.¹⁶¹ Unlike previous defamation suites, this was the first time that *Chosun ilbo*, as a company,¹⁶² sued a civic movement. To progressive observers, this was proof of the success of Joase and a sense of crisis for *Chosun ilbo*.¹⁶³ Joase’s activities, however, rarely uncovered new facts—this work had been mostly carried out by Kang or the ACF earlier. Also, subscription numbers themselves did not change significantly (with the sole exception of Okch’ŏn County).

Joase marks the emergence of Anti-Chosun as a visible grassroots movement within the greater city of Seoul. Its success lay in taking the discourse onto the streets, and by doing so raising the profile of Anti-Chosun far into other layers of society. An opinion poll from 14 August 2002, published by *Newsweek Korea*, shows a strong support for Anti-Chosun among Koreans in their 20s and 30s.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, regarding influence as opposed to subscription numbers, the gap between KBS as the country’s most-influential media, and *Chosun ilbo*, was said to have widened significantly during the first half of 2002, with the influence of *Chosun ilbo*’s major editorialists (Kim Tae-jung, Ryu Kŭn-il [Yuu Kŭn-il] and Cho Kap-je [Cho Gap-je]¹⁶⁵), having also dropped significantly.¹⁶⁶ The Anti-Chosun camp, however, decided to fight back. In a press conference held on 8 November 2002, Joase announced that it would counter-sue the newspaper: “The issue of *Chosun ilbo*, i.e., (...) in order to cater to the pro-Japanese and pro-US flunkeyists, as well as the military dictatorship, has been committing to false, distorted, and

biased reporting, and recently has been negligent. (...) We accuse *Chosun ilbo* on the altar of ethnic history.”¹⁶⁷

As such, the year 2002 marks the time when Anti-Chosun took an important place within Korean progressives. Not only did Anti-Chosun, through the activities of Nosamo, albeit indirectly, play a crucial role in the presidential election, but also, through the activities of Joase, gained influence among (mostly younger) Koreans.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration, Anti-Chosun, and the emergence of the New Right

Unsurprisingly, Roh Moo-hyun maintained his critical stance toward conservative media even after he was inaugurated president in February 2003. The conservative dailies, too, continued—just as they had done during the Kim Dae-jung administration—to sharply criticize the new administration. For Nosamo, the election of Roh as president, marked a crossroads. While some called for the dissolution of the NGO, the ACF chairman Kim Tong-min, in an article published in *Ohmynews*, called for Nosamo to openly embrace Anti-Chosun and media reform as its central task, seeing support for Roh against *Chojungdong*, an acronym for the three big conservative dailies *Chosun ilbo*, *Joongang ilbo*, and *Tonga ilbo*.¹⁶⁸ Strongly against any disbandment of Nosamo, another *Ohmynews* article argues that “defending Roh from the nepotist press and the reactionary establishment” and preparing for the upcoming 2004 general election are the upcoming tasks for Nosamo and supporters.¹⁶⁹ Media reform, in other words, was at the forefront of progressive hopes by the end of 2002. Gradually, within the supporters behind Roh, the bogey man had shifted from *Chosun ilbo* to *Chojungdong*. Taken together, the term *chokpöl öllon* (적벌 언론 elite clan-owned media), in combination with *sugu seryök* (수구 세력 reactionary camp) and *kidükkwön* (기득권 establishment), was increasingly used by progressives in their advocacy for media reform.¹⁷⁰ The reactionary establishment, to Nosamo supporters, consisted of the reactionary press, the *ch'inilp'a*, and the remnants of military dictatorship, which were seen within the GNP, the strongest party within the South Korean parliament.¹⁷¹

The fears of Nosamo activists proved true when, just a year later, Roh faced an impeachment orchestrated by the GNP, before the general election. Roh, who had voiced support for his newly-created United Uri Party (Yöllin Uri-dang 열린우리당, hereafter Uri party), was said to have broken a law that requires presidents to remain neutral for legislative elections. Nevertheless, the Uri Party managed to gain a decisive victory in the elections, giving the progressives—for the first time in South Korean history—a majority in the national assembly. In October 2004, Roh's

government announced the will to undertake a significant media reform, along with abolishing the NSL and reforming the nation's education system. Despite Roh's parliamentary majority, the anticipated reforms of 2004 failed. Roh's attempted media reform and his on-going critical stance toward conservative media spurred a reorientation among disillusioned conservatives. Aided by the three conservative dailies, the so-called New Right movement emerged,¹⁷² ultimately gaining significant influence in the corridors of power during the Lee Myung-bak administration.¹⁷³ Although initially framed as an attempt to overcome existing divisions within South Korean politics and society,¹⁷⁴ in the long term, their rise and eventual influence on the GNP rather cemented existing rifts, especially in relation to the issues of media reform and historical memory or truth and reconciliation.

Of course, Anti-Chosun was by far not the only factor in this development. The prevalence of the collaborator discourse among progressives amidst Roh's push for a state-led truth and reconciliation commission, as well as continuing détente with North Korea, and a de-centralization of history textbooks, all did their part in gearing up conservatives—now under the banner of a “new” right—for relentless opposition to Roh and the progressive camp. The political and ideological coordinates of post-authoritarian South Korea had, by this point, reached a level that remained unchanged for the next 10 to 15 years.

Observations: Anti-Chosun and historical memory

Kim Tong-min was one of the activists most actively involved in raising awareness of the *Chosun ilbo* issue in regards to history and historical memory. He emphasized the function of Anti-Chosun in the wider context of setting history straight:

The first act that we must carry out in order to open up the history of a new era is (...) to thoroughly repent and settle wrong history. It is impossible to create a new, healthy history without assessing and settling the mistakes of the past.¹⁷⁵

In this context, Anti-Chosun mainly focused on three issues: (1) *Chosun ilbo* as a pro-Japanese, i.e., collaborationist newspaper before liberation; (2) the close connection between *Chosun ilbo* and Park Chung-hee during the 1960s and 1970s; and (3) the history of *Chosun ilbo* in connection to the Kwangju Massacre and the rise of the Chun Doo-hwan regime.¹⁷⁶ Taken together, Kim terms this the “three submissive histories of *Chosun ilbo*.”¹⁷⁷

Regarding the *ch'inilp'a* issue, Kim Tong-min highlights that, against the newspaper's own history as a proud, ethnic newspaper, *Chosun ilbo* instead was opportunistic during the colonial period, especially during the war years after 1937.¹⁷⁸ The issue, however, is further intertwined with the post-liberation elite.

That is, in the shadow of the emerging Cold War, attempts to purge and convict former collaborators were interrupted in the name of anti-communism, and many former collaborators retained their posts, forming the core of the ROK elite after the 1960s. This history is referred to by Kim as a “concealment of the past,”¹⁷⁹ and reflects criticism that was already made by Kang Chun-man four years earlier.¹⁸⁰

In the eyes of Kim, these activities were considered treacherous to the Korean nation:

[After liberation,] those who were pro-Japanese during the period of the Japanese Empire almost unequivocally prolonged their political life by taking a pro-US stance. *Chosun ilbo* walked precisely the same way. They had no interest in the future of either the state (*kukka*) or the nation (*minjok*) (...).

As a newspaper speaking for the nation, in other words a national newspaper (*minjokji*), seen through the context of world history, [*Chosun ilbo*] had to take on the role of correctly reading international affairs after the end of WWII, provide a course for national history, and determine the strength of the people (*minjung*). At that time, the historical task [of Koreans] can be expressed by the creation of a unified, independent, sovereign state. What did the *Chosun ilbo* do?

Just like other pro-Japanese collaborators who spent the liberation period in hiding, President Pang U-yŏng groped for resurgence by adopting a pro-US, anti-communist ideological stance. To say nothing of repenting for his pro-Japanese activities, he once again started walking an anti-national (*pan-minjok*) road.¹⁸¹

Kang Chun-man, who is sometimes referred to as a “moderate,” as opposed to “progressive,” on the other hand is cautious against such judgements. Instead of mainly criticizing *Chosun ilbo*'s history, Kang rather draws attention to the role of the newspaper in creating and influencing historical memory.¹⁸²

Taking the memory of Syngman Rhee as an example, Kang laments a tendency to judge Rhee as either black or white, to either glorify or condemn his image. To Kang, such simplified memory raises caution, emphasizing the need to focus on newspapers and their role in the creation and revision of historical memory.¹⁸³ Kang evaluates the mid-1990s' nostalgia for Park Chung-hee and conservative attempts at glorifying Syngman Rhee as a “PR success” of the establishment in trying to keep their influence over South Korean society.¹⁸⁴ Over-focusing on the successful economic development in historical memory, Kang argues, helped keep the political corruption and other negative aspects originating in the Park Chung-hee era outside of the historical consciousness of most South Koreans. This, he emphasizes, was also a responsibility of academics who had failed to gain influence over the broader public.¹⁸⁵ In regard to *Chosun ilbo* as a *ch'inilp'a* paper, activists tend to fall into a discursive trap, simplifying historical development

through the lens of the present, driven by agendas focused on domestic affairs. This is perhaps most visible in the repeated and harsh critique of *Chosun ilbo* as a pro-Japanese newspaper, especially during the war years. Between 1937 and 1940, before being discontinued in August 1940, the newspaper had printed portraits of the Japanese Emperor for New Year and had the Japanese flag atop its head. Whereas activists use this as proof for the treacherous nature of the paper in Korean history,¹⁸⁶ historical scholarship requires a subtler evaluation of this period. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, the start of an eight-year long war and an increasing militarization of Japanese society, one may critically ask if, as a newspaper in a colony, *Chosun ilbo* had any realistic choice if it wanted to continue publishing. And that, while *Chosun ilbo*'s role in post-liberation anti-communist South Korea is a legitimate subject for critique, *Chosun ilbo* during the colonial period must be also evaluated as a newspaper that had helped to spread the Korean vernacular at a time when Korean was degraded to a second-class language.

Concerning *Chosun ilbo*'s past during the 1970s and 1980s, problem awareness following the Anti-Chosun Federation's establishment in 2000 is strikingly similar to the points outlined in Kang's 1992 essay introduced above. For example, Kim Tong-min highlights the salutatory editorials published in the newspaper on 18



Figure 10 A scene from the (first) Civic Trial against *Chosun ilbo*'s anti-ethnic and anti-unification actions, organized by a committee including key figures of the ACF and Mulch'ong, 30 January 2002, Seoul Press Center, 20 F. *Ohmynews*, 15 October 2004.

October 1972, following the proclamation of the Yushin constitution, in which *Chosun ilbo* welcomes the reform as “just the right measure at just the right time ... for improving the democratic system.”¹⁸⁷ What differs from Kang’s problem awareness in 1992 was that, by 2000, the thirty years of military dictatorship had been connected to the *ch’inilp’a* discourse, with hopes by Kim and others of the ACF to make *Chosun ilbo* repent for its past in this context.¹⁸⁸

The same must be said for the third issue that directed the attention of Anti-Chosun activists, the Kwangju Massacre and *Chosun ilbo*’s role in it. Kwangju received much more attention by activists than the 1960s and 1970s. While the 1950s to 1970s remained, for most Koreans in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a rather distant past, the events of May 1980 and its aftermath were central to not just intellectuals and other former student activists, but were at the core of a post-authoritarian consciousness.¹⁸⁹ For the progressive camp, Kwangju constitutes a formative moment. A series of articles idolizing Chun Doo-hwan in the months following Kwangju were used by activists to highlight *Chosun ilbo*’s close relationship with power during the 1980s: the first was an article titled “Chun Doo-hwan, the human” from 23 August 1980, painting a picture of a man who “put public before private.”¹⁹⁰ The second was an article from a week later, on 28 August, when *Chosun ilbo* hailed Chun’s election to president as the “beginning of a new era” and, for the next years, remained in a close relationship with the Chun regime.¹⁹¹ The *Chosun ilbo* articles concerning Kwangju and the rise to power by Chun, for Kim Tong-min, were “not even journalistic articles. They are highly agitating essays full of distortions,” which continued throughout the 1980s.¹⁹² As Kang previously argued, and activists repeated time and again, *Chosun ilbo*’s rise in the 1980s is hard to imagine without this currying of favor from Chun and his regime.

Throughout the period covered in this article, from the Ch’oe Chang-jip Incident (1998) to the election of Roh Moo-hyun (2002), historical memory constituted a central place within the Anti-Chosun discourse. Kim emphasizes that in the context of an on-going process of historical truth and reconciliation, “the tragedy of Korean contemporary history is the fact that we were never able to interrupt and settle a wrong course of history,”¹⁹³ revealing a strong continuity with minjung historical views of the 1970s and 1980s.¹⁹⁴ Anti-Chosun, as a movement to settle past affairs and shed light on the past, can be thus solidly placed within the epistemological framework of transitional justice from below. This was most visible in the staging of two civic tribunals in January 2002 and October 2004. The tribunals, which were purely symbolic from a judicial point of view, were organized by a joint committee involving members of the ACE, the CCDM, and O Han-hŭng from Okch’ŏn. In the first tribunal, which was set up as a spiritual successor to the 1948–1949 *ch’inilp’a*

commission, *Chosun ilbo* was accused of being, through its collaboration with the ruling elite, “anti-national” (*pan-minjok*) and “anti-unification” (*pan-t’ongil*) in the period of colonial rule, under the Park and Chun regimes, and into post-authoritarian South Korea after 1987.¹⁹⁵ At the trial, *Chosun ilbo* was accused of, among other points, “destroying the constitutional order,”¹⁹⁶ and, through its reporting in the spring and summer of 1980, preventing the spread of democracy and sabotaging, in a malicious way, those who were fighting for democratization and unification.¹⁹⁷ As with most of the Anti-Chosun Movement, the *ch’inilp’a*-card was prominent, with activists connecting past collaboration to recent, pro-US flunkeyism, such as the unequivocal support of the US through *Chosun ilbo* in the wake of 9.11, or the newspaper’s stance on US troop withdrawal.¹⁹⁸ Although the trials had no legal implications for *Chosun ilbo*, the indictments present the most extensive collection of problematic articles to date. With the materials of the first trial released as a book in April 2002, we can conclude that the trial was influential in further sensitizing progressives for the issue and providing activists with material for their activities.

Concluding remarks

In 2010, *Chosun ilbo* remained the leading newspaper on the South Korean market.¹⁹⁹ Although absolute numbers for subscriptions to the newspaper have been going down since 2010, proportions remain largely unchanged to the present day. This demonstrates that, speaking in absolute numbers, the Anti-Chosun Movement can hardly be considered a success. However, it is unclear how much these numbers actually tell us about influence. In February 2021, the Korea Audit Bureau of Circulation came under investigation by the authorities for exaggerating circulation numbers by as much as double, a measure that would ultimately benefit the three big conglomerates.²⁰⁰

Taken together, Anti-Chosun as a discourse and a movement was significant in that its rhetoric and goals represent a quintessence of progressive discourse in late-1990s and early-2000s’ South Korea. Progressives came to perceive *Chosun ilbo* not just as a newspaper closely connected to past military dictatorships, but as the central mouthpiece of the ancient regime, the *ch’inilp’a*. As such, *Chosun ilbo* and its history formed the archetype for an anti-national and anti-unification newspaper in the perception of progressives. Ultimately, Anti-Chosun hardened already existing rifts between conservatives and progressives, eventually turning from mere intellectual disputes into outright history “wars” by the next decade. The development of Anti-Chosun, as the first major movement organized online, laid the framework for protests and civic activism in the decade to come. Between 2000 and 2002, online journalism remained mostly progressive, but it was not long

before right-wing outlets like *Dailian* or *NewDaily* were established, reflecting the extension of social polarization into the realm of online journalism.

How does *Chosun ilbo* remember Anti-Chosun? In a self-published centennial history from 2020, Anti-Chosun is mentioned twice: once in connection to a 2001 tax survey and once in connection to Roh Moo-hyun. Neither the Ch'oe Incident, nor any of the defamation lawsuits or other developments are mentioned. Instead, the company's official history paints Anti-Chosun as a group of extremists intent on "suppressing the press," highlighting instead that the movement gave birth to a number of "pro-Chosun" groups.²⁰¹

Although the present study aimed to reconstruct the origins and overall development of the Anti-Chosun discourse and its transformation into a civic movement through a historical lens, further research on the subject remains to be done. More detailed studies on each of the different stages of the movement should be written and further materials, e.g., court documents and oral testimonies, need to be uncovered.

Abbreviations and acronyms

ACF	Anti-Chosun Federation	조선일보반대시민연대
CCDM	Citizens Council for Democratic Media	민주언론시민연합
Chojungdong	<i>Chosun ilbo</i> , <i>Chungang ilbo</i> , <i>Tonga ilbo</i>	조중동
GECS	2000 General Election Citizen's Federation	2000 년총선시미연대
GNP	Grand National Party	한나라당 (1997.11–2012.2)
Insamo	Assembly of Those who Love <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	인물과사상을 사랑하는 사람의 모임
Inmul	<i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	
Joase (Choase)	A Beautiful World Without Chosun ilbo	조선일보없는 아름다운 세상
KBS	Korea Broadcasting Station	
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party	새천년민주당 (2000.1–2005.5)
Nosamo	Assembly of Those who Love Roh Moo-hyun	노무현을 사랑하는 사람의 모임
NSL	National Security Law	

PSPD	People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy	참여연대
ROK	Republic of Korea	

Important actors

Chin Chung-gwön	Journalist, <i>Mal</i> , later <i>Ohmynews</i>
Chong Chi-hwan	Journalist, <i>Mal</i>
Ch'oe Chang-jip	Political scientist
Hong Se-hwa	Columnist, <i>Hankyoreh</i>
Hwang Sök-yöng	Author, formerly imprisoned on charges of the NSL
Im Hyön-gu	Chairman of Choase
Kang Chun-man	Professor, media studies; essayist and editor of <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i> ; writer
Kim Tae-jung	Chief editor, <i>Chosun ilbo</i>
Kim Tong-min	Professor, media studies; chairman of ACE, CCDM member
Myöng Kye-nam	Actor; chairman of Nosamo
O Han-hüng	Editor, <i>Okch'ön sinmun</i>
Yi Han-u	Journalist, <i>Chosun ilbo</i> , focus on historical memory

Chronology

Period	Key Actors / Organizations	Classification	Major Issue(s)
1992–	Kang Chun-man / <i>Inmul kwa sasang</i>	intellectual	media reform
1999–	Urimodu	Online	media reform, historical memory
2000–	Anti-Chosun Federation / CCDM	intellectual, education	media reform, historical memory
2000–	O Han-hüng / Mulch'ong	regional, local media	historical memory, esp. <i>ch'inilp'a</i>
2002–	Nosamo (Roh Moo-hyun)	Political	media reform, <i>ch'inilp'a</i>
2002–	Choase	mass movement	historical memory, <i>ch'inilp'a</i>

Notes

1. PhD Student, Department of Contemporary History, Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, E-Mail: vierthaler.patrick.54z@st.kyoto-u.ac.jp.

2. This paper presents a revised version of a manuscript included in the proceedings of the 8th Annual Korea University Graduate Students Conference, held on 28 May 2021 in Seoul, South Korea. The research carried out for this article was supported by a Korea Foundation Fellowship for Graduate Studies in Japan, April 2021–August 2021, and a scholarship from the Honjo International Scholarship Foundation, September–October 2021. Furthermore, I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to Daria E. Grishina from the Academy of Korean Studies, who proved irreplaceable during the COVID-19 pandemic in repeatedly helping me to acquire all the necessary primary and secondary sources for the present research from Korea, something which would otherwise have been impossible due to ongoing COVID-19-related travel restrictions.
3. Kim Mikyoung, ed. *Korean Memories and Psycho-Historical Fragmentation* (London: Routledge, 2019).
4. Kim Chŏng-in, *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng: kwagŏ rŭl haesŏk hanŭn ssaum* (Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2016).
5. In previously published articles, the author has suggested the methodological framework of approaching South Korea's mnemonic divide through the lens of mnemohistory. With the conservative establishment as a central pillar of Korean society, I avoid simplifications of "revisionists" against "historians" as commonly seen within South Korean discourse, as both major parties conduct deliberate acts of "forgetting" in their quest for hegemony regarding Korean history from 1945–1953. Rather, I aim towards writing a "social history of remembering" (Peter Burke) by focusing on "contested Cultural memories" (Aleida Assmann) in a dynamic process of "remembering" and "forgetting" (Aleida Assmann) within "memory cultures" (Astrid Erll). In this framework, politics, mass media, civic activism, and historical scholarship all constitute individual realms within a larger "memory community." Cf. Patrick Vierthaler, "1948 as Division or Foundation? The New Right Movement and South Korean Cultural Memory: A Mnemohistorical Approach," Essay published as part of a carousel lecture series "Between Nostalgia and Nausea: Attitudes towards the Past in Contemporary Korea," SEED Olomouc (2020): 1–3. <http://seed.upol.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Patrick-Vierthaler-ESSAY.pdf>; Patrick Vierthaler, "The New Right and the 1948 Foundation View: A Failed Revision of South Korean Cultural Memory," *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2021): 20–26.
6. Kim Chŏng-in's above-quoted *Yŏksa chŏnjaeng* stands exemplary for connecting the "history wars" to the New Right movement in Korean. In Western scholarship, too, this tendency is visible. Cf. Myungji Yang, "The Specter of the Past: Reconstructing Conservative Historical Memory in South Korea," *Politics & Society* 49.3 (2021): 348–351. Furthermore, recent studies on conservative historical consciousness and disputed historical memories tend to place a focus on the 1980s left-wing student movement and the "New Right" as a backlash to this. Cf. Sungik Yang, "An Old Right in New Bottles: State Without Nation in South Korean New Right Historiography," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 80.4 (2021): 897–898.
7. For detailed studies on the New Right movement and its institutionalization, cf. Patrick Vierthaler, "A Reconsideration of the New Right's Formative Period (2003–2008): Conservative Experiences, Mass Media and Cultural Memory in Post-Authoritarian South Korea," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 20.1 (2020): 35–84; and Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak No-ja), "The Rise and Fall of the New Right Movement and the Historical Wars in 2000s South Korea," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 18.2 (2019): 5–36.
8. These continuities have been vividly elaborated by Korean political scientists and essayists. In 2002, Ch'oe Chang-jip's monograph *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuūi* (Democracy after democratization) critically dissected the nature of the South Korean political system after 1987. For Ch'oe and other observers, democratization was, and remains, a process, rather than a singular watershed moment. This helps explain an on-going anxiety of progressives, as the successors to the democratization movement, in their political struggles with conservatives, as the successors to the former ruling elite, throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Cf.

- Ch'oe Chang-jip. *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minjujuūi* (Seoul: Humanitas, 2002), revised and extended editions were released in 2005 and 2013.
9. The terms "1987 System" (*87-nyŏn ch'eje*) or "1997 System" (*97-nyŏn ch'eje*) emerged to define the distinctions, but also continuities to the authoritarian period, the "1948 System" (*48-nyŏn ch'eje*). E.g. Kim Chong-yŏp, ed. *87-nyŏn ch'eje* (Seoul: Changbi, 2009).
10. On regionalism and its legacy, cf. e.g. Keedon Kwon, "Regionalism in South Korea: Its Origins and Role in Her Democratization," *Politics & Society* 32.4 (2004): 555–566. Cf. also Ch'oe, *Minjuhwa ihu*, pp. XX.
11. A detailed historical study on the development of the Jeju April 3 Incident can be found in John Merrill, "The Cheju-do Rebellion," *Journal of Korean Studies* 2 (1980): 139–197. On the subsequent process of historical fact-finding and truth and reconciliation, cf. Hun Joon Kim. *The Massacred at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
12. On the Kwangju Uprising and its impact on South Korean society, cf. Gi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds. *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
13. Illustrating this polarization within media is, for example in the realm of historical memory, reporting surrounding the so-called Foundation Day Dispute of 2008. Cf. Patrick Vierthaler. "How to Place August 15 in South Korean History? The New Right, the '1948 Foundation' Historical View and the 2008 Kŏn'gukchŏl Dispute," *Vienna Journal of East Asian Studies* 10 (2018): 160–165.
14. This process is described in detail in Kim Dong-Choon, "The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea," *Critical Asian Studies* 42.4 (2010): 525–552. The context necessary for reconciliation, in the case study of historical fact-finding regarding the Jeju April 3 Incident, is dealt with in: Ja-hyun Chun and Jung-Sun Han, "Delayed Reconciliation and Transitional Justice in Korea: Three Levels of Conditions for National Reconciliation," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 45 (2017): 294–315.
15. An overview over the historiography of the Korean War, with a particular focus on the 1990s, can be found in Wada Haruki, *The Korean War. An International History* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016): xviii–xxvii.
16. Song Yoonjae defines *ch'inilp'a* (친일파 親日派) as "contain(ing) a strong moral judgment. The notion holds a meaning of not only an anti-national traitor, but it is also used to describe an individual as a self-seeking, opportunistic, and immoral traitor of the nation. Since the late 1970s, many progressive intellectuals associated the notion not only with anti-nation, but also anti-democracy and anti-minjung (the oppressed common people of Korea who constitute the genuine national subject)." In addition, Song adds, "(m)ost recently, it tends to refer to someone who is not in line with progressive political line or who is politically conservative/reactionary." Source: Yoonjae Song, "Contextualizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in the Process of Democratization after Democracy," *The Review of Korean Studies* 18.1 (2015): 197.
17. This discourse, Song writes, "(...) indicates a unique historical narrative of the progressives that explains the reciprocity between the unpunished *ch'inilp'a* and the unfolding of post-1945 S. Korean history. According to the narrative, unpurged collaborators came back to the public sphere after the dissolution of the Special Committee to Judge Anti-national Crimes and continued to rule the society in cooperation with authoritarian regimes and the US. Their very existence and success damaged the historical legitimacy of the newly born nation-state, the national spirit (*minjok chŏnggi*), and a sense of social justice among Koreans. Furthermore, their support for post-1945 dictators resulted in the repeated failures of democracy in the forms of prolonged dictatorship, military coups, and massacre." Source: Song, "Contextualizing," pp. 196–197.

18. For progressives, peaceful unification stayed the historical task of the Korean people, and co-operation with the North was a means to achieve it. For conservatives, in lieu of a military threat, “democratization” of the North in the Zeitgeist of liberal democracy replaced forceful unification as a realist solution, with toppling, not supporting, the Kim regime as opposed to perceivably idealist or naïve progressive ideals.
19. In 1990, Kim Yōng-sam joined forces with Roh Tae-woo, in the so-called three party merger (*samdang hapdang*), that became the spiritual ancestor of the later Grand National Party, the main conservative party from 1997 to 2012. In 1998, Kim Dae-jung, in order to secure a majority, too, signed a pact with Kim Chong-pil, the former number two under Park Chung-hee, in the so-called DJP-alliance (*DJP-yōnhap*) Throughout the 1990s, former democracy activists were, in the context of realpolitik, forced to co-operate with the former ruling establishment.
20. The author deducts this from a look at sales-figures in the category of books on modern and contemporary history in the 1990s and 2000s. Throughout the 1990s, highly progressive treatments of Korean history, by authors such as Pak Se-gil or Kang Man-gil were the top sellers within this category.
21. Cf. Dal Yong Jin, “How to Understand Digital Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 179–192; Ki-Sung Kwak, “Digital Media and Democratic Transition in Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 218–230; and Eun-mee Kim. “Digital Media and the Rise of Connected Individuals in Korea.” In Youna Kim, ed. *Routledge Handbook of Korean Culture and Society* (London: Routledge, 2016): 231–242.
22. On the establishment of *Ohmynews*, the first and most prominent outlet of online “citizen’s journalism,” established by Oh Yōn-ho, a former journalist of the monthly *Mal*, cf. Jennifer Veale. “Seoul Searching,” *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2007): 94–96, and Kwak, “Digital Media,” 2017, pp. 220–222.
23. Cf. Hang Shin Eui, “Presidential Elections, Internet Politics, and Citizens Organizations in South Korea,” *Journal of Asian Sociology* 34:1 (2005): 39–45; or Chung, Jongpil, “Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea: The Internet and the Political Regime,” *Asian Survey* 48:5 (2008): 748–750.
24. E.g. Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).
25. E.g. Jiyeon Kang, *Igniting the Internet: Youth and Activism in Postauthoritarian South Korea* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2016) or Andrew Eungi Kim, “Civic activism and Korean democracy: the impact of blacklisting campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 general elections,” *The Pacific Review* 19.4 (2006): 519–542.
26. Cf. e.g. Kim, *Yōksa chōnjaeng*, 2016.
27. In 2008, New Right scholars gained influence in the Lee Myung-bak administration’s official commemorations. That year, commemorations for August 15, the day marking both the liberation from colonial rule (1945) as well as the ROK’s establishment (1948), were held solely focussing on the later, angering progressives, for whom the ROK primarily represents a political division of the peninsula. Cf. Vierthaler, “How to Place,” pp. 137–174.
28. One outcome of the 2008 commemorations was the construction of a National Museum of Contemporary History. Planned and finished in only four years, the final museum reflected New Right historical consciousness in its exhibition, and was heavily criticized by progressive intellectuals. Cf. Yi Tong-gi and Hong Sök-ryul, “Taehan Min’guk Yōksa Pangmulgwan’ saōp pip’an kwa chōngch’aek taeon,” *Yōksa Pip’yōng* 99 (2012): 284–313.
29. The perhaps most well-known example of this was the trial surrounding Park Yu-ha and her book on comfort women. As the result of a defamation lawsuit, Park was forced to censor parts of her (highly disputed) book. Cf. Rumi Sakamoto, Kitahara Minori, and Kim Puja, “The Flawed Japan-ROK Attempt to Resolve the Controversy Over Wartime Sexual

- Slavery and the Case of Park Yuha,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus* 14:5 (2016), no. 2. <https://apjff.org/2016/05/Kitahara.html> (accessed 15 October 2021).
30. E.g. Kim Tong-min, “Ant’i chosōn simin undong ūi yōksajōk ūimi.” In Chosōn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yōndae, ed. *Wae? Chosōn ilbo inga* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2000), pp. 13–37; “Chaengjōm 1: ant’i chosōn 2-nyōn, chindan kwa mosaek,” *Sahoe pip’yōng* 34 (2002.12): 12–40.
31. Song Yeun-Jee, “Historicizing the Discourse on Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Contemporary Korea from the Late 1970s to the Late 2000s,” PhD thesis (University of California Los Angeles, 2013): 90 and 93–97.
32. Han Yun-hyōng, *Ant’i chosōn undongsa* (Seoul: T’eksūt’ū, 2010).
33. For matters of readability, I use *Chosun ilbo* and *Chosun* interchangeably to refer to *Chosun ilbo*.
34. In present-day South Korea, Kang is well-known as a writer of public history books. His 23-volume *Han’guk hyōndaesa sanch’aek* (A stroll of Korean contemporary history, 2002–2011) series was a steady best-seller for much of the 2000s and 2010s, far outselling most of the academic works on contemporary history (on e-sellers Aladin and Kyobo Books). Kang is known as an energetic writer, having published multiple books each year since the mid-1990s.
35. Kang Chun-man’s PhD thesis was on the relationship between journalism and politics in Reagan’s US. Cf. Kang Chun-man, *Taet’ongnyōng kwa yōron chojak: Ronaldū Reigōn ūi imiji chōngch’i* (Seoul: T’aeam), 1989.
36. This stream of thought is characteristic for his early writings, which are included in: Kang Chun-man, *Han’guk ōllon kwa yōron chojak* (Seoul: Iron kwa silch’ōn, 1992); Kang Chun-man, *Han’guk ōllon kwa yōron chojak* (Seoul: Iron kwa silch’ōn, 1992); and Kang Chun-man, *Ōllon ūn k’amelleon inga* (Seoul: Konggan), 1993.
37. Kang Chun-man, *Kim Tae-jung chugigi* (Seoul: Kaema kowōn 개마고원, 1995). The same year, *Chosun ilbo* (together with the Samsung-owned *Joongang ilbo*), undertook massive efforts to “re-evaluate” Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president (1948–60) who ruled the country autocratically in the 1950s, as the ROK’s “founding father,” triggering in itself a mnemonic dispute. Cf. Patrick Vierthaler, “Founding Father or Traitor to the Nation? Contested Memories of Syngman Rhee in Mid-1990s South Korea,” forthcoming.
38. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, p. 33.
39. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 34–35.
40. Pang Ūng-mo (方應謨, 1883–1950), who joined *Chosun ilbo* in 1932, served as president of the company from 1933 until his death in 1950—an formally remained publisher until 1979. Following his death, his nephews and adopted sons Pang Il-yōng (方一榮, 1923–2003) and Pang U-yōng (方又榮, 1928–2016) were to take on important roles in the company. Pang Il-yōng became representative director in 1954. From 1964 until 1993, Pang Il-yōng was chairman (회장 *hoejang*), Pang U-yōng president (사장 *sajang*) of the company (as well as CEO, 대표이사 *daep’yo isa*, from 1964–1970). In 1993, Pang Il-yōng’s son Pang Sang-hun (方相勳, 1948–) took over as president, a post in which remains in until the present day. Pang Il-yōng took over the role of chairman, staying in the post until 2003. Due to his power as president of one of South Korea’s most powerful media conglomerates, Pang U-yōng was nicknamed “shadow president” (*pam ūi daet’ongnyōng*).
41. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 32–33.
42. Kang Chun-man, *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk* (Seoul: Inmul kwa Sasang-sa, 1999), p. 202.
43. Kang et al., *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
44. Kang et al., *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
45. Kang et al., *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 196–198.
46. Kang et al., *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, p. 199.
47. Kang et al., *Chosōn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 195–196.

48. Kim Tae-jung (金大中, 1939–)—not to be confused with the later president of the same name, who for matters of clarity shall be romanized as Kim Dae-jung in this paper—served as opinion chief editor (논설위원 *nonsŏl wiwŏn*) from 1988–1989, and as chief editor (주필 *chupil*) of *Chosun ilbo* from 1990–2002. Having entered the company in 1965, Kim was important in the shift of *Chosun* to the right, which became the focus of Anti-Chosun activists discussed in this paper. In 1998–99, Kang’s writings openly attacked Kim’s columns.
49. Ryu Kŭn-il (柳根一, 1938–), a former political dissident during the Syngman Rhee period, became one of the newspapers most well-known editorialists in the 1990s and early 2000s, and, later, in the mid-2000s, a vocal advocate for the New Right movement. He served as head editorial writer from 1989–1996, opinion chief-editor from 1996–2002, and as chief editor from 2002–2004. Cf. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020: 51.
50. “‘Ije nŭn mal handa’ pangsŏng kongsa chŏt kohae sŏngsa (‘이제는 말한다’ 방송공사 첫 고해성사 ‘Now we can say it’: the broadcasting corporation’s first confession),” *Hankyoreh*, 21 April 1998.
51. “Ije,” *Hankyoreh*, 21 April 1998.
52. “Kaehyŏk rip’ot’u kat’ŭn ppopannŭnde... (개혁리포트 같은 뽑았는데... Picking the same reform report, but...) ,” *Hankyoreh*, 8 September 1998.
53. “Ilbu naeyong ohae issŏ pallon podo yoch’ŏng (일부 내용 오해 있어 반론보도 요청 Requesting a correction due to factual errors),” *Tonga ilbo*, 11 October 1998; “Pangsŏng sŏngjŏng kyŏngjaeng wiŏm suwi ch’ongpung tŭng p’yŏnp’a podo sim hada (방송煽情경쟁 위험수위 銃風 등 편파보도 심하다 Severely biased reporting due to dangerous competition in TV),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 3 November 1998.
54. Park Myung-lim, in his study on the historiography and memory of the Korean War, evaluates Ch’oe as a significant scholar who helped to bring new perspectives into Korean War historiography in the later 1980s and early 1990s, and who helped to foster interdisciplinary research whilst remaining a distance from both orthodox and revisionist interpretations of the War. Cf. Park Myung-lim = Pak Myŏng-lim, *Yŏksa wa chisik kwa sahoe: han’guk chŏnjaeng ihae wa han’guk sahoe* (Seoul: Nanam, 2011): 120–128.
55. U Chong-ch’ang, “6.25 nŭn Kim Il-sŏng ūi yŏksajŏg kyŏldan: ‘che-2 ūi kŏn’guk’ ch’uchin kwa tŏburŏ chumok toenŭn Choe Chang-jip ūi han’guk hyŏndaesa sigak,” *Wŏlgan chosŏn* (1998.11): 206–222.
56. Lee Han-u (1961–) is a journalist at *Chosun ilbo*, who joined the paper in 1994. With a PhD from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in philosophy, Yi had translated a number of books before starting to work as a journalist. In 1995, he was authoring an extensive series on Syngman Rhee. Cf.: Yi Han-u, “Hyŏndaesa chae-palgŏn, ‘han’guk taet’ŏngnyŏng’ sirijŭ: Kŏdae-han saengae Yi Sŭng-man 90-nyŏn (현대사(現代史)재발견「한국대통령」시리즈 거대한 생애 이승만(李承晩) 90년 Re-discovering contemporary history, series on the ‘Korean president’: 90 years Syngman Rhee’s great life),” 65 instalments, *Chosŏn ilbo*, 1 January–26 December 1995; in 1998, he took a central role in a *Chosun*-sponsored exhibition on Syngman Rhee as the “father of the nation.” Cf. Vierthaler, “Founding Father or,” 2022, forthcoming.
57. “Han’guk chŏnjaeng kwallyŏn Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang nonmun palch’oe: migun kwa han’gukkun ūi 38-sŏn tolpa ‘konggyŏkchŏk p’aengch’angjuŭi ūi pallŏ’ (한국전쟁 관련 崔章集위원장 논문 발췌: 美軍과 한국군의 38선 돌파 ‘공격적 팽창주의의 발로’) An extract from a paper by chief commissioner Ch’oe Chang-jip in regards to the Korean War: the crossing of the 38th parallel by US and Korean troops as a ‘step of aggressive expansionism’),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 26 October 1998; “Choe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang 6.25-gwan podo kwallyŏn chaeya, Chosŏn ilbo sŏngt’o (崔章集위원장 6.25 觀 보도 관련 在野, 朝鮮日報 성토 The opposition examining *Chosun ilbo* in relation to its reporting on Ch’oe Chang-jip’s views on June 25),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 3 November 1998; “Chosŏn ilbo chugigi (조선일보 죽이기 The *Chosun ilbo* witch-hunt),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 4 November 1998, p. 2.

58. On 4 November 1998, a number of further articles and opinion pieces on were prominently placed in the newspaper, with the headline “Ch’oe Chang-jip’s historical views damaging the ROK’s legitimacy” in big, bold letters on a related article on the same page as Yi’s column. Cf. “‘Ch’oe Chang-jip wiwŏnjang yŏksagwan, taehanmin’guk hweson’ (‘최장집위원장 역사관, 대한민국 전통선 훼손’) ‘High commissioner Ch’oe Chang-jip’s historical views damaging the ROK’s legitimacy’),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 4 November 1998, p. 2.
59. E.g. “Taet’ongnyŏng chamun haeksim kongin ...kŏmjŭng mattang (대통령 자문 핵심공인 (公人)....검증 마땅 It is appropriate to examine (the)... key presidential advisor),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 24 October 1998.
60. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu ‘han’guksa yŏn’gu waegok podo’ Wŏlgan Chosŏn e 5-ŏk sonbaeso (최장집교수 ‘한국사연구 왜곡보도’ 월간조선에 5억 손해소 ‘Distorted reporting of Korean history’: Ch’oe Chang-jip suing Wŏlgan Chosŏn for a compensation of 500 million),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 October 1998; “Chosŏn ilbosa chinbo insa konggyŏk kwagŏ sarye (조선일보사 진보인사 공격 과거사례 Past examples of attacks by *Chosun ilbo* on progressives),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 October 1998.
61. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu nonmun ‘woegok podo’ Wŏlgan Chosŏn 11-wŏlho: pŏbwŏn, p’anmae kŭmji kach’yŏbun kyŏljŏng (최장집교수 논문 ‘왜곡보도’ 월간조선 11월호: 법원, 판매금지 가처분 결정 The Ch’oe Chang-jip “distorted reporting” paper: court sentence to stop the selling of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*’s November issue),” *Hankyoreh*, 12 November 1998 (title page).
62. “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sasang nonjaeng ‘ponghap’ (최장집교수 사상논쟁·봉합) The Ch’oe Chang-jip controversy has been stitched-up),” *Hankyoreh*, 19 January 1999; “Choe Chang-jip kyosu sosŏng chwihwa (최장집교수 소송 취하 Ch’oe Chang-jip withdrawing his lawsuit),” *Hankyoreh*, 20 January 1999.
63. While Kang’s activities can be traced back as far as 1992 (cf. above), *Mal*’s *Chosun*-critical stance—although technically dating back to its establishment as a progressive journal committed to further democratization and reform of the media in the mid-1980s—was an outcome of the 1998 KBS documentary controversy (cf. above). From June 1998 to March 2000, a “newspaper monitor division” of the CCDM (cf. below) began focusing its writings on *Chosun ilbo* in a series titled “The press must stand upright in order for the country to be alive.” Articles in this series focused on current affairs as well as they did on *Chosun*’s history, e.g. an instalment on the close relationship between *Chosun ilbo* and Chun Doo-hwan from October 1998. Cf. Minju Ŏllon Undong Simin Yŏnhap Sinmun Monit’ŏ Pungwa. “Chosŏn ilbo ūi Chŏn Tu-hwan podo kisa nŭn ‘hyŏndaep’an yongbiŏch’ŏn-ga’,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.10): pp. 132–137.
64. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija rŭl sabyŏnghwa han *Chosŏn ilbo*,” *Inmul kwa sasang* (1998.12): 61–63.
65. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 64–65.
66. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 69.
67. P’yŏnjippu, “Kija,” p. 64.
68. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “‘Chinbo insa chugigi’: ppuri nŭn ch’inil k’omp’ŭllesŭ,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998.12): 96–97.
69. The publisher of *Inmul kwa sasang*.
70. “Chosŏn ilbo kija ‘mal’ ‘inmul kwa sasang’ e sonbaeso (조선일보 기자 ‘말’ ‘인물과 사상’에 손해소),” *Tonga ilbo*, 1 December 1998. Furthermore, on 11 December, Cho Gap-je (Cho Kap-je) at that time the chief editor of *Wŏlgan Chosŏn*, too, filed a lawsuit against *Mal*, demanding five-hundred million Won in compensation.
71. Reporting on the Ch’oe Incident centered primarily on *Chosun ilbo* and *Hankyoreh*, Between 21 October and 1 December 1998, a total number of 139 articles mentioning Ch’oe Chang-jip were published in *Chosun ilbo*, as opposed to 119 articles in *Hankyoreh*, *Tonga ilbo*, on the other hand, only published 40 articles, *Kyŏngnyang sinmun* 20. Reporting in both *Chosun ilbo* and *Hankyoreh* centered on 12–14 November. Data compiled by the author.

72. Kim Tong-min et al. *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl asimnikka?* (Seoul: Kaema kowŏn, 1999); Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999.
73. “Chosŏn ilbo kongdaewi” paljok (‘조선일보 공대위’ 발족 Establishment of the *Chosun ilbo* joint measures committee),” *Hankyoreh*, 20 November 1998. Unfortunately, to date, the author has not been able to find further material on this committee and its activities.
74. Kim Tong-min, “Uri nŭn wae Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu haeya hanŭnga,” *Chŏnŏllijŭm pip’yŏng* 31 (2000.9): 47.
75. Hong Hyŏn-sŏng, “Pan-Chosŏn ilbo undong ŭi chinjja ŭimi,” *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.9): 13.
76. For example, O Han-hŭng of the *Okch’ŏn sinmun*, a later central figure to the Anti-Chosun Movement (cf. further below), names a pamphlet by the Joint Measures Committee, *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl haebu handa* (Dissecting *Chosun ilbo*) as the reason for gaining an interest into the issue. Source: “Ōllon paro seuryŏmyŏn Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok haengwi kyumyŏng put’ŏ” (“언론 바로 세우려면 조선일보 반민족행위 규명부터” “If we want to make decent media, we need to start with the investigation of *Chosun ilbo*”),” *Hankyoreh*, 23 March 2020. Unfortunately, due to COVID-19-related travel restriction, the author has not been able to gain a copy of this pamphlet yet.
77. In Chŏng’s case, the lawsuit against Yi would continue until 2003, when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chŏng and against *Chosun*. Cf. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “Myŏngye sosong 5-nyŏn chŏnjaeng” kwa ‘Okch’ŏn chŏnt’u’ ŭi ch’uŏk,” *Hwanghae munhwa* 50 (2006): 438.
78. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 105.
79. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 105.
80. The full dispute between Chin and Yi can be retrieved at: <http://www.urimodu.com/tell/movement.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 5 December 2000) by accessing pages 1–12 beneath “(인물과 사상 게시판에서 있었던 이한우 기자와 진중권님 및 네티즌 간의 최장집 사건 관련 논쟁입니다.)” at the bottom of the page).
81. This date is named as the establishment date at an ad published by Urimodu in *Hankyoreh*: “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ, na rŭl koso hara! (조선일보여, 나를 고소하라! Hey *Chosun ilbo*, sue me!),” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000, p. 25 (full-page ad, not available online).
82. On the website itself, 9 January 2000 is listed as its creation date. The Urimodu bulletin board has its first entries on 5 January. It is likely that after 22 November, the website was built step-by-step, with 9 January marking the official starting point.
83. Han Yun-hyŏng argues that despite the site being rather small, over the next months, the nature of Urimodu users as “keyboard warriors” contributed significantly to the visibility of the *Chosun* issue. Han, *Anti chosŏn*, 2010, p. 118.
84. In a separate section, all Ch’oe Incident or *Chosun*-related posts from the *Inmul* bulletin board were copied to the new Urimodu site. Due to technical issues, however, all these entries are listed as “5 January 2000.” With the *Inmul* board inaccessible as of this day (October 2021), these 352 entries are the only available source from this period of time. Source: <http://urimodu.com/bbs1/bbs.cgi?db=history> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 26 April 2001).
85. “Anti Chosun movement,” <http://urimodu.com/bbs1/bbs.cgi?db=history&mode=read&num=7&page=12&ftype=6&fval=&backdepth=1> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 3 September 2001).
86. The National Front to Liberate South Korea was an underground, anti-Yusin opposition movement established in February 1976 with the goal to democratize and “liberate” South Korea (*nam-chosŏn*). On 9 and 16 October, the organization’s existence was made public by the Ministry of Interior, and until November, 84 members were arrested and charged under the NSL. Cf. “Nam-chosŏn minjok haebang chŏnsŏn sakkŏn,” *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*. <http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0073400>.
87. “Na rŭl koso hara! (나를 고소하라! Sue me!),” *Hankyoreh*, 29 November 1999.

88. “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ,” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000. The full page, in high resolution, can be accessed at <https://tinyurl.com/antichosun>.
89. See further below in the section on Roh Moo-hyun and Anti-Chosun.
90. “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ,” *Hankyoreh*, 7 July 2000.
91. “Chosŏn ilbo yŏ na rŭl koso hara’: Urimodu dat k’ŏm, 7-il 1748-myŏng sŏmyŏng tamŭn chŏnmyŏn kwanggo kejae (“조선일보여 나를 고소하라”: 우리모두닷컴, 7일 1748명 서명 담은 전면 광고 게재 “Hey Chosun ilbo, sue me!”: urimodu.com publishing a full-page ad including on 1,748 signatures on the 7th),” *Ohmynews*, 9 July 2000.
92. “Ri Yŏng-hŭi kyosu, ‘ant’i-chosŏn’ e dongch’am: ant’i-chosŏn Urimodu ŭi ‘na rŭl koso hara’ e Ri Yŏng-hŭi kyosu sŏmyŏng (리영희 교수, ‘안티 조선’에 동참: 안티조선 우리모두의 ‘나를 고소하라’에 리영희 교수 서명 Prof. Ri Yŏng-hŭi, participating in ‘Anti-Chosun’: Prof. Ri Yŏng-hŭi has signed Anti-Chosun Urimodu’s ‘Sue me!’),” *Ohmynews*, 15 July 2000.
93. “Sŏsŏlga Hwang Sŏk-yŏng ssi ‘eChosŏn ilbo wa nŭn int’ŏbyu sajŏl’ (소설가 황석영씨 ‘조선일보와는 인터뷰 사절’),” *Sŏul sinmun*, 7 June 2000.
94. “Chŏhangjŏk riŏllijŭm chakka Hwang Sŏk-yŏng int’ŏbyu (저항적 리얼리즘 작가 황석영 인터뷰),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 18 May 2000.
95. “Tong’in munhaksang’ 1-ch’a simsa chakka 9-myŏng ŭi 10-p’yŏn ppoba (‘동인문학상’ 1차심사 작가 9명의 10편 뽑아),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 6 June 2000.
96. “(T’ŭkbyŏl kigo) Tong’in munhaksang hubojak ŭl kŏbu handa ((특별기고) 동인문학상 후보작을 거부한다.),” *Hankyoreh*, 19 July 2000.
97. “(T’ŭkbyŏl kigo) Tong’in,” *Hankyoreh*, 19 July 2000. Hwang’s rejection of *Chosun ilbo* was the start for a separate dispute on mass media’s influence over literature that would be known as the Literature Power Dispute (*munhak kwŏllyŏk nonjaeng*) later on.
98. Kim, “Ant’i chosŏn,” 2000, p. 14.
99. Kim, “Ant’i chosŏn,” 2000, p. 17.
100. Over the next months and years, *Ohmynews*, much more so than *Hankyoreh*, would emerge the central media outlet reporting on Anti-Chosun related issues. This was, as will be clear from the analysis further below, apparent in reporting on the local Anti-Chosun Movement in Okch’ŏn as much as it was in reporting on the activities of Joase.
101. Chosŏn ilbo kigo wa int’ŏbyu rŭl kŏbu hanŭn chisikin (조선일보 기고와 인터뷰를 거부하는 지식인 Intellectuals boycotting interviews and co-operation with *Chosun ilbo*, henceforth “Intellectuals”). “Chosŏn ilbo kigo wa int’ŏbyu rŭl kŏbu hanŭn chisikin 1-ch’a sŏn’ŏn: uri nŭn Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hamnida (조선일보 기고와 인터뷰를 거부하는 지식인 1차 선언: 우리는 조선일보를 거부합니다),” *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.9): 7.
102. “In particular, we are paying attention to *Chosun ilbo*, a reactionary newspaper loved by the establishment, that is not merely opposing any (media) reform, but openly in favor of military unification.” Source: Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, pp. 7–8.
103. Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, p. 9.
104. Intellectuals, “Chosŏn,” 2000, pp. 7–9.
105. The CCDM—the Minju Ōllon Simin Yŏnhap 민주연로시민연합—was established by dissident journalists in 1984 who, since 1985, were issuing the monthly *Mal* and, in 1988, were influential in establishing the daily *Hankyoreh*. A major progressive NGO in 1990s South Korea, the CCDM undertakes media watching and gives (public) lectures on journalism, advocating for the need of media reform. Cf. “Minŏllon yŏnhyŏk,” *Minju ŏllon simin yŏnhap* 민주연로시민연합, http://www.ccdm.or.kr/xeccdm_history (accessed 16 October 2021).
106. Kim Tong-min, “Chosŏn ilbo kŏbu chisigin sŏnŏn, kŭ hu,” *Inmul kwa Sasang* (2000.10): 9.
107. “Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae ch’ulbŏm (조선일보 반대 시민연대 출범 Establishment of the Federation of Citizens Opposing Chosun Ilbo),” *Hankyoreh*, 21 September 2000.
108. “Now, we are shaking off the long yoke of division and dictatorship, turning towards a new age of democracy and unification. We are the point where we are turning from the Cold War towards living together as equals, from dictatorship towards democracy, from a monopoly

- towards equality, from conflict and feuds towards harmony and concord. However, such a future is not given to us without effort. We still have not been able to overcome the heavy shadow of a dark past cast on all areas of politics, society, economy, culture, religion and education. ... In the face of this calling towards a transitional period, we must emphasize the liberty of the press. ... However, at this day, the shape of media in our countries is ... one in which (the media) stands in retrogression to the current of the times in order to protect its own company's vested interests. Amidst (this media landscape), the one which is the biggest problem is without doubt the Chosun ilbo. Instead of repenting its own past and devoting itself to the efforts of reforming itself as a newspaper of the people, Chosun ilbo is re-igniting the values of the bygone period of the Cold War and dictatorship, using this as a survival strategy and thus having become a target of public criticism. ... Reasons why we are opposing Chosun ilbo. First, ... we point out that Chosun ilbo is undertaking distorted reporting on a daily basis. ... Second, we focus on the shameless distortion of history by Chosun ilbo. ... Third, we oppose the disguise used by Chosun ilbo to refer to its standpoint as "conservative." Source: "Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae sŏnŏnmun (조선일보반대 시민연대 발족선언문 Proclamation of the Federation of Citizens Opposing Chosun Ilbo)," *Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae* 조선일보반대 시민연대, <http://www.antichosun.or.kr/info3.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 October 2001).
109. Cf. the following papers for these Anti-Chosun-internal debates. Hong, "Pan-chosŏn," 2000, pp. 13–18; Kim Yŏng-in, "Kŭgu ōllon kwŏllyŏk kwa han'guk chisigin ūi mosŭp: ant'i chosŏn undong ūl parabonŭn sisŏn," *Chungdŭng uri kyoyuk* (2000.9): 30–31; Kim Ch'ang-nam, "Int'ŏnet ūi ant'i chosŏn undong," *Hwanghae munhwa* 28 (2000): 372–380; and Kim, "Chosŏn," 2000, pp. 7–14; Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, pp. 13–18.
110. Kim Tong-min, "Taŭm tangye nŭn Chosŏn kudok kŏbu undong," *Wŏlgan mal* (2001.7): 174–175.
111. Quoted after Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, p. 16.
112. Kim, "Ant'i," 2000, p. 16.
113. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, pp. 138–139.
114. Ko Kil-sŏp, "Ant'i chosŏn undong kwa ttodarŭn yŏngyedŭl," *Chŏnŏllijŭm pip'yŏng* 31 (2000.9): 51–56.
115. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, p. 128.
116. "Chosŏn ilbo pandae simin yŏndae hwaldong kyehoek (조선일보반대 시민연대 활동 계획 Plans for future activities of the ACF)," *Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae* 조선일보반대 시민연대, <http://www.antichosun.or.kr/info4.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 October 2001).
117. "Minju ōllon ūl hyang han uji khan kŏrŭm (민주언론을 향한 우직한 걸음 Naïve and honest steps towards a democratic press)," *Minju ōllon simin yŏnhap* 민주언론시민연합, http://www.ccdm.or.kr/xe/ccdm_history (accessed 7 October 2021).
118. Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, ed. *Wae?*, 2000.
119. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e tae han mingan pŏpchŏng ch'ujin wiwŏnhoe, ed. *Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok, pan-t'ong'il haengwi e tae han mingan pŏpchŏng paeksŏ*. Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2002.
120. Chosŏn Ilbo Pandae Simin Yŏndae, ed. *Han sigan humyŏn sesang i talla poinda* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2004): 109–204.
121. "Ch'ong-chŏngni ant'i-chosŏn nonjaeng sisibibi (총정리 안티조선논쟁 시시비비 Summarizing the rights and wrongs of the Anti-Chosun dispute)," *Sin tonga* (2000.10): 116–125.
122. The full text of the inaugural proclamation can be retrieved in: "Chosŏn ilbo ro putŏ ūi Okch'ŏn tongnip sŏn'ŏnsŏ chŏnmun (조선일보로부터의 옥천독립선언서 전문 Full text of the declaration of independence from Chosun ilbo in Okch'ŏn)," *Ohmynews*, 28 November 2000.

123. "'Chosŏn ilbo paro pogi Okch'ŏn simin moim' kongsik ch'ulbŏm ('조선일보 바로 보기 옥천시민모임' 공식 출범 Formal constitution of the Okch'ŏn Citizen's Gathering to Properly Understand Chosun Ilbo)," *Okch'ŏn sinmun*, 19 August 2000.
124. "'Ōllon paro," *Hankyoreh*, 23 March 2020.
125. A high-resolution screenshot of this website is available at <https://tinyurl.com/antichosun>.
126. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, pp. 131–133.
127. Kim, "Chaengjŏm," 2002, pp. 129–130.
128. *Okch'ŏn chŏnt'u*, Movie by Hwang Ch'ŏl-min. 2001.
129. "'Tongnipgun undong, 'Mindŭllae' ch'ŏrŏm chŏnguk hwaksan ūl' ('독립군 운동, '민들레'처럼 전국 확산을 Movement of the independence soldiers, hoping to spread nationally just like *Mindŭllae*)," *Okch'ŏn sinmun*, 28 November 2000.
130. For a brief overview over the tumultuous events during the presidential election of 2002, cf. Lee, Hong Yung, "South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dramas," *Asian Survey* 43.1 (2003): 65–72.
131. The story of the two later arch rivals as a "mingled fate" rooted in their running in the 1996 election in the district of Jongno is narrated in Yang Wŏn-bo. *1996-nyŏn Chongno, No Mu-hyŏn kwa Yi Myŏng-bak: ōtkallin unmyŏng ūi sijak* (Seoul: Wisdomhouse), 2018.
132. "2000-nyŏn ch'ongsŏn simin yŏndae hwaldong: yugwŏnjadŭl kwa hamkke mandŭrŏnaen sŏngo hyŏngmyŏng (2000년 총선시민연대 활동 - 유권자들과 함께 만들어 낸 선거혁명 The activities of the 2000 General Election Citizen's Federation: a political revolution made together with the voters)," *Ch'amyŏ Yŏndae*, <https://www.peoplepower21.org/pspd100/1338984> (accessed 15 October 2021).
133. Kang Chun-man wrote an essay on how Chosun ilbo reacted to the challenge presented by the ECS. Cf. Kang Chun-man, "Ch'ongsŏn simin yŏndae wa Chosŏn ilbo," *Inmul kwa sasang* (2000.3): 15–27.
134. Kim Chin-guk: "Ch'ongsŏn simin yŏndae naksŏn undong p'yŏngga," *Sahoe kwahak yŏn'gu* 14 (2001): 347–348.
135. On Nosamo's establishment, cf. Kang Wŏn-t'aek, "Int'ŏnet chŏngch'i chiptan ūi hyŏngsŏng kwa ch'amyŏ: Nosamo rŭl chungsim ūro," *Han'guk kwa kukche chŏngch'i* 20.3 (2004): 164–174; or Eui, "Presidential Elections," pp. 34–39.
136. In the documentary *No Mu-hyŏn innida / Our President* (2017), minutes 01:21:08–01:21:18 and 01:23:51, Anti-Chosun banners and stickers are seen prominently at the MDP primaries.
137. "No Mu-hyŏn hubo Inch'ŏn kyŏngsŏn yŏnsŏl chŏnmun (노무현 후보 인천경선 연설 전문 Candidate Roh Moo-hyun's full speech at the Incheon primary)," *Ohmynews*, 6 April 2002.
138. The media framing of Roh Moo-hyun has been subject to three monographs by Kang Chun-man: *No Mu-hyŏn kwa kungmin sagigŭk* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2001); *No Mu-hyŏn chugigi* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2003); and *No Mu-hyŏn salligi* (Seoul: Inmul kwa sasang-sa, 2003).
139. From February–June 2001, over 400 investigators entered the offices of 23 media outlets, among them *Chosun ilbo*, *Tonga ilbo*, and KBS, eventually arresting Pang Sang-hun of *Chosun ilbo* and others. The first such investigation for tax avoidance since 1994, the conservative dailies, most notably *Chosun ilbo*, vehemently opposed the investigation, decrying it as a suppression of the free press. Cf. "Ōllon-sa semu chosa ūimi wa p'ajang (언론사 세무조사 의미와 파장 The meaning and implications of the media tax investigation)," *Hankyoreh*, 20 June 2001.
140. "No Mu-hyŏn komun, Chosŏn ilbo int'ŏbyu kŏbu (노무현 고문, 조선일보 인터뷰 거부 Roh Moo-hyun boycotting interviews with *Chosun ilbo*)," *Ohmynews*, 14 November 2001.
141. Yu Si-min, *No Mu-hyŏn ūn wae chosŏn ilbo wa ssaurŭnga?* (Seoul: Kaema kowŏn, 2002), pp. 28–68. Interestingly, the journalist involved in these articles, and in a later article on an alleged yacht owned by Roh, was U Chong-ch'ang, who also wrote the article in the November 1998 issue of *Wŏlgan chosun* that led to the Choi Chang-jip Incident.

142. “Öllon i simin üi p’yön e söttön yöksa nün öpsössümnida’: Minju-dang No Mu-hyön komun Taegu sö konggae t’ükkang (“언론이 시민의 편에 섰던 역사는 없었습니다” 민주당 노무현 고문 대구서 공개특강 “The press had no history of being on the side of the people”: MDP advisor Roh Moo-hyun at a special lecture in Taegu),” *Ohmynews*, 12 July 2001.
143. “Chosön ömnün arumdaun sesang mandülja’: Okch’ön esö chön’guk Chosön ilbo pandae tongnipkun moim kajyö (“<조선> 없는 아름다운 세상 만드자” 옥천에서 전국 조선일보 반대 독립군 모임 가져) (“Let’s make a beautiful world without Chosun ilbo”: Assembly of Anti-Chosun independence soldiers from all around the country in Okch’ön),” *Ohmynews*, 19 January 2001.
144. “No Mu-hyön chijjadül kwa ‘ant’i chojungdong’: Nosamo, chöltk ondong e nasö (노무현 지지자들과<안티 조중동> : 노사모, 절독 운동에 나서) (The supporters of Roh Moo-hyun and “Anti-Chojungdong”: Nosamo embarking on a movement to stop reading conservative dailies),” *Ohmynews*, 9 April 2002.
145. “Ümmoron baehu e Nosamo ga issötta? 27-il pam Ich’ön Tökp’yöng Suryönwön sö kajyö, No Mu-hyön pubu ch’amsök (음모론 배후에 노사모가 있었다? 27일밤 이천 덕평수련원서 가져, 노무현 부부 참석) (Was Nosamo behind the conspiracy theory (speech)? Roh Moo-hyun and his wife joining an event at the Duckpyung Youth Center on 27)” *Ohmynews*, 29 April 2002.
146. “Nosamo, Chosön 50-manbu ‘chöltk ondong’ sön’ön(;) Pak Wön-hong-ssi ‘chöltk ondong ün sahoejuüjök saenggak: Nosamo, ‘chop’ok sinmun kwa üi chönjaeng’ sönp’o ... Pak Wön-hong, Kim Yun-su ssi koso do (노사모, <조선> 50만부 ‘절독운동’ 선언 박원홍씨 ‘절독운동은 사회주의적 생각’: 노사모, ‘조폭신문과의 전쟁’ 선포...박원홍-김윤수 씨 고소도) (Nosamo declaring a movement to bring down the subscriptions of *Chosun ilbo* by 500,000; Pak Wön-hong: “This boycott is a socialist way of thinking”: Nosamo declaring a ‘war on the vulgar media’ and even suing Pak Wön-hong and Kim Yun-su),” *Ohmynews*, 13 May 2002.
147. “Nosamo üi ‘Chosön ilbo 50-manbu chöltk ondong’ chiji handa: chön’guk ‘mulch’ong tongnipkun’ üi ponggi (노사모의 ‘조선일보 50만부 절독운동’ 지지한다: 전국 ‘물총독립군’의 봉기) (Mulch’ong independence soldiers from around the country in support of the Nosamo “lowering Chosun ilbo subscriptions by 500,000”-campaign),” *Ohmynews*, 15 May 2002.
148. “Nosamo chöltk sön’ön kyegi ant’i-chosön tasi pongyökhwa (노사모 절독선언 계기 안티조선 다시 본격화) (A new intensification for Anti-Chosun due to the declaration of lowering-subscriptions by Nosamo),” *Ohmynews*, 18 May 2002.
149. “‘Chop’ok öllon chöltk’ ün sobija ondong(;) Nosamo, chöngch’i hwaldong sön’ön han chök öpta’ (“조폭언론 절독’은 소비자 운동노사모, 정치활동 선언한 적 없다”) (“The ‘boycott of the vulgar press’ is a consumer movement; Nosamo has not proclaimed to do political movements),” *Ohmynews*, 19 May 2002.
150. “‘Chop’ok öllon chöltk’ ün,” *Ohmynews*, 19 May 2002.
151. “Choase e tae hayö (조아세에 대하여 On Joase),” *Chosön ilbo ömnün arümduun sesang* 조선일보 없는 아름다운 세상, <http://www.joase.org/joaseorg.htm> (accessed via the Wayback Machine, 11 August 2002).
152. Insamo (인사모), an abbreviation of Inmul kwa Sasang üi Sarang hanün Saramdül üi Moim (인물과 사상을 사랑하는 사람의 모임 Assembly of those who love *Inmul kwa Sasang*) was established in April 2000. Born out of journal’s homepage’s bulletin board, the group became a registered organization thereafter, assembling supporters and advocates of Kang Chun-man. Insamo was established roughly at the same time as Nosamo (cf. further below).
153. While the inaugural declaration on Joase’s homepage, as available of October 2021, does not mention a date, June 2002 is mentioned as the date of its establishment in two newspaper articles: “Chosön ilbo–Ant’i-chosön ondong chöngmyön ch’ungdol (조선일보-안티조선운동 정면충돌 Full clash of *Chosön ilbo* and Anti-Chosun),” *Hankyoreh*, 29 October 2002; and “Uri do Chosön ilbo rül koso handa’: ‘Joase’ mat-koso... kongjöng köraewi, sinmun hyöp’hoe do kobal (“우리가도 <조선일보>를 고소한다” ‘조아세’ 맞고소... 공정거래위-신문협회도 고발 “We will

- also sue *Chosun ilbo*”: Joase’s counter-accusation ...the Fair Trade Commission and the Newspapers Association also complain),” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
154. “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
155. “‘Tongnip kinyömgwan sö Chosön yunjön’gi ppaera’: kyönggi minölyön tüng, 15-il tongnip kinyömgwan chöngmunsö sömyöng undong chöngae (“독립기념관서 <조선> 윤전기 빼라” 경기민언련 등, 15일 독립기념관 정문서 서명운동 전개 “Get the *Chosun* printing press out of the Independence Hall!”: The Gyeonggi CCDM and others, gathering signatures at the main gate of Independence Hall on the 15th),” *Ohmynews*, 16 August 2002.
156. *Ttak* highlights how the newspaper printed the Japanese flag atop its title, how its funter Pang Ün-mo was considered a collaborator, or how the newspaper had welcomed Park Chung-hee’s Yusin constitution and distorted reporting on the Kwangju massacre. Source: “‘Ttak ün Chosön ilbo rül kkünnün sori’: ‘ant’i-chosön tongnipkun’ choase üi hongboyong soch’aekcha Ttak (“<딱>은 조선일보를 끄는 소리” ‘안티조선 독립군’ 조아세의 홍보용 소책자 <딱> *Ttak* is the voice to end Chosun ilbo: the promotional booklet *Ttak* of Joase’s ‘Anti-Chosun soldiers of independence’),” *Ohmynews*, 10 September 2002. Unfortunately, due to COVID-19-related travel restrictions, the author has not been able to acquire a copy of the booklet as of today.
157. “Ol ch’usök en Chosön ilbo rül yaegi haseyo: ant’i-chosön, Söul-yök tüng sö kwisönggaek sangdae ‘Chosön ilbo pandae’ yuimul baep’o (올 추석엔 조선일보를 얘기하세요 안티조선, 서울역 등서 귀성객 상대 ‘조선일보 반대’ 유인물 배포 Please talk about *Chosun ilbo* this upcoming Chusök: Anti-Chosun handing out printed materials in opposition to Chosun ilbo to people heading home at Seoul station and other places),” *Ohmynews*, 21 September 2002.
158. Over the next weeks and months, Joase activists also began making and distributing Anti-Chosun newspapers—leaflets in the layout and size of a Korean newspaper.
159. “Choase ‘uri chujang konggae t’oron haja’, Chosön ‘pulmae ondong ün öllon chayü ch’imhae: Chosön, ant’i-chosön hoewöndül e ch’öt-ponsa ch’awön sosong (조아세 ‘우리 주장 공개토론 하자’ 조선 ‘불매 운동은 언론자유 침해’ <조선>, 안티조선 회원들이 첫 본사차원 소송 Joase: “Let us discuss our arguments in a public debate!”, Chosun: “A boycott movement is infringing on a free press!”: the first trial of Chosun headquarters against Anti-Chosun activists),” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002.
160. “‘Pyöngghwa üi chök, konggong üi chök, Chosön ilbo’: 17-il ohu, Söul Chongmyo kongwön esö ‘pyöngghwa üi chök konggong üi chök Chosön ilbo kyut’an chön’guk taehoe’ yölgü huggün (“평화의 적, 공공의 적, 조선일보”: 17일 오후, 서울 종묘공원에서 ‘평화의적 공공의적 조선일보 규탄 전국대회’ 열기 후끈 *Chosun ilbo*, Enemy of the people, enemy of the public: ‘national assembly to denounce *Chosun ilbo*, enemy of peace, enemy of the public’ held at Seoul’s Chongmyo park on the 17th),” *Ohmynews*, 17 November 2002.
161. “Chosön ilbo üi sonjön p’ogo? Chosön ilbo ‘Choase’ rül koso hada (조선일보의 선전포고? 조선일보 ‘조아세’를 고소하다 A declaration of war by *Chosun ilbo*? *Chosun ilbo* suing Choase),” *Ohmynews*, 24 October 2002.
162. During the Ch’oe Incidents, the defamation lawsuits against Ch’oe, Kang or Chöng were filed by individual journalists like Lee Han-u or Cho Gap-je, not *Chosun ilbo* as a corporation.
163. Also: “‘Chosön ilbo üi isöng hoebok üi ch’okku handa’: Chosön ilbo üi ‘Choase’ koso rül parabomyö (“조선일보의 이성 회복을 촉구한다” 조선일보의 ‘조아세’ 고소를 바라보며 “Urging Chosun ilbo to recover reason”: observing the trial of *Chosun ilbo* against Joase),” *Ohmynews*, 25 October 2002; cf. also “Choase ‘uri,” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002; and “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
164. Newsweek’s opinion poll shows a 48% support (12% high support, 36% somewhat support) for the Anti-Chosun Movement among Koreans in their 30s. Source: *Newsweek Korea*, quoted after “Choase ‘uri,” *Ohmynews*, 29 October 2002.
165. Cho Kap-je (조갑제 趙甲濟, 1945–) is a Korean journalist and essayist. He was chief editor at *Wölgan Chosön* from 1991–1996 and from 1998–2004, and the first CEO of *Wölgan Chosön*

- from 2001–2005. Cho is known for his far-right, anti-communist views—even within the conservatives: in 2005, he was fired from Chosun ilbo over a comment that “pro-North” was even worse than “pro-Japanese,” and in the wake of this, has established chogabje.com as his private blog and news outlet. There, he continues to write commentary until the present.
166. “Chosŏn ilbo ūi sonjŏn,” *Ohmynews*, 24 October 2002.
167. “Uri do,” *Ohmynews*, 8 November 2002.
168. “Nosamo, simin danch’e ro chŏnhwan hagil: No Mu-hyŏn tangsŏnja rŭl sŏnggong han daet’ongnyŏng ūro mandŭrŏya (노사모, 시민단체로 전환하길: 노무현 당선자를 성공한 대통령으로 만들어야 The need for transforming Nosamo into a civic organization: we must make Roh Moo-hyun a successful president),” *Ohmynews*, 21 December 2002.
169. “Nuga Nosamo haech’e rŭl iyagi hanŭnga! Nosamo ga naagaya hal panghyang kwa namgyŏjin kwajedŭl (누가 노사모 해체를 이야기하는가! 노사모가 나아가야 할 방향과 남겨진 과제들 Who dares to speak about disbanding Nosamo! The road forward and open issues for Nosamo),” *Ohmynews*, 21 December 2002. Similarly, Insamo members hailed Roh’s election as a “revolution” in a system consisting of a “power cartel” consisting of the GNP (as the direct successor to Park’s Yushin system in opposition to the “people”) and *Chojungdong*. Source: “Han’guk kwŏllyŏk ūn Hannara–Chojungdong yŏnhapch’e: Insamo songnyŏnhoe, Chŏng Kyŏng-hŭi sŏnsaeng kohŭi ch’ukha hamyŏ ōllon kaehyŏk tajim (“한국 권력은 한나라-조중동 연합체”: 인사모 송년회, 정경희 선생 고회 축하하며 언론개혁 다짐 Power in South Korea is a federation of the GNP and Chojungdong: Prof. Chŏng Kyŏng-hŭi at his seventieth birthday pledging oneself to media reform),” *Ohmynews*, 24 December 2002.
170. The term *Chojungdong* has first been used by *Hankyoreh* in October/November 2000. In *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, it first appears in a column by Kang Chun-man in October 2001. As Ha Chong-mun has shown, *Tonga ilbo*, critical of conservative efforts to revise historical memory until 1999, amidst the intensifying collaborator discourse, underwent a ‘conversion’ to the right around 2000/01. Cf. Ha Chong-mun, “Pan-il minjokjuŭi wa nyurait’u,” *Yŏksa pip’yŏng* 78 (2007): 177–180.
171. “Han’guk kwŏllyŏk,” *Ohmynews*, 24 December 2002.
172. The institutionalization of the New Right movement has previously been analyzed by the author in: Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 45–48. Cf. also Tikhonov, “Rise and Fall,” pp. 9–24.
173. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 62.
174. Vierthaler, “A Reconsideration,” 2020, pp. 53–54.
175. Kim, *Chosŏn*, 2000, pp. 18–19.
176. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 65–90; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 13–37; and Kim Tong-min, *Uri nŭn wae Chosŏn ilbo rŭl kŏbu hanŭnga?* (Seoul: Paegŭi 2001): 23–48. Before the ACF and its activities, praise of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee in the *Chosun ilbo* had already caught the attention of Urimodu users. Source: Kim, “Kŭgu ōllon,” 2000, pp. 26–27.
177. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 20.
178. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 69–81.
179. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 82–83.
180. Kang, *Kim Tae-jung*, 1995, pp. 32–33.
181. Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 81–82.
182. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 82–117.
183. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 83–84.
184. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 103–104.
185. Kang et al., *Chosŏn ilbo konghwaguk*, 1999, pp. 111–117.
186. These articles were first presented in this context by Chŏng Chi-hwan in the December 1998 issue of *Mal*, and then later repeated in Kim Tong-min’s writings and the civic tribunal indictment. Chŏng Chi-hwan, “Chosŏn ilbo ch’inil haenggak: han’il pappang ūn Chosŏn ūi haengbok ūl wi han choyak,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998:12): 98–101; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 20–24,

- and Kim, *Uri nŭn*, 2001, pp. 37–39; and Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 31–32.
187. “P’yŏnghwa t’ong’il ūl wi han sin-ch’eje (平和統一을 위한 新體制 A new system for a new era),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 18 October 1972, quoted after Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, p. 85.
188. “A tragedy of our history is without doubt that, not properly having settled the remnants of pro-Japanese activities, pro-Japanese collaborators played the leading role of history without an excuse, without sanctions, and without any other measures. They continue to prosper without a sense of guilt.” Source: Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 33.
189. Cf. Shin/Kyung, *Contentious Kwangju*. Similarly, Park Myung-lim evaluates Kwangju as a central watershed in contemporary South Korea. Park, *Yŏksa wa*, 2011, pp. 39–43.
190. “Ingan Chŏn Tu-hwan (人間全斗煥 Chun Doo-hwan, the human),” *Chosŏn ilbo*, 23 August 1980.
191. So for example in Minju Ōllon ... Pungwa, “Chosŏn ilbo,” *Wŏlgan mal* (1998:10), pp. 133, Kim et al., *Chosŏn ilbo rŭl*, 1999, pp. 85–88; Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, pp. 27–33; Kim, *Uri nŭn*, 2001, 43–46; and Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 66–69.
192. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 29.
193. Kim, “Ant’i,” 2000, p. 31.
194. Lee, *The Making of*, pp. 37–42.
195. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 31–99 (indictment) and pp. 178–179 (verdict).
196. The verdict refers to a 1995 law which criminalizes any offences that aim at undermining the constitution or destroying the constitutional order. In the verdict, the court refers to the preamble of South Korea’s constitution, which takes democratic reform and peaceful re-unification as the country’s mission, and judges *Chosun*’s harsh opposition to any forms of détente with the North as an activity guilty under the above laws. Source: Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 179–181.
197. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 182–183.
198. Chosŏn ilbo pan-minjok ..., *Chosŏn ... paeksŏ*, 2002, pp. 49–50.
199. In 2010, *Chosun ilbo*’s subscription numbers stood at 1,8 million copies a day compared to 1.31 million (*Chungang ilbo*) and 1.25 million (*Tonga ilbo*) for its closest competitors. The progressive *Hankyoreh*, on the other hand, stood at 283,000 copies, *Kyŏnghyang sinmun* at 267,000. Source: “2010-nyŏn 1-wŏl – 12-wŏl injŭng pusu (2010년 1월 ~ 12월 인증부수 Number of copies from January–December 2010),” *ABC Pusu poddo charyo* (ABC 부수보도자료), www.kabc.or.kr/about/issuereference/ (accessed 23 December 2020). The year 2010 is the first year concrete data regarding the distribution of newspapers became available.
200. “(Tandok) Munch’ebu, ‘pusu chojak’ ūihok ABC hyŏphoe ga ch’wiso to koryŏ ([단독] 문체부, ‘부수 조작’ 의혹 ABC협회 허가 취소도 고려 (Exclusive) Ministry of Sports, Culture and Tourism, suspicions of ‘fabricated circulation numbers’: considerations of revoking KABC’s permit),” *Media Today*, 22 February 2021. In April, a report by MBC uncovered that large numbers of printed newspapers were exported unread and re-surfaced, as “paper,” in places such as Thai IKEA stores. Source: “Future of Journalism: IKEA Packing Material,” *The Blue Roof*, https://www.bluerooftopolitics.com/p/future-of-journalism-ikea-packing-material/ (accessed 16 October 2020).
201. Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa p’yŏnch’ansil, ed. *Minjok kwa hamkke han segi: kanch’urin Chosŏn ilbo 100-nyŏnsa, 1920–2020* (Seoul: Chosŏn ilbo-sa, 2020): 547–548.

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Terms Used for Smallpox and Its Personification in Korean Shamanic Language

ANTONETTA L. BRUNO Professor, Università di Roma “La Sapienza”¹

Abstract

The history of the terms and expressions associated with smallpox offers evidence of semantic change and reflects both the internal and external worldviews of Korean people with regard to smallpox. In Korean shamanic language, smallpox is personified as gods known by various names with their own linguistic registers, personalities, and behaviors. The present paper first analyzes the semantic relationship between the terms used for smallpox and for smallpox gods, and argues that similarities in their meanings and in the characteristics of the disease were determining factors in the creation of the gods’ personalities. The second part of the paper discusses how possession is defined in relation to the personification of smallpox, the smallpox goddess, and the person afflicted.

Keywords: smallpox, possession, shamanic language, personification, smallpox terms

Introduction

In Korea, as elsewhere, smallpox was one of the most feared diseases from ancient times up to its disappearance from the country in 1959.² It is therefore not surprising that it is one of the diseases that is mentioned most

often in the annals and medical books of the Chosŏn period. The response of Korean people to the disease was not unidirectional: the idea that it was caused by supernatural entities was widespread at all levels of society and medical and traditional-popular cures for the disease were sought after, often mixing various methods. While the government occasionally deemed that treatment involved physical isolation, people also conducted rituals like *yŏje* 厲祭 during the smallpox epidemic to expel the disease by performing acts of deference to the smallpox gods. Indeed, such shamanistic healing rituals and popular prescriptions were often applied in parallel with those ordered by the government.³

It is uncertain when smallpox first arrived in Korea, but Chinese and Japanese documents indicate it first came from China between the fourth and the sixth centuries.⁴ The first mention of smallpox in Korean documents dates back to the year 785 in *Samguk sagi*, where it is reported that in the sixth year of the reign of King Sŏndŏk (r. 780–785) the king passed away after 13 days of the disease, while in 857 King Munsŏng (r. 839–857) died after 10 days. Although words related to smallpox are not mentioned, the length of the disease suggests that the cause of death was indeed smallpox.⁵

Terms for smallpox and semantic change

Studies in historical linguistics indicate that semantic change took place over centuries with regard to the terms used for diseases: these meanings encapsulate historical, social, and cultural information and reflect people's perception of diseases. Shin Tong-wŏn discusses diachronic changes in how the disease was conceptualized and the words that were used for smallpox in Korea prior to the twentieth century.⁶ Following a similar line of research, Ruth I. Meserve presents a linguistic analysis of the words used for smallpox in Tungus languages in the sixteenth century, incorporating not only the historical relationships between Manchu and other countries, but how they show important cultural, religious, and linguistic borrowings.⁷

According to Shin Tong-wŏn, the medical terminology for smallpox in Korean can be divided into two periods: before and after the introduction of “modern” western medicine. The first period is strongly indebted to oriental medicine and uses Chinese medical terminology, while the second is characterized by western medicine and the adoption of western medical terms. While Japanese, Mongolians, and Manchurians used their own native words for “disease,” Korea adopted Chinese terms and assimilated more Chinese medical words than neighboring

countries. An example of the close relations between the two countries is the Korean borrowing of the Chinese word for disease, *bing* (Kr. *pyŏng*) 病.⁸

Semantic changes of words for disease may indicate Koreans' close relationship with other medical traditions, but there is abundant evidence to indicate native Korean concepts of the disease itself, and these concepts reveal the attitudes and emotions people had towards the disease, particularly before the introduction of “modern” Western medicine. Pertinent questions in this regard are: What do the terms for disease communicate or how do these terms manifest people's fears and hopes before and after the introduction of western medicine? What kind of diagnoses and therapies were prescribed according to official and non-official authorities? Were shamanistic practices and a shamanistic world view on smallpox distinct from the medicine of officialdom or did they overlap? By exploring the semantic aspects of terms for smallpox and the practices and prescriptions regarding the disease, I shall suggest that the traditional concept based on a shamanistic view of the disease is fundamental in understanding the pox, its characteristics, and the determination of effective therapies. This view was not in contrast with the more official diagnoses and prescriptions on the pox. Official terms prior to the introduction of modern western medicine tended to be merely descriptive but non-official terms indicate beliefs about spiritual power and the efficacy of ritual acts. The aim here is thus to demonstrate how by personification of the pox and by anthropomorphizing the disease, shamans produced diagnoses and constructed therapies and taught these to people. Since ancient times, Koreans have created familiar ways to control and deal with the terrible disease and references to the disease in shaman's *muga* or songs offer insights into attitudes and emotions.

Smallpox Reflected in Name Changes and Worldviews

Smallpox is a disease that is known by more terms than any other illness both in medical documents and in common parlance. *Chŏnyŏndu* 天然痘, *taeyŏk* 大疫, *tuch'ang* 痘瘡, *tujin* 痘疹, *tuyŏk* 痘疫, *wanduch'ang* 豌豆瘡, *p'och'ang* 疱瘡, and *hoyŏk* 戶疫 are just some of the terms used in medical documents, while *sonnim* 손님, *mama* 媽媽, *paeksech'ang* 百歲瘡, *pyŏlsŏng* 別星, *k'un mama* 큰마마 (큰媽媽), and *hogu mama* 戶口媽媽 were some of the common terms and names of gods used in everyday speech.

Generally speaking, terms for smallpox indicated in the *K'un sajŏn* (1947)⁹ suggest a tendency for usage based on whether the register is oriental medicine, western medicine, or, until the end of the Chosŏn period, popular tradition relating to shamanism. From the above-mentioned registers—for convenience

called “official texts” (oriental and western medicine) and “unofficial texts” (popular tradition)—only some of the terms considered salient for the purposes of this paper will be discussed.

Terms for smallpox in official texts

Tuch'ang 痘瘡

Tuch'ang was the most common term for smallpox—also called *wönduch'ang* 豌豆瘡—and was mentioned for the first time in the thirteenth-century text *Hyangyak kugüppang* 鄉藥救急方.¹⁰ Yi Nüng-hwa looks back to the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) and notes the origin of the term: “[the] word *tu* 痘 is a re-figuration of the shape of a crusty bean.”¹¹ The character 痘 underwent several changes, and its synonyms *tuch'ang* 痘瘡 and *tujin* 痘疹 added second characters that represent the progression of the disease: *ch'ang* 瘡 refers to how the skin changes as it becomes moist and festers, while *chin* 疹 alludes to the outbreaks on the skin rather than to the change of color.¹² Before the Chosön period, the term *haengyök* 行疫 was also used: *haeng* 行 indicates movement, so its meaning suggests epidemic spread rather than bodily symptoms. Although *tuch'ang* was used less at the beginning of Chosön, the term *tu* 痘 in *tuch'ang* was widely used as a general term in oriental medicine by the end of the dynasty. In the *K'un sajön*, the word is mentioned when listing another term for smallpox: *ch'önyöndu* 天然痘, which the dictionary states is synonymous with *tubyöng* 痘病 and *yökshin* 疫神, two words that will be discussed in more detail below. It is interesting that in the annals published at the beginning of the Chosön dynasty, one finds the term smallpox relating more frequently to the restrictions imposed from the shamanistic view of the disease, i.e., resorting to medication was an act against the smallpox gods and the disease must be welcomed. Not even the king and his family were exempt from such restrictions, the belief being that smallpox deities were extremely capricious and had the power to decide if an afflicted person should live, be harmed, or even die.

Yökshin 疫神

Another term that was widely used in official registers—and mentioned above in relation to *K'un sajön*—was *yökshin*. Despite the fact that it signifies “smallpox god,” this term was not generally used by shamans or by ordinary people. Nevertheless, the meaning of the word puts emphasis on spiritual power and therefore on the popular religious belief system. In the case of the synonymous *yökbyöng* 疫病, the disease is objectified, as the second character indicates. It was during the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945) that the use of the word *yök*

ceased to occur: *yökshin* was replaced with *tuch'ang* 痘瘡, which in some way signals the end of the personification of smallpox and the end of the idea that the disease had a spiritual cause. Objective “modernity” had arrived.

Terms for smallpox in unofficial texts

Mama

K'un sajön quotes the term *mama* that appears frequently with *tuch'ang* and *ch'önyöndu*. Shin Tong-wön points out that there is no mention of *mama* being used as a respectable appellative for the king and queen in the records before Chosön, and that its first appearance occurs in the late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries.

The headword *tuhüryo* 痘回料 (痘回了) is indicated in the Korean language during the Chosön period as *yökchil tosyöda* 역질도서다 (a native Korean term), and in the Chinese Qing dynasty it was called *mama marimbi* 妈妈 妈里必; moreover, the headword *songdu* 송두 (送痘), (send away the smallpox) is, in the Korean of the Chosön period, 送信 [송신] ㄱ-다, which corresponds to the Chinese Qing term *mama pudömbi* 妈妈 부담비. In other words, *yökchil tosyöda* means the “smallpox gods are leaving;” 송신 ㄱ-다 means “bid farewell to the smallpox gods;” and the Manchu word *mama* corresponds to *tushin*. During the Manchu war (1636) the Qing invaded Korea, which was subsequently strongly influenced by the Qing; it is possible that the term *mama*, which was used in the Qing court, entered Korean, as with *tushin*.¹³

That the Manchu war was connected to smallpox in Korea is also mentioned by Ruth Meserve, who notes that Manchu soldiers were aware of the danger of smallpox in Korea and were concerned about contracting the disease. Of all the names for the smallpox gods in the Manchu language of the seventeenth century, it is interesting that twelve of the thirty-three that Meserve lists are terms where *mama* occurs: the meanings of the names have similarities with the names of the smallpox gods in Korean shamanism.¹⁴ Some examples of these Manchu names are listed below:

- Amba *ilha mama*: Great flower spirit = smallpox (Meserve no. 1),
- Fodo *mama*: Willow Goddess (or in Chinese: Zisun Niangniang = Offspring Goddess) (Meserve no. 5),
- Ilha *mama*: Flower spirit (female) (Meserve no. 6),
- Mafa *mama* (Sibe): Old Woman of the Variole (Meserve no. 7),
- Mama *enduri* (Sibe): Goddess of the Pox (an evil spirit) (Meserve no. 8),
- Mama: literally, grandmother or female ancestor (Meserve no. 10).

Meserve explains *mama* further: “The role of such ‘old women’ is common among the Tungus. ‘On the road to the world of the dead (...) lived old women, the mistresses of the clan river-road and the guardian of the path of clan life.’”¹⁵

In the list above, the word Niangniang (Meserve no. 5) is of Chinese origin, sharing a meaning of respect with the Korean word *mama*. As Yi Nŭng-hwa notes: “In [Korean] slang, it is also referred to as *yŏkshin mama*; *mama* means *niangniang* (娘娘, the Chinese term for female members of the royal family). Moreover, in this case the term ‘emissary’ refers to the smallpox gods governing people’s lives.”¹⁶

In brief, *mama* has multiple meanings: it is a name for smallpox gods, it is a title of respect for the gods, and it is an appellative used for members of the royal family.¹⁷ What should be noted is the fact that the god’s personality is reflected in their names and appellatives in both Manchu and in Korean. Further characteristics of the smallpox gods that are common to Manchu and Korean shamanism regard the association of pockmarks with flowers and their descriptions of the gods as being very vindictive.¹⁸

Pyŏlsŏng 別星

Pyŏlsŏng is a multi-semantic item and its meaning recalls links with China. The term indicates a messenger or a government official who receives orders from the king to travel to another region and so is dispatched on a mission. Concerning the names *pyŏlsang* 別常 or *pyŏlsŏng* 別星, Shin explains: “...in Korea smallpox was transmitted from China, so Korean people accepted it just as they accepted orders from Chinese envoys; they called it *pyŏlsang*, a term that had existed since Koryŏ, and it later became *pyŏlsŏng*.”¹⁹

Pyŏlsŏng is also synonymous with *kaeksŏng* 客星, composed of *kaek* 客 “guest” and *sŏng* 星 “star,” that is, a star that appears from time to time. A connection between the king, star or sky, and smallpox is proposed by Yi Nŭng-hwa, who quotes a passage from the 1818 text *Mongmin simsŏ* 牧民心書 by Chŏng Yang-yong that describes a shaman scraping some yellow soil to drive away *pyŏlsŏng*, the smallpox god. This is similar to the ritual act performed by the king during his travels that recalled the sun’s elliptic orbit.

Hogu 戶口 (Wandering God)

*Hogu*²⁰ is also known by toponymic names: Kangnam *Hogu Pyŏlsŏng* and Kangnam *Hogu Kaesŏng*, but also *Hogwui Mama*. Kangnam (Ch. Jiangnan²¹) is a shaman reference to China, the place name thus revealing the origin of smallpox. The first

time that the word *hogu* is associated with the smallpox gods is in *Ojuyŏn munjang chŏnsan’go* (五洲衍文長箋散稿), an encyclopedic book written by Yi Kyugyŏng (1788–1863).²²

The gods of smallpox are called *Hogwi Mama* or *Sonnim* in the east and *Soshin* in the Yŏngnam or southeast region. When a child gets smallpox, a bowl with purified water is placed on a clean small table, and the parents pray every day, and they offer rice cooked in a pot and *siruttŏk*. When the child is ill, all the offerings, including paper flags and a horse made of bush clovers are presented to the gods. This is called to “deliver with respect.” When the child starts to suffer from smallpox, it is prohibited for the parents to sleep together. If a child with smallpox also has other diseases, it is believed that the cause and the healing depend on the gods. It is said that *Nobong* (老峯) and *Minsangong* (閔相公) became the gods in charge of smallpox. That is nonsense! Moreover, they say that when they allow a child to get smallpox, parents see in their dreams a noble man entering in their house, and the child must tremble.²³

Hogu’s red veil

In Europe the color red was used to treat smallpox.²⁴ Fenner et al., provides some examples showing that red had a strong symbolic power from the twelfth century. Red cloth was hung in the rooms of smallpox patients: King Charles V of France (r. 1364–1380) was dressed in red when he had the disease, and when she fell ill with smallpox in 1562, Elizabeth I of England was wrapped in a red blanket. Wearing red was extended “to all persons that come near the patient [who] must be clad in gowns of the same color.”²⁵ Later, Fenner et al., point out that “the red treatment was given scientific authority by Finsen, who claimed that the treatment of smallpox patients with red light reduced the severity of scarring, and later developed rules governing erythrotherapy.”²⁶

Elsewhere, red therapy was practiced in Japan, China, India, Turkey, Asian Georgia, and West Africa. In Manchu, red treatment was personified in the transformation of the smallpox god into the “Red Witch,” who was described as an ugly little old woman called “mother” or “grandmother.” In this respect, the description given in a tale reported by Meserve is of interest:

With red hair and robed in red fur or a red dress, she comes along the migration routes of reindeer or is at a crossroads. She sits on a sledge often pulled by dogs with red fur. Invisible to people, she can be seen by a shaman, who knows she is the evil spirit of smallpox. To appease her, various offerings are made or spirits appealed to; shamans may engage her in great battles.²⁷

The description of the Red Witch recalls *Hogu*’s veil in Korean shamanistic rituals for *Sonnim* (or “Visitors”). In the sequence of shamanistic ritual dedicated to

Hogu, a young female god appears with her head and face completely covered by a red veil. Except for this description, there is no further direct reference to the color red being used as a treatment in Korean shamanistic rituals. The appearance of Hogu in the ritual is nevertheless significant and can be interpreted in various ways. One such interpretation is that the red of the veil symbolically refers to her pockmarked face; it indicates that she has been infected and is now immune.

Another aspect to consider is the association of the color red with other diseases. In the past, smallpox was not always distinguished from other contagious diseases, particularly measles, *hongyök*, literally the “red epidemic.” The disease was called *hongyök*, because a red rash developed all over the body, and it was also known as *majin* (hemp seed pox), because the rash resembled hemp seeds, which are even smaller than sesame seeds. Along with *tuch’ang* (smallpox) and another disease vaguely classified as a *yök* (pestilence), *hongyök* became established as one of the three most common and most widely spread epidemic diseases.²⁸

The red color is common to various epidemic diseases, but there was a tendency to consider them as a single category, as can be seen in the royal edicts. The rituals offered to the gods or demons of pestilence were among those rituals occasionally ordered by the king, in addition to other measures against *hongyök*. According to Sin Tong-wön, sacrificial rites devoted to the pestilence demons were undocumented up to the Koryŏ Dynasty (918–1392), becoming institutionalized from 1403.²⁹

The color red also has significance in ritual practices. On the fifth day of October, a rice cake made with red *adzuki* beans is offered for good health; in Pyŏlshin *kut*, three cups of water mixed with red chili pepper and charcoal are offered to banish miscellaneous spirits and misfortunes. In healing rituals too, red-colored beans and red chili pepper are scattered around the area where the ritual is to take place in order to fight the disease and expel evil spirits.

Nor are shamanic songs lacking in smallpox gods represented by the color red. The brief appearance of the Red Ghost Hongshin—one of the most fearful gods in the song for Paridaegi, the abandoned princess—and Hogu’s red veil in Sonnin *kut* are just two instances where red undergoes a process of personification. Personification involves a symbiotic relationship and an association between the color red and high temperature (fever, anger) and possession (infection). In other words, red is charged with symbolic meanings that communicate the phase of the disease: the apex of vulnerability to the disease, i.e., the patient’s unconscious state and high fever is complemented by the gods’ possession of the patient. The afflicted person is therefore doubly possessed, by the disease and by the gods. However, if the patient is seen as a vessel at the gods’ disposal, the

gods become the alter ego of the patient, who exhibits this state of possession through the symptoms of the disease. The close relationship between the disease and the patient is best demonstrated by an analysis of the *Song of Ch’öyong*³⁰ and shamanic songs or *muga*.

Anthropomorphized names: shaping personality

Further to my discussion of names, we should consider how the names anthropomorphize the disease and even create personality. On the one hand, the names reflect people’s fear of the disease and its cause. On the other hand, they demonstrate people’s efforts to “control” the disease by anthropomorphizing it—giving it an appearance, character, and behavior.

In shamanic language, the aforementioned terms and Korean names for the smallpox gods can be grouped in the following way:

- 1) Yökshin and tushin: these terms stress the appearance of the disease, its supernatural cause (*yök* and *tu*, combined with *shin* 神), and the dangerous power of the gods.
- 2) Mama has multi-semantic features: it is a name that indicates beautiful young smallpox goddesses; it is an honorific title used for royal family members and thus highlights the great respect given to the gods.
- 3) Sonnim means “the guest” or “Visitor,” and underlines that the god is an outsider or stranger: a guest who will be treated well, but one who should leave after a certain time.
- 4) Hogu is synonymous with pyölsöng and is identified as the god of smallpox who goes from house to house and person to person, without exception, spreading the disease.

Names more than terms seek to anthropomorphize, but they all seek to endow the disease with personality. Literary references make this abundantly clear.

The Personification of the Smallpox God

The oldest extant description of the god of pestilence is in the poem *Ch’öyong*, which clearly anthropomorphizes the smallpox disease. The poem tells of a man (Ch’öyong) married to a beautiful woman. Ch’öyong confronts the god of pestilence as the latter has transformed himself into a human being to lie beside the woman while Ch’öyong, her husband, is away. On his return, he witnesses the scene and improvises a song accompanied by dance. The god is moved by this unexpected behavior and decides to take his leave. Tradition says that if Ch’öyong’s portrait

is hung at the front door of a house, the family will be protected from smallpox. Ch'öyong is seen as a shaman, who through his dance and song entertains the god, prompting the “demon” of pestilence to depart.

More can be said about the poem from a symbolic point of view, and in particular with regard to the intimate relationship between the agent and the object of the disease, that is, between the god and the smallpox victim. This is symbolized by the spirit lying beside the diseased female, which represents the smallpox incubation period: the god takes possession of the victim's body. Smallpox is anthropomorphized and transformed into a male god with a pockmarked red face. The poem focuses on the behavior of Ch'öyong, but not a word is mentioned about his wife. The silence that surrounds her is the symbolic language of passivity, like a person suffering from catching the virus: she is possessed by the god.

The advice to hang a portrait of the god's pockmarked red face in front of the house calls to mind the aforementioned tradition of hanging red cloth in the room of the smallpox sufferer or wrapping the victim in a red blanket. In other words, hanging the portrait of the smallpox god at the door is a precaution to avoid being infected by the virus, while also acknowledging that the god has the power to decide *not* to inflict the disease.

Over the centuries, the *Song of Ch'öyong* continued to have the function of exorcising smallpox. In order to control smallpox or an epidemic in general, the poem evolved during the Koryö dynasty into a dance called the Ch'ugyök 逐疫, a dance to expel spirits of diseases, and the Narye 儺禮 rituals to expel demons and evil spirits, which survived in the Yöje 厲祭 ritual.

Similar Traits in the Smallpox God and in the Disease

In the past, the smallpox ritual was held during a smallpox epidemic, but also whenever it was necessary to forestall one. A few songs of the Sonnim ritual were recorded before the disease was eradicated in Korea. Like other shaman's songs, the songs for Sonnim also have complex regional and individual variants. For the purpose of this paper, extracts of a Sonnim song from *Tonghaean muga* (Shaman Songs from the East Coast)³¹ will be considered.

In this *muga* we come to learn that there are over fifty-five smallpox gods, of whom only three decided to go to Korea from Kangnam China. The description of their journey to Korea closely recalls the itinerary of Chinese delegates in the Chosön period, and the song praises the wonders of the landscape and food in Korea; indeed, Korean delicacies are the things that make Sonnim decide to go there. Here, it is worth recalling the aforementioned term *yökchil tosyöda*,

comprising a noun *yökchil*, pox, and a verb of movement, *tosyöda* to go out, that is, the smallpox gods leaving and the movement is in an outward direction.

Among the smallpox gods, we will focus only on the beautiful young goddess Kak-ssi Sonnim (Kak-ssi, the Visitor) as, more than others, her behavior is consistent with the illness compared to, for example, Monk Sonnim or Scholar Sonnim, whose tempers are less vindictive. Her beauty is as noteworthy as her temperament; her vindictive nature recalls the violence and fearlessness of the disease. Before entering Korea, she asks a boatman to loan her a boat to cross the Amnok River, but he tries to bargain with her, saying:

If the Visitor Kak-ssi will spend one single night with me, then
I will carry you across without charging for the journey. Then,
As soon as he uttered these words,
Visitor Kak-ssi, hearing them,
Thrust fire inside the smokestack and a torch into the fire,
Seized the shifty boatman, cutting off his head
And throwing him into the Amnok River in Üiju.

Kak-ssi (the Visitor) is characterized by her cruelty: her fury will not abate until she has killed all three sons of the boatman. Her actions are uncontrollable, violent, and lethal, similar to the virulence of smallpox. Further common traits with the disease are found in the obligations imposed on people: we again note that the obligations are subject to a process of personification, transformed into the personal tastes of the smallpox gods. Any offerings made must be clean, unpolluted, and carried out with a pure heart. In other words, the smallpox gods hate anything that is contaminated, unclean, and dirty. These precautions have to be taken to stop the disease spreading, and they must be strictly observed along with safeguards in hygiene. The shaman song continues with the following.

The old grandmother agrees to welcome the Visitors into her shabby house, but takes care to clean everything before they enter:

[...] In the four corners of the room, and the four corners of the kitchen,
She beats everything,
The dust which is on the ground,
The dust which is on the uprights,
She sweeps everywhere and spreads [carpets]
And although there is only a mat to sit on, she beats it,
Sweeps the floor free of all the dirty dust,
Washes and lays the clean carpet,
And after beating all the dirty kitchen utensils
And hanging them up again clean,
She receives the Visitors, she welcomes the three Visitors.

In another part of the *muga* narrative, pollution and dirt become the object of speech acts that convey human unwillingness to welcome the smallpox, acts which signify a lack of respect towards the gods, whose anger drives them to take revenge by infecting the child with smallpox.

Rich Mister Kim refuses to welcome the gods:

You know, suspecting that the Visitors might come back,
He brings [outside the front gate] all the dirty things
And in each corner scatters hens' droppings
And other putrid things,
Upon the gate he hangs branches and sprigs of Artemisia
And takes floating feces out of the toilet
And scatters them all over,
He comes and goes in all directions
Spreading red hot chili powder.

Mr. Kim is punished for such behavior as the Visitors are powerful supernatural beings who decide life and death. However, they can also be benevolent, deciding to infect a person with smallpox only lightly, rather than fatally.

Smallpox Infection—Possessed by the Gods

In the *muga* narrative above, one can observe that smallpox, as a disease and as gods, is distinct from the afflicted person who is seen as being a potential vessel of infection. The following lines of the *muga* tell of the infection by the gods, and the symptoms of the disease. First of all, the hope that the Visitors will infect the child only superficially is expressed in the words of the old grandmother:

I beg you to infect our Ch'örüng [rich Mister Kim's son] with the first degree
[of sickness],
Please leave [after] infecting him
And causing the black, the red, and the white rash of the second degree.

In the lines below, the imminent infection or possession involves a sudden change in the ongoing speech event: more participants take part, and this is marked by a change in personal pronouns, suffixes, and verb tenses, particularly in reference to symptoms. The symptoms of the disease are high fever and pain, which make those infected unable to control themselves; shamanic language is used when describing how the smallpox gods take possession of the child. Once the virus takes hold or, in other words, once the Visitors take possession of the child, the victim describes the terrible pains in the first person. A closer reading of the text suggests the presence of different voices. The alternation between the third person narrator and the first-person speaker followed by repetition of the

interjection “*Aigo*,” and the mention of specific parts of the body affected, render the scene dramatically:

They cause Kim Ch'örüng,
Who was studying, to stop studying and make him ill.
While he was studying, Kim Ch'örüng suddenly said:
“*Aigo* my head! *Aigo*, my legs!
Aigo, my stomach! *Aigo*, what am I to do!”
Breathing causes sharp pain,
And there's no question of eating or drinking,
He feels only sharp pains.
“*Aigo*, mother, *aigo*, father,
Aigo I will die.”

The *muga* shows the progression of the disease through a gradual possession by the Visitor, who enters the afflicted person's body. One of the symptoms is a high fever that clouds the patient's mind. This also transforms a healthy child into a possessed ill person who can “see” things that are “unseen” and can “hear” the voices of those who are familiar to him, i.e., extraordinary senses that only belong to special people or beings like the gods. The possession is made by visual and audible means: Visitor Kak-ssi takes on the appearance of Ch'örüng's mother and follows Mr. Kim, who takes his son to a temple to hide him from the Visitors.

Visitor Kak-ssi took the appearance of Ch'örüng's mother,
And went up to the temple Yōnha, calling him from outside.
“Hey, Ch'örüng! Ch'örüng!” she calls.
Ch'örüng, whether he wants to listen or not,
Knows that this is really his mother's voice!
He rushes out, *vrurr*,³² to look for her all around,
But there is nowhere his mother might have gone,
Only a sinister and desolate wind blowing!
After looking around carefully, Ch'örüng does not see her,
And is about to go back into the temple.
How can Visitor Kak-ssi, who is a god,
Become visible to human beings?
As Ch'örüng is going inside, she catches him and inflicts a first stab,
She catches him, and she inflicts one stab at a time,
(...)
Meanwhile, [the Visitors] force Ch'örüng to say:
“*Aigo*, father, *aigo*, mother!
I am dying, I beg you to let me live a little longer.
Father! Please let me live.
Mother! Please let me live.
I am going, going away,
Going away following the Visitors. [...]”

As [his son] is saying these words,
The Visitors pierce his throat with a metal staple
And his mouth with an iron gag,
So that he may say no more.

The *muga* is interrupted by the shaman, who chants now in the first person.³³

I tell you, before, in those days, in their villages,
either they are possessed by smallpox or measles,
or are dead of smallpox or measles,
before Sonnim departs from the village,
[people] do not bury adults or children but
they place a *ttöktae*³⁴ on the hill behind the house,
and lay the corpse on top of the *ttöktae*,
and if they guard it night and day
it seems that sometimes [Sonnim] allowed the dead to come back to life...

The voice of the shaman narrator again changes into that of the Visitors' voices:

"We will let him live again, so don't bury his corpse,
set up a *ttöktae* on the hill behind the house and lay his corpse outside
and tell rich Mister Kim to go there to guard it!
Tell him to stay awake night and day,
to keep watch [over his son's body]."

The shaman speaks as an officiant in the first person:

When the Visitors are no longer angry, I mean,
when they are truly pacified, they let Ch'örüng live again!
They bring Ch'örüng back to life.

The *ttöktae* tradition mentioned in the *muga* requires some explanation. Murayama Chijun, an ethnographer who conducted fieldwork in Korea during the Japanese colonial period, reported the custom of exposing the bodies of those who died of smallpox to the air before giving them permanent burial. The corpse was wrapped well and placed upon a wooden altar set in a wall or tied to the branches of a tree, or else placed at the entrance of a village, or left in the fields or the mountains.³⁵

The reasons for this temporary grave custom differed from region to region. In general, it was thought that the death was the will of the gods, and if the corpse was buried immediately it would provoke their anger. The god would take revenge by infecting other children in the family or in the whole village, so the corpse was first offered to the gods by, for example, hanging it in a tree for three to seven days. According to the shaman's song above, the reason for laying the child's corpse on the *ttöktae* is to offer the child to the smallpox gods, and his

family must pray devotedly in the hope that the gods will forgive them and bring their son back to life.

Identification—Personification—Possession

Perundevi Srinivasan's work discusses a possible definition of the concept of "possession" in the context of the goddess Mariyamman, the goddess of poxes, in South India.³⁶ Indeed, her work prompts us to ask how possession can be seen in the case of the smallpox gods in Korean shamanism. Srinivasan discusses various explanations of "possession," but does not address clearly how infection with smallpox occurs in terms of "possession" by an external agent. She argues that in the case of Mariyamman, the "source" of the diseases is not conceived of as something that enters the body from the outside, but "dwells in the stomach and it arrives from there,"³⁷ i.e., it comes from within and manifests itself in pustules. The gods and the pustules are one and the same, that is, the afflicted person is identified with the smallpox goddess. Moreover, such gods are considered benevolent (they visit to protect, to save the family from greater tragedy), but people cannot simply "invite them" to receive a disease from them.

It is not particularly useful in this study to try and formulate a general definition of "possession," but rather to place "possession" within a field of meaning that can be derived from this *muga*. Sonnim does not dwell inside the body of an afflicted person, but is invited to infect it superficially. The cause of the smallpox is thus perceived as an external entity that enters the body and causes the suffering. The smallpox gods are identified with the disease. The afflicted person is not identified with the smallpox goddess or the disease. A question remains, however, as to whether possession completely occludes the sufferer's identity or not. The narrative of the *muga* suggests that a healthy child is possessed by Sonnim, who enables the child to "hear" the voices of those who are familiar to him, i.e., that the power to "hear" and "see" the voices of people who are not there can be available only to special beings, like the gods. Endowing the sufferer with special powers does not identify the afflicted person with the smallpox gods or even with the disease itself. To be more precise, the power is *granted* by the smallpox goddess, who allows the child to "hear" his mother's voice: the power remains with the goddess, who transforms her appearance and her voice to be those of Ch'örüng's mother. Later in the *muga* it is again Sonnim who induces Ch'örüng to describe the symptoms of the pain in detail. The source is Sonnim, the speaker is Ch'örüng, and the two entities remain distinguishable. The voices do not overlap, but are heard alternately. The switching of personal pronouns in the *muga* clearly distinguishes the speakers throughout the narrative structure.

The first-person pronoun is used by the shaman as narrator and officiant, and by Ch'örŭng to describe his sufferings, and lastly by Sonnim. Elsewhere, I have discussed possession in the case of *kongsu*, or an oracle, when the change of speakers is indicated by the switching of personal pronouns, verb endings, and verb tenses.³⁸ Although the physical voice of the two speakers, the possessed and the possessor, come from the same body, grammatical cues indicate the actual speaker—the ordinary person or the possessive or oracular power.

In short, the possession found in the *muga* can be defined as: 1) smallpox with an external spiritual cause; 2) the afflicted person is possessed by an external agent; 3) the afflicted person's power "to hear" is again identifiable with an action induced by an external agent. That power "to hear" does not come from the afflicted person. In other words, the aforementioned *muga* indicates possession by the smallpox goddess and the disease, but they remain different from the afflicted person, who is a mere vessel of the smallpox goddess.

As to personification, two types can be seen: one is connected with the disease itself and the other one with its causes. The disease is treated in an anthropomorphic way, with certain features of character attributed to it. The disease was spoken to with reverence to avoid hurting its feelings and prevent it from attacking another person. The personified disease as a goddess then caused the affliction; the affliction did not come from within.

Final considerations

There are interesting parallels between the names for smallpox and those for the smallpox gods, which reflects how people perceived the disease at the time. That is, smallpox came from outside the body and it had personality. The terms often found in official documents refer to place or symptom, but the popular view of smallpox, as evidenced in the *muga* examined above, was different. Furthermore, the linguistic and cultural aspects highlighted here (colors and hygiene) do not contradict our modern concern with the material origins of disease and so we would not be justified in calling them superstitious. Meanings in names and terms, and the narrative voice in shamanic songs indicate the processes through which the disease became anthropomorphized in the smallpox gods' characters and behavior. Because the disease acquired a personality, it then became amenable to negotiation and supplication. Although people believed that smallpox had a supernatural cause, they prayed that it would enter the body only minimally, in other words, that a child would not die, but recover after a few days. Further measures were the restrictions put into force during a visitation of the smallpox gods: the gods required clean, uncontaminated food and pure clean water; they

hated dust and dirt, and strict rules had to be followed. These are similar to the guidelines given in connection with modern medicine in order to avoid infection during an outbreak of smallpox.

Notes

1. Professor in Korean language and civilization, Italian Institute of Oriental Studies, Università di Roma "La Sapienza," Scalo S. Lorenzo RM 21, Circonvallazione Tiburtina 4, 00185, Roma (Italia), E-Mail: antonetta.bruno@uniroma1.it.
2. Kim Ok-chu, "Chosŏn malgi tuch'ang ūi yuhaeng kwa min'gan ūi taeŭng," *Ŭisahak* 2.1 (1993): 38.
3. Kwŏn Pok-kyu, "Chosŏn chŏngi yŏkpyŏng e taehan min'gan ūi taeŭng," *Ŭisahak* 8.1 (1999): 21–32.
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5. Kim, "Smallpox Epidemics," 1993, p. 39.
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7. Ruth I. Meserve, "Smallpox among the Tungus Peoples: The language of a disease," *Central Asiatic Journal* 50.1 (2006): 75–100.
8. Chŏn Chae-wan, "Shin Tong-wŏn, *Hohwan, mama, ch'ŏnyŏndu*," *Yonsei ūisahak* 16.2 (2013): 123.
9. *K'ŭn sajŏn*, 1947. The dictionary comprises several volumes with the first volume published in 1947, the second in 1949, the third in 1950, and the fourth, fifth and sixth in 1957. The medical terms from *K'ŭn sajŏn* are those mentioned by Shin Tong-wŏn, *Hohwan, mama, ch'ŏnyŏndu*, 2013.
10. See *Hyangyak kugŭppang*, 1258, and *Sejong Sillok*, vol. 107, Sejong, year 27, first month, *kyŏngin*; *Sŏnjo Sillok*, vol. 25, Sonjo, year 24, first month, *shinch'uk* (quoted in note 17 by Kim Ok-chu, p. 39).
11. Yi Nŭng-hwa, *Chosŏn musok: yŏksa ro pon Han'guk musok* (Seoul, Ch'angbi, 2008): 361–362, at 360.
12. Chŏng Yŏn-shik, "Chosŏn shidae ūi Ch'ŏnyŏndu wa min'gan ūiryŏ," *Inmun nonch'ong*, Seoul Yŏja taehakkyo Inmun kwahak yŏn'guso 14 (2005): 97–108.
13. Shin Tong-wŏn, *Hohwan, mama, ch'ŏnyŏndu* (Seoul: Tolbegae, 2013), p. 175.
14. Lee, Ki-Moon, "A Comparative Study of Manchu and Korean," *Ural-Altische Jahrbücher*, 30 (1958): 104–120, indicates *buturi* as "measles" and *mama* as "smallpox;" quoted by Meserve in note 29, p. 82.
15. Meserve, "Smallpox," p. 83.
16. Yi Nŭng-hwa, *Chosŏn musok*, pp. 361–362.
17. *Han'guk minsok taebaek kwa sajŏn* vol. 1 (Seoul: Minjok munhwasa, 1991): 654.
18. During the Japanese colonial period, the Japanese anthropologist Akiba reported that Korean people believed that pockmarks were given by the god Tu, and associated these marks to smallpox and the various names related to *mama*: *mama chaguk* and *sonnim: sonnim chaguk*. See Akamatsu Chijō and Takashi Akiba, *Chosŏn musok ūi yŏn'gu, second part* (first printed 1938). (Korean language translation of *Chōsen fuzoku no kenkyū*, Study of Korean Shamanism), (Seoul: Tongmun, 1991), p. 170.
19. Shin, *Hohwan*, p. 173.
20. Hogu Pyŏlsŏng 戶口別星 is also called Hogwi Pyŏlsŏng 胡鬼別星; here the emphasis is on the smallpox goddess going from house to house to spread the disease.
21. "Kangnam" likely refers to Jiangnan 江南.

22. Yi Kyugyŏng's book consists of 60 volumes, 60 books, and a total of 1,417 topics covering history, art (literature, music), life history, religion (Buddhism, Taoism, geomancy, epidemiology), livelihoods (agriculture, fishing, commerce), and natural science (astronomy, biology, medicine).
23. *Han'guk minsok taebaekkwa sajŏn*, <https://folkency.nfm.go.kr/kr/topic/detail/3042> (accessed 21 May 2021).
24. F. Fenner, D. A. Henderson, I. Arita, Z. Jezek, I. D. Landyi, *Smallpox and its Eradication* (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1988), p. 228.
25. E. Kaempfer, *The history of Japan, 1690–92* vol. 1 (trans. J. G. Scheuchzer in 1727; reprinted 1906) (Glasgow: MacLehose, 1906), p. 296. Quoted by Fenner, *Smallpox*, 1988, p. 228.
26. N.R. Finsen, "The chemical rays of light and smallpox." In Finsen, N. R. (trans. J. H. Sequiera), *Phototherapy* (London: Arnold, 1901): 1–36, quoted by Fenner, *Smallpox*, 1988, p. 228.
27. Meserve, "Smallpox," p. 84.
28. Shin Dongwŏn [Shin Tong-wŏn], "Measures against Epidemics during Late 18th Century Korea: Reformation or Restoration?" *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident* 37 (2014): 191.
29. King Chŏngjo ordered the immediate performance of sacrificial rites to the demons of pestilence at the same time as the court was pondering measures against *hongyŏk*. In Shin Dongwon, "Measures against Epidemics," 2014.
30. One of the *hyangga* of the Silla period, the *Song of Ch'ŏyong*, 879 reads: "Having caroused far into the night/ In the moonlit capital,/ I returned home and in my bed,/ Behold, four legs./ Two were mine;/ Whose are the other two?/ Formerly two were mine; What shall be done now they are taken?" Peter Lee, ed. *A History of Korean Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 73.
31. Ch'oe Chŏng-nyŏ and Sŏ Tae-sŏk, eds. *Tonghaean muga* (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏl, 1974): 240–406.
32. Onomatopoeic sound of the verb to run.
33. See A.L. Bruno, *The Gate of Words: Language in the Rituals of Korean Shamans* (Leiden: Leiden University Press), 2002.
34. A rectangular wooden board.
35. Murayama Chijun, *Chosŏn ūi kwishin*, trans by No Sŏnghwan (Seoul: Minŭmsa, 1990), pp. 286–288.
36. Perundevi Srinivasan, "Sprouts of the Body, Sprouts of the Field: Identification of the Goddess with Poxes in South India," *Religions* (2019): 147.
37. Srinivasan, "Sprouts of the Body," 6.
38. Bruno, *The Gate of Words*.

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Interrogating Trot, Situating the Boom: *New(tro)* Nostalgia, Old Songs, and National Identity Performance

ANDREW LOGIE University of Helsinki

Abstract

Across 2019–2020 a number of South Korean TV competition shows branded their musical identity as “trot.” This term denotes a perceived genre of popular music considered normative to South Korea’s developmentalist decades and thereafter as the music of older generations, yet the surprise success of the TV shows seemingly indicated a younger uptake heralding a “trot boom.” However, in much of their choice of repertoire, the shows transgressed pre-existing expectations of the genre. The notion of a trot boom premised on a reified genre discourse is thus overly reductionist and fails to explain adequately the performed aesthetics and socio-musical phenomenon engendered by the shows.

This article problematizes the received narrative(s) of “trot,” while highlighting three alternative trans-genre elements and aesthetic trends that operate in close proximity to trot discourse: “old song” collections, *kug’ak* (traditional music) fusion, and a discourse of Korean vocal affect. It analyzes the repertoire and performances of three of the most noted trot-branded television series, and juxtaposes them with two further case studies: YouTube channel Chu Hyōnmi TV and a sample of “old song” collections dating 1969–1989. It argues that all three cases variously intersect and diverge from reified trot, while simultaneously exhibiting their own interrelations collectively bound by performed retro and *newtro* aesthetics, and national identity discourse.

Keywords: trot, *kug’ak*, retro, *newtro*, South Korea, Korean popular music

During 2019–2020 in South Korea a genre of popular music commonly referred to as “trot” appeared to experience a resurgent boom in popularity.¹ Scholarly and popular understandings of “trot” encompass both stylistic and socio-historical definitions that will be a topic in this paper. Common to both, a dominant conceptualization of trot is as a *diachronic genre-lineage*: one that began during the mid-twentieth century, anywhere between the 1920s and the 1960s, and that continues today. This understanding of trot is delineated in written treatments, such as histories of popular Korean music, where the narrative of trot is closely aligned with the trajectory of (South) Korea’s socio-historical development.

In terms of genre history, trot is understood as a formerly normative genre of popular music, with a heyday in the 1960s to the 1970s, that has been gradually marginalized through newer stylistic genres and generational change. On a popular level, trot has thus been associated in recent decades—at least, until the boom—variously as the music of older generations, and of provincialized, blue-collar settings. Reflective of this marginalized status, a more derogatory label for the same music is the onomatopoeic term, *ppongtchak*, that in repetition describes the standard 4/4 meter associated with the style. More positively, and in contrast to “trot,” that derives from English “foxtrot,” *ppongtchak* further gives expression to a perceived and sometimes essentialized Korean vernacularity of the genre.

The recent “trot boom” was led by several television audition-style shows that branded themselves with the label. Three archetypal series were: TV Chosun’s “Tomorrow[’s] Miss Trot” (*Naeil ün misü t’ürot* 내일은 미스트롯 2019.2.28–2019.5.2), that achieved initial surprise success; the follow-up “Tomorrow[’s] Mr. Trot” (*Naeil ün misüt’ö t’ürot* 내일은 미스터트롯 2020.1.2–2020.3.14), that was a media sensation; and MBC’s “I Am a Trot Singer” (*Nanün t’ürot’ü kasu-da* 나는 트로트 가수다 2020.2.5–2020.4.22), that represented mainstream appropriation. With *Tomorrow’s Miss Trot* having initiated the boom in 2019, the latter two shows coincided with the tumult of the COVID-19 pandemic and thus provided moments of national entertainment and catharsis.

The common conceptualization of trot as a diachronic lineage would naturally situate the boom as the most recent, current chapter of trot’s history. Due to trot’s association with South Korea’s contemporary history, such an explanation accords with the nation’s mainstream teleological narrative of socio-economic development, a narrative that, in its most sanitized form, is promoted by the political right. Indeed, TV Chosun (est. 2011) is operated by the pro-right media group led by *Chosun ilbo* (*Chosön ilbo*). The trot boom notably coincided with a change in political winds that saw the then incumbent Moon Jae-in administration hindered by a series of increasingly self-made scandals that damaged their claims

to represent social progressivism and lived experiences of common citizens. This alienated younger generations, and particularly catalyzed right-leaning tendencies among the male demographic. Against this context, reductionist explanations of the trot boom being a youth-infused revival of a lineage of music that is conceptualized as having been normative to South Korea’s autocratic and developmentalist decades (1950s–1980s) would risk enabling, however implicitly, the notion of a trot renaissance to serve as cultural support for current political agendas of the resurgent, popularist right.

This paper argues, however, that the shows’ performed repertoires did not as closely align with pre-boom understandings of the genre as might be expected. Their temporal scope, for example, was principally focused on music of the 1980s to the 2010s rather than earlier decades. As the diachronic conceptualization of trot continues to the present, this alone would not be a problem. However, the stylistic representation of the shows’ repertoires also clearly transgressed conventional stylistic boundaries of pre-boom “trot.” Such transgressions were rarely problematized within the shows and did not draw public criticism. In fact, inclusion of originally non-trot style songs was likely a key factor in the shows’ ability to capture middle-aged and younger viewers. For this audience, the past four decades are at once an object of personal nostalgia and aesthetic reimagination, and are less tied to the developmental experience. In this mode, rather than a narrowly-defined “trot” renaissance, I argue the shows’ stylistic diversity to have more clearly aligned with a current and politically neutral trend for *pokko* “retro,” and the Korean-coined *nyut’üro*, or updated *newtro* aesthetics, trends that have had their temporal focus on the same recent decades.²

Parallel and converging with the television-led trot boom, meanwhile, has been “Chu Hyönmi TV” (주현미TV), a YouTube-based project launched in November 2018 featuring a trio ensemble fronted by the singer Chu Hyönmi (b.1961).³ The trio perform repertoire of principally mid-twentieth-century (c.1930–1960s) Korean popular songs. Historically, “trot” came into discursive usage as a genre label only from the late 1960s, however, in current genre-lineage conceptualizations, much of this same mid-twentieth-century repertoire is treated as early-period trot.⁴ Chu herself is regarded as a representative trot singer of recent decades; she further enjoys iconic status for a number of albums she recorded at the beginning of her career in the mid-1980s, in a format known as “medley.” Cut parallel to her own early discography, these medleys comprised similar mid-twentieth-century repertoire sung over what was then an “updated” synthesizer-based accompaniment and pulsating rhythm that made them a ubiquitous soundtrack for such settings as long-distance driving and local markets.⁵ Through such pre-existing associations with trot and to lived experiences, Chu Hyönmi

TV has both reinforced and benefitted from the perception of a trot boom originating from the aforementioned television shows.⁶ The project, however, initially avoided referring to trot. Rather, with a stated goal to record a thousand *yet norae* or “old songs,” Chu has situated it in a discourse of national heritage and curatorship. In its visual and performative aspects, however, Chu Hyönmi TV aligns with retro and *newtro* trends, as much as it does to traditionalism.

Stepping back, the idea of a trot boom invites us to (re)examine current significations of “trot.” The television shows’ apparent deviations from pre-boom understandings of trot, meanwhile, both enable and compel us to complicate explanations of the phenomenon—trot or otherwise—that the shows engendered. To this end, this study presents an alternative historicization of the boom that decentres the genre-lineage conceptualization of trot. The paper is divided into two parts. The first begins with an elaboration of the pre-existing modalities of “trot,” followed by a schematic summary of the received narrative of trot as a diachronic lineage. Rather than a full deconstruction, the article de-reifies this narrative by highlighting three genre-transcending phenomena that are typically omitted from the genre-centred narratives. These include: 1) a historical practice of popular singers recording mid-twentieth-century “old song” repertoire, 2) the emergence of a fusion genre style incorporating elements of traditional Korean performance that I characterize as being thematically evocative of “traditional Korea,” and 3) a trans-genre discourse of *Korean* vocal affect. Incorporating these explanations, the second part of this article presents analysis of the performances and repertoire of the three television shows and Chu Hyönmi TV. To these it adds a third repertoire for comparison: a sample of “old song” records, cut between 1969 and 1989, inclusive of Chu Hyönmi’s own medleys. Elaborated in the conclusion, this historicizing analysis reveals trilateral interrelations between each of the media, collectively yielding a de-reified, contextually “triangulated” explanation for the trot boom.

Modalities of trot

As a genre label, popular and scholarly notions of “trot” are variously fluid, contested, reified, performed, and lived. The *fluidity* of trot derives from it being regarded as simultaneously both a historical and a current-day genre that is assumed to have evolved and stylistically diversified over time, allowing for different stylistic qualities according to period. Trot has been *contested* principally in relation to a discourse that understands its commercial origination in the early 1930s to have occurred under conditions of Japanese cultural hegemony. The received understanding of trot, including stylistic change and disputes concerning

accusations of lingering pre-1945 Japanese influence, has been *reified* both in written histories of popular Korean music, and through popular, mnemonic identification of trot with a pantheon of both past and present star singers. While such reified narratives are historically focused, the intangible sound and practice of trot is *performatively constituted* through live performance and recordings. Meanwhile, although the elements contributing to a discernible sound of trot may be musicologically defined, and are delineated in music histories, most people know or perceive the sound of trot without reading such descriptions. Ultimately, the performance and consumption of trot is *socially constituted*; as noted above, it is closely tied to lived experience and normative social settings, from tour-bus karaoke to nationally broadcast media.

These various modalities of trot are bound by a discourse of national South Korean identity that operates through the association of trot’s evolution with the trajectory of Korea’s contemporary history. This history has occurred still fully within the lifespan of the now older stratum of living citizenry. A significant portion is similarly encompassed within the multi-decade careers of veteran singers, imbuing them with a status as *national* popular icons. Chief among them are first-generation icons Yi Mi-ja (b.1941), who debuted in 1959, and Nam Chin (b.1946) and Na Hun-a (b.1947), who debuted in the late 1960s; and second-generation singers T’ae Chin-a (b.1953), Kim Yön-ja (b.1959), Söl Un-do (b.1958), and Chu Hyönmi, who debuted in the 1970s–1980s. A third generation is represented by Chang Yun-jöng (b.1980), who debuted from the turn of the millennium.

Narratives of trot as a diachronic genre

A defining characteristic of trot is that it is a historical genre grounded in Korea’s twentieth-century experience. Thus, nearly all written treatments of trot begin with a diachronic narrative of trot’s evolution. This narrative is most fully delineated in South Korean-authored survey histories of popular Korean music. In this section I provide a distillation of the narrative principally based on two examples authored by musicologists Yi Yöng-mi (2006) and Chang Yu-jöng and Sö Pyöng-gi (2015).⁷

These histories narrate Korean popular music as a series of stylistic genres emerging and evolving over the course of the twentieth century. As chapters trace through the decades, they differentiate and juxtapose supposed genres of each period. Structurally, the narratives characterize each genre of a given period relative to one another across three continuums: innovative or conservative; foreign, localized, or indigenous; and through their lyrics, as either socially concerned or reflective of the given period, or unengaged entertainment.

As the longest-running strand, they narrate the evolution of trot over three broad periods. The first period is the late 1920s to the 1950s. They characterize trot during this period as innovative, foreign but successfully localized, and socially reflective of the times. Pre-1945, the narratives principally juxtapose “trot” with *sin minyo* (“new folk songs”), that they characterize as being more indigenous, conservative, and less reflective of the zeitgeist.⁸ In the 1950s, they narrate trot as now conservative but remaining socially reflective. Here they juxtapose trot with incoming ballroom-dance rhythms such as swing, boogie, and mambo.⁹

The second period is the 1960s–1970s. During this period the narratives treat trot as the normative mainstream genre juxtaposed to incoming styles, including: standard pop or easy listening, psychedelic rock, soul, folk, and disco. They describe trot as remaining socially reflective of the developmentalist 1960s, but narrate its social reflexivity waning in the 1970s and being displaced by that of incoming guitar-based folk.¹⁰ At this point, histories narrate trot musically fragmenting between a purely conservative strand, and another, associated with younger generation singers, that pursues innovative fusion with rock and soul. The third period is the 1980s onwards. During this time, narratives describe trot reviving itself through stylistic innovations and new singers but even as unengaged entertainment the genre is now commercially marginalized by rock and pop ballads and subsequently by electronic dance, hip hop, and indie.

Across this linear trajectory, the narratives describe trot as exchanging stylistic influences, and intermittently absorbing or fusing with other genres. They begin by acknowledging trot to have formed under the influence of the late 1920s and early 1930s Japanese music and “new drama” (*shingeki*) movements. Subsequent intersections occur as follows: in the 1950s trot adopts dance rhythms and the greater tonality of American standard pop; during the 1960s and 1970s trot absorbs *sin minyo*; in the mid-to-late 1970s trot fuses with soul and rock to create the subgenre “trot *gogo*,” and during the 1980s and 1990s trot adopts elements from pop ballads, as well as new electronic dance and techno rhythms.

In addition to these diffusionary exchanges of influence, music histories further complicate the genre-boundary of trot through their treatment of three particular singers: Nam Chin, Sin Chung-hyŏn (b.1938), and Cho Yong-p’il (b.1950). The narratives characterize Nam as one of the “golden-age” trot singers of the 1960s and 1970s, contrasting his urban style to that of commercial rival, Na Hun-a. While describing Na’s style and repertoire as quintessential to trot, in the case of Nam, the histories highlight that he also recorded in American-influenced styles distinct from trot.¹¹ They nevertheless do not associate Nam with fusion styles. In

their treatment of Sin Chung-hyŏn, the histories rightly describe him as the leading exponent of standard and psychedelic rock, but crucially characterize the breadth of his music as further exhibiting an indigenous Korean aspect that overlaps with similar elements that they attribute to trot.¹² The narratives similarly characterize Cho Yong-p’il, the leading pop star of the 1980s and 1990s, as a genre-transcending artist, and highlight his early regenerative impact on trot that occurred with his 1976 hit, *Torawayo Pusan hang e* (“Come back, to Pusan harbor”).¹³ The narratives characterize both Sin and Cho as artists who successfully synthesized foreign and indigenous styles, where “foreign” refers to rock and pop, and “indigenous” to trot and traditional Korean music, *kug’ak*.

In treating trot as a traceable and distinct genre, the narratives rely on several musicological descriptors, the relative emphasis of which change according to period. They initially highlight two elements. First, a 2/4 or 4/4 meter that identifies trot as foreign and distinguishes it from compound rhythms of indigenous Korean music that were rendered into *sin minyo* as 3/4 meter.¹⁴ Second is usage of the five-note pentatonic scale in both major and minor modes, but particularly the minor.¹⁵ For the 1950s the narratives juxtapose pentatonic-based melodies with incoming heptatonic scales of American pop.¹⁶ From the 1960s, however, they narrate trot gradually adopting similar major and minor tonality.¹⁷ Hereafter pentatonic scales remain a key identifier of conservative or “traditional” trot, but with the tonal distinction between trot and standard pop increasingly blurred, the narratives switch to emphasize a new identifier of trot: the *ch’angbŏp* or “vocal technique” characterized by wide vibrato and emotional intensity.¹⁸ From the 1980s they narrate “trot” as adopting faster rhythms and a preference for major modes, but hereafter they principally discuss the genre in social terms.¹⁹

From the above summary of the received narrative of trot, we may note three associative functions. First, their portrayal of trot as the first and longest-running genre of commercially recorded popular music enables socio-historical associations to be made between the trajectory of trot and contemporary (South) Korean history. Second, accepting the premise of a distinct trot lineage, the moments of intersection and fusion serve to blur strict stylistic boundaries. Third, a changing emphasis of musicological descriptors through time limits their valency in fixing trot as a specific musical style but has left current discursive emphasis on vocal technique. In the following section, I offer alternative historicization to these insights that will better serve to understand the content of the current trot boom.

De-reifying the narrative: old songs, *kug'ak* fusion, and Korean voice

In this section I elaborate on the three aforementioned factors that inform my analysis of the recent trot boom: recordings of “old song” collections, songs evocative of traditional Korea, and vocal affect. Although diverse in their constitutions, I contend that all three evoke aspects of Korean national identity discourse. It is at their intersection that the recent trot boom may be best situated.

New Recordings of Mid-Twentieth-Century “Old Songs”

A topic overlooked by music histories, from the late 1960s onward contemporary popular singers began releasing newly recorded collections of preexisting older songs, chiefly comprising repertoire of the 1930s to the 1950s, but later extending to the 1960s. Clearly marketing them through the discourse of nostalgia, the titles of such albums usually contained terms indicating their focus on old songs. This term is most often *yet norae*, but there also occur in the titles *hüllökan norae* “songs that have flowed away [with time],” and *küriun norae* “nostalgic songs.” During the 1970s such albums were most often recorded by singers including Yi Mi-ja, Na Hun-a, and Paek Söl-hüi, whose own established repertoire would go on to constitute “golden-age” trot.

In the mid-1980s, the same “old song” repertoire was recorded in the new medley format in which the transition between songs occurred without a break. Beginning with Chu Hyönmi and Kim Chun-gyu’s *Ssang ssang p’at’i* (1984), the medley albums eschewed the “old song” branding, and typically included the word *p’at’i* (“party”) in their titles. Although medleys are distinct in form, I argue the act of recording and re-popularizing the same “old song” repertoire reinforced an associative sense of continuity between the emergent “trot” signers of the 1980s and the preceding “golden age” singers who had recorded this same repertoire. Further, the association of these two generations of singers, whose careers occurred within the period of a “trot” genre identity, with the mid-twentieth-century “old song” repertoire, has enabled the projection of “trot” identity onto the preceding decades of the 1930s to the 1950s.

In addition to the medley phenomenon, from 1979 and through the 1980s, the same “old song” repertoire was also recorded by singers whose own music was stylistically associated with guitar-based rock, then the antithesis to normative trot and easy listening. The earliest of this demographic had debuted as a part of the youth culture movement of the early 1970s but in the middle of the decade many became subject to recording and performance bans imposed by the Park Chung-hee regime under the *ad hoc* pretext of marijuana smoking.²⁰

The post-Park return of several of these singers saw them record collections of the “old song” repertoire. Two notable examples are albums released by Kim Chöng-ho (1952–1985) and Cho Yong-p’il in 1981 and 1984, respectively. While the musical arrangements remained orthodox, such albums were distinguished by the singers’ social identities and their rock and ballad-inflected vocal aesthetics. These aspects blurred the genre-boundary of the “old song” repertoire beyond the confines of trot and medley-associated performers. Although premised on mid-twentieth-century songs, their recording of the “old song” repertoire further expanded associative intersections of trot and rock.

Evoking Traditional Korea: Kug’ak Fusion

From the early 1980s, several of this same demographic, including both Kim Chöng-ho and Cho Yong-p’il, also participated in a musical trend experimenting with incorporating elements from traditional Korean music, *kug’ak*, and story-telling performance, *p’ansori*, into rock and ballad formats. In its evocation of “traditional Korea,” this trend bears analogy to *sin minyo*, however, it was also influenced by the left-leaning *minjung* movement, which on the cultural front called for rediscovery and reclamation of a subaltern, ethno-national identity defined in opposition to American cultural hegemony. Parallel to a resurgent interest in authentic traditional performance arts that spread among student activists, musicians innovated a style that today may be best termed “*kug’ak* fusion.” This combined vocal techniques imitative of Korean *minyo* folk song and *p’ansori* together with a synthesizer-based texture analogous in ambience to the contemporary Celtic new-age music exemplified by Irish band, Clannad. Cho Yong-p’il’s own comeback included two archetypal *kug’ak* fusion tracks, *Kan’yangnok* and a rendition of the *minyo*, *Han obaengnyön* (“Five hundred years”), that together with soft-rock and pop ballads elevated him to megastar status.²¹ In the 1990s, *kug’ak* fusion shifted from rock to softer pop-ballad inflections; in lyrics and sound, its evocation of traditional Korea has since lent itself to original soundtracks for both television dramas and musical theatre.

The case of Kim Chöng-ho is aberrant to new-age fusion, because the aspect of traditional Korean performance he expressed was principally present in his voice.²² Kim had been born and raised in a family of *kug’ak* practitioners in the *p’ansori* heartland of South Chölla province. Prior to his premature death from tuberculosis, Kim spoke of an ambition to turn more toward traditional music but this would not be realized. Nevertheless, during his initial debut as a singer in 1974, Kim became a sensation for his affective voice that distinguished him from other youth-culture singers. Heralding his comeback, Kim’s recording of the

“old song” repertoire exhibited a greater vocal intensity than heard in previous treatments. In albums of his own music that he went on to record at this time he applied this vocal intensity within a rock-ballad format most powerfully exemplified in the song, *Nim* (“My love” 1983);²⁴ a performance of *Nim* on *Mr Trot* is discussed below.

Voice of Korea: Vocal Affect

As noted, vocal technique is a popularly perceived characteristic of trot.²⁵ For male singers, the archetype of this voice is that of Na Hun-a, though earlier singers, mostly notably Pae Ho, exhibit similar aspects.²⁶ During the latter twentieth century, debates have flared over trot’s perceived homogeneity with Japanese *enka* (Pak 2006). Against this context, proponents for the indigenous Korean origins, or full localization, of trot have argued the trot *ch’angbōp* to constitute a uniquely Korean aspect; through its essentialized “Koreanness,” this aspect is necessarily regarded as equating to vocal techniques of *minyo* and *p’ansori*, a notion present in popular understanding of contemporary trot.²⁷ I argue that there are indeed shared elements in the vocal techniques, though some are the result of convergence and cultural transcoding rather than common origins. Two key elements include: the use of a wide vibrato that post-1945 has distinguished normative Korean song from incoming standard pop and easy listening; and *kkōngnūn sori* or “broken voice” that gives expression to emotional intensity. I contend that, what makes such abstract vocalizations uniquely “Korean” is how they are rendered through the phonetic system of the Korean language, and the specific emotive associations of the Korean language words they convey. Due to the presumption of homogeneity between trot and traditional music, any further vocal techniques of *minyo* and *p’ansori* may also be integrated into performance of repertoire regarded as trot, but due to the specific and long training required, they are not inherent to trot and are principally the preserve of those singers coming from a *kug’ak* background. This was notably the case of the winning contestant of *Miss Trot*, Song Ka-in (1986), who is a trained *p’ansori* performer.

The same basic elements of vibrato and broken voice additionally lend themselves to 1980s rock ballads, which naturally segue to *kug’ak* fusion. They are further transferable to acoustic guitar-based folk, exemplified in the affective vibrato present in iconic voice of singer-songwriter Kim Kwang-sōk, (1964–1996). In the case of women singers, analogous techniques typified by vibrato and huskiness have had a longer history of genre-transcendence, exemplified in the voices of Kim Ch’u-cha (b.1951) and Mun Chu-ran (b.1949). While Yi Mi-ja has a

legendary status, her vocal technique on certain songs was specifically subject to accusations of *waesaek* (“Japanese colour”).²⁸ For this reason her voice has remained less essentialized in performed national identity discourses than that of Na Hun-a.²⁹ In recent decades, vocal affect appealing to an essentialized Korean identity among women’s voices is more directly informed by singers trained in *minyo* and *p’ansori*, such as the *minyo* prodigy Song So-hūi (b.1997), and Song Ka-in. It further converges with techniques of emotional expression employed by pop-ballad singers.³⁰

Musicological features of “trot”

Popular discourse emphasizes vocal affect as a defining feature of trot. However, precisely due to its perceived genre-transcending essentialism, vocal technique alone cannot serve to distinguish an archetypal sound of “trot” from *kug’ak* or other stylistic genres. In order to identify songs that are typically perceived as belonging to the “trot” genre, I highlight four elements that, I argue, to lay listeners (including myself) function as heuristic signifiers of “trot.” First is clear foregrounding of a 2/4 or 4/4 meter. This rhythm is particularly present in 1960s’ songs accused of sounding Japanese. Second are vocalizations of the melody between soft and harsh emotions. This distinguishes “trot” from easy listening, though converges with vocal techniques of rock and ballads. Third are interval leaps in the melodic line of a fourth or more that, again, distinguish “trot” from most incoming American styles, the melodies of which typically move incrementally.³¹

Fourth are decorative elaborations of the vocal melody played by accompanying instruments, both solo and ensemble.³² This feature is historically connoted by the Japanese term, “Koga melody” (古賀メロディー), that signifies a characteristic style of guitar accompaniment popularized in the early 1930s by guitarist and songwriter, Koga Masao (古賀政男 1904–1978). Musicologists consider Koga melody as formative to both Japanese *ryūkōka* (流行歌) and homologous Korean *yuhaengga*—reified “early trot”—of the 1930s onward.³³ Korean music discourse sometimes acknowledges Koga’s pre-war influence, but perhaps owing to the obvious Japanese association, it does not typically isolate this element as a descriptor of Korean trot. I contend such instrumental elaborations and interplay with the vocal line to constitute the most consistent heuristic feature for perceiving music as “trot” across time periods, including in the present.³⁴ In analyzing the question of style below, I take the clear presence of any one of these four elements as being sufficient to impute a feeling of a musical style commonly recognizable as “trot.”

followed by the 2000s. Among these four decades, the 1990s was the least represented but was still the fourth most represented decade overall. Representation of songs originally dating prior to the 1980s dramatically decreased in reverse chronological order by decade. The supposed “golden-age” period of the 1960s and 1970s accounted for under 16% of the total repertoire, while the preceding mid-twentieth-century decades constituted under 5%. Such modest representation of earlier decades still supported the premise of trot as a diachronic tradition but it was far from a dominant feature.

Singer Representation

Certain singers are popularly associated with the trot genre and so the relative representation of their songs in the repertoire can serve as an indicator of concordance with pre-boom trot expectations. The sampled repertoire comprised songs originally recorded by 154 individual singers or groups. In terms of social classification, only around 40% to half of these singers would be typically associated as “trot singers,” whether historical or contemporary (Table 2). These trot singers were more likely than other singers or groups to be represented in the repertoire by two or more songs and consequently their songs represented between 63–72% of the shows’ collective repertoire.

Nam Chin and Na Hun-a topped the list of highest represented singers. However, despite their historical association with the late 1960s and 1970s era, they were principally represented by songs they have recorded in subsequent periods of their careers, that is, in the 1980s and after. Legendary singers, Pae Ho and Yi Mi-ja, whose oeuvres are more limited to the 1960s–1970s, were notably underrepresented. Matching the temporal emphasis of recent decades, the most represented singers after Nam and Na were rather singers whose careers flourished either in the 1980s or in the 2000s and 2010s. Songs of Chang Yun-jōng and Kim Yōn-ja were dominant on *Miss Trot*, on which these two singers participated as judges, while on *Mr Trot*, songs by Sōl Un-do and Chu Hyōnmi contributed to the higher representation of the 1980s. Meanwhile, *I Am a Trot Singer* had a more even representation of singers after Na Hun-a, a circumstance reflecting the

Table 2 Associative genre identity of original singers from TV shows’ collective repertoire

Associative identification of original singers/groups	Out of 154 individual singers/groups	Number of songs of those singers out of total repertoire (316 songs)
Trot	61 (39.6%)	201 (63.6%)
Ambiguous	15 (9.7%)	25 (7.9%)
Not trot	78 (50.6%)	92 (29.1%)

show’s broader eclecticism of repertoire. Table 3 shows a sample of singers whose originally recorded songs had highest representation in the collective repertoire together with a breakdown of their songs by decade.

Stylistic Representation

The question of stylistic representation of the collective repertoire concerns both the style of the songs as they were historically recorded by original singers, and the styles in which they were performed on the shows. Here I base stylistic appraisal on my own listening to the original recordings with attention to the aforementioned musicological features. The strict stylistic appraisal of any one song may be disputed but I contend my evaluations to be broadly commensurate with the contours of pre-boom genre expectations, both academic and popular.

Concerning the originally recorded style of songs across the collective repertoire, songs identifiable as unequivocal “trot,” or possessing stylistic “trot” influence, accounted for less than half of the shows’ repertoire (Table 4). Such underrepresentation occurred because there were stylistically “non-trot” songs even among those of singers popularly associated with trot. Notably, among the top three represented singers, Nam, Na, and Chang, less than half of their songs were stylistically definable as “trot” (Table 5).

In addition to this diversity occurring among the songs of singers popularly associated with trot, the shows’ repertoires included songs by singers and bands that would not usually be classified as trot, whether associatively or stylistically. Examples of such representation from across all three shows includes performances of songs originally recorded by the following artists: the contemporary idol-pop girl groups, EXID and Orange Caramel, and singer PSY (Park Che-sang); 1980s’ pop-ballad singers Yi Sōn-hŭi and Chōng Su-ra; rock and group-sound bands Songgolmae and San’ullim; and 1960s’ girl-group act Pearl Sisters, whose songs were composed by rock guitarist Sin Chung-hyōn. Exemplary of this diversity was the song, *Ōnŭ 60 tae no pubu iyagi* (“Story of an elderly couple in their sixties” 1995), by acoustic guitar-based singer-songwriter Kim Kwang-sōk that was performed both on *I Am a Trot Singer* and, most notably, as the final winning performance of *Mr Trot*.³⁶ The occurrence of such diversity among the original songs of the shows’ repertoires demonstrates that the shows did not restrict their choice of repertoire to the pre-existing understanding of “trot.” It indicates instead that in much of their song selection the shows conflated or expanded the definition of “trot” to include a broader stylistic swathe of repertoire principally dating from the last four decades.

Table 3 Highest represented original singers, and Pae Ho, with breakdown of their songs by decade

	Tomorrow's Miss Trot 2019	Tomorrow's Mr Trot 2020	I Am a Trot Singer 2020	Total	Repetitions of songs between shows	Representation of songs by decade (excluding repetitions)					
						1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Nam Chin	6	11	3	20	5	1 (2)	1	1	1	3	4
Na Hun-a	3	10	5 (4) ³⁷	18	3	1	9 (6)	1	1	4	2
Chang Yun-jöng	11	1	1	13	1					8 (7)	5
Söl Un-do	0	10	1	11	1		2 (1)	5	2	2	2
Chu Hyönmí	2	7	1	10	1		6 (5)	2	1	1	1
Kim Yöñ-ja	5	3	2	10	3		3			2 (1)	4 (3)
Chin Söng	2	6	1	9	2					3 (2)	6 (5)
Pak Sang-chöl	2	4	2	8	4					7 (3)	1
Kim Su-hüi	2	3	2	7	0	1	3	2	1		
Yi Mi-ja	1	1	4	6	2	3 (2)					
Cho Yong-p'il	0	3	2	5	1			5 (4)			
Chöe Chin-hüi	0	2	3	5	0		4	1			
Song Tae-kwan	1	1	3	5	1				2 (1)	1	2
Pak Hyöñ-bin	1	2	1	4	1					4 (3)	
Tae Chin-a	0	3	1	4	0		1	2	1		
Pae Ho	0	2	0	2	0	2					

Table 4 Representation of songs among the TV shows' repertoire classifiable as trot, *sin minyo*, or ballad

	Tomorrow's Miss Trot 2019 (out of 86 songs)	Tomorrow's Mr Trot 2020 (out of 139 songs)	I Am a Trot Singer 2020 (out of 91 songs)	Total (excluding repetition)	As percentage of collective repertoire of 316 (279 individual) songs
Trot / <i>ppongtchak</i>	34 (39.5%)	67 (48.2%)	43 (47.3%)	144 (116)	45.6% (41.6%)
<i>Sin minyo</i>	2 (2.3%)	7 (5.0%)	5 (5.5%)	14 (13)	4.4% (4.7%)
Ballad (rock / pop)	16 (18.6%)	22 (15.8%)	20 (22.0%)	58 (56)	18.4% (20.1%)

Table 5 Stylistic divisions of the original versions of the top six represented singers' songs

Singer	Total songs	Trot	Ballad	<i>Sin minyo</i>
		(Excluding repetition) [As a percentage of singer's represented repertoire]		
Nam Chin	20 (15)	9 (5) [45% (33.3%)]	5 [25%]	0
Na Hun-a	18 (14)	7 (5) [38.9% (35.7%)]	3 [16.7%]	0
Chang Yun-jöng	13 (12)	6 (5) [46.2% (41.7%)]	2 [15.4%]	0
Söl Un-do	11 (10)	8 (7) [72.7% (79%)]	0	0
Chu Hyönmí	10 (9)	7 (6) [70% (66.7%)]	0	2 [20%]
Kim Yöñ-ja	10 (7)	5 (3) [50% (42.9%)]	0	0

Performance Styles

Had the original stylistic diversity of the repertoire been maintained in the contestants' performances, there would have been little musical cohesion, or credibility in the shows' claims to "trot." The shows, however, successfully mitigated the risk of stylistic discordance through homogenizing strategies within their performances. In the context of the shows branding, this homogenization gave the impression that even non-trot songs were being adapted to stylistic trot conventions. I contend, however, that this homogenization of performance style was not purely a normativization to pre-boom trot, and nor was it restricted to the performances of the originally non-trot-associative repertoire. Rather, several performative elements, both musical and discursive, collectively worked to homogenize the stylistic affect of the performances. Elaborated below, these aspects were necessary not only to reduce perceived clashes between pre-existing reified genres, but just as importantly, to eliminate differences in sound and style

that occurred across the original repertoire due to its broad temporal representation. Such diachronic dissonance would have occurred even had the shows limited themselves to trot repertoire as defined in the pre-boom narratives. The resultant effect achieved was a collapsed temporality that felt both *timeless yet contemporary*. Rendered both aurally and visually, this effect drew on retro and *newtro* aesthetics that were key to the shows' success.

The strongest homogenizing impact on the performances was the employment of live studio orchestras to accompany the contestants' voices.³⁸ Most mainstream popular music styles of the past four decades in Korea have been based on synthesizers and digital production. This is true both for dance-based electropop (K-pop) and ballads, as well as for pre-boom trot. Rearrangement of this music for live orchestra thus involved de-digitalization, or *retrofication*, of the original sound. Such genre-defining textures as four-piece "group-sound" rock bands, and such period-defining textures as 1980s' synthesizer-infused music or 1990s' techno were all homogenized to the studio-orchestra sound. Synthesizers and electric guitars were still employed but their dominance in the overall texture was reduced and became principally decorative, alluding to the original style rather than being core to the music. The synthetic texture of 1980s' medleys, meanwhile, was entirely expunged thus eliminating a soundscape that has given trot its reputation of under-sophistication.

As a fixture of television broadcasting from the analogue era, both the visual aspect and sound of live studio orchestras lend themselves to the retro aesthetic while the contemporary studio setting and digital capture and broadcast ensures a *newtro* refinement. Nearly all normative popular Korean music through to the 1960s, and much through to the 1980s, was originally recorded with jazz orchestras. For the performances of repertoire dating to pre-1980s, the shows' employment of a live orchestra could thus readily lend an authentic texture. Here the homogenizing aspect was rather one of *newtro-fication*. This occurred less in the orchestration, than through combined affective impact both of crystal-clear digital capture, and through the situating of the pre-1980s' repertoire—itsself comprising diachronic and stylistic diversity—alongside the *retrofied* repertoire of recent decades. Thus, rather than a juxtaposition of earlier analogue and more recent synthesizer-based styles, the dual forces of *newtro* affect and retro aesthetics effectively homogenized the original diachronic diversity.

In addition to pre-1980s popular music, studio orchestras further lend themselves to two contemporary ballad styles that have proliferated in the past two decades: soft-pop ballads recorded by mainstream commercial artists, often purposed as title music for television dramas, and ballads composed for live musical theatre, an industry that has enjoyed resurgent popularity in Korea.

Soft-pop ballads were represented among the shows' original repertoire (Table 4). Here they injected a contemporary, mainstream aspect. However, while ballads provide a vehicle for emotionally intensive vocal performances, the shape of melodies, as well as musical rhythm and textures are distinct from pre-boom trot. The voice, too, typically lacks the affective vibrato associable with trot or *kug'ak*. The backing texture of the orchestra was thus crucial in homogenizing the presence of pop ballads. Musical theatre, by contrast, was employed as a style for a small number of individual performances, the originally recorded styles having been diverse. Examples include *Kok yesa ūi chōt sarang* ("An acrobat's first love" 1978) on *Miss Trot*, *Ch'ang pakk ūi yōja* ("Woman outside the window" 1980) on *Mr Trot*, and *Mojōng* ("Maternal affection" 1970) on *Trot Singer*, performed by contestants Kim Na-hŭi, Sōn In-sōn, and Kim Yong-im, respectively.³⁹ Due to its current-day popularity, the aesthetics of musical theatre exhibited both retro and *newtro* elements that again made for "timeless yet contemporary" performances.

Aside from musical theatre, the shows' most aberrant or distinctive performance styles were those incorporating live *kug'ak* fusion elements and vocal technique. Across the shows, this style was most clearly adopted on seven performances (Table 6). In all seven cases, the original song had a stylistic aspect already evocative of "traditional Korea" for which they would be variously classifiable as *sin minyo* or *kug'ak* fusion. Rather than homogenizing these songs to the "timeless" studio-orchestra texture, to varying degrees the shows' performances instead maintained or even enhanced the "traditional" aspect. This performed discourse of "traditional Korea" was principally constituted through three elements: live *kug'ak* instruments; Korean *hanbok* costume for both female and male singers; and the singers variously imitating the vocal technique of *p'ansori* or *minyo* singing. The utilization of *kug'ak* instruments and the *hanbok* styling (adopted in four of the performances) are both elements present in the current-day practice of Korean tradition. I contend that in the context of the performances, *kug'ak* instruments and *hanbok* thus functioned as *newtro* modifications updating the songs to *present-day* expectations of traditional performance. In particular, foregrounding of live *kug'ak* instruments superseded the now dated synthesizer texture of *kug'ak* fusion that is present on the original versions of all but two of the songs (*Yōllaksōn* and *Nim*, and arguably less present on *Hŭngbo ka ki ka mak'hyō*).

From among the original versions of the seven songs, two songs were distinct from archetypal *sin minyo* or *kug'ak* fusion styles: Kim Chōng-ho's *Nim* (1983) and the song *Hŭngbo ka ki ka mak'hyō* ("Hŭngbo is flabbergasted!" 1995) by self-styled "*p'ansori* rap" group, Yukkasu. Kim's original version of *Nim* is a slow rock ballad characterized by a vocal line of immense intensity. Inflected by his then chronic tuberculosis, Kim's vocalism imitated *p'ansori*. In particular, in

Table 6 Kug'ak fusion songs performed on TV shows

Song	Year	Singer / group	Original music	Original voice	Show	Contestant(s)	Show music	Show voice	Hanbok
<i>Hŭngbo-ga ki ka mak'hyŏ</i> 홍보가 기가 막혀 "Hŭngbo is flabbergasted!"	1995	Yukkaksu 육각수	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion techno dance	<i>Chang-t'aryŏng</i> with power pop chorus	<i>Mr Trot</i>	Kim T'aesu Oh Saem Ok Chin-uk	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion dance rock	<i>Chang-t'aryŏng</i> inflected musical theatre	Yes
<i>Changnoksu</i> 장녹수 "Evergreen tree"	1995	Chŏn Mi-kyŏng	<i>Sin minyo</i> inflected <i>kug'ak</i> fusion ballad	<i>Kyŏnggi minyo</i> inflected power ballad	<i>Miss Trot</i>	Chŏng Mi-ae	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion pop ballad	Power ballad	No
<i>Ōmae</i> 어메 "Mother"	1993	Na Hun-a	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	Lightly inflected	<i>I Am a Trot Singer</i>	Pak Sŏ-chin	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	<i>Kug'ak</i> inflected theatrical pop	No
<i>Ch'ilgapsan</i> 칠갑산 "Mount Ch'ilgap"	1989 [1980]	Chu Pyŏngsŏn [Yun Sang-il]	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion [<i>Kug'ak</i> pastiche with strings and clarinet]	<i>Kug'ak</i> inflected soft rock ballad	<i>I Am a Trot Singer</i>	Pak Ku-yun	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	<i>Kug'ak</i> inflected pop ballad	Yes
<i>Nim</i> 님 "My love"	1983	Kim Chŏng- ho	Slow rock ballad	<i>Pansori</i> inflected theatrical rock	<i>Mr Trot</i>	Chang Min-ho	<i>Kug'ak</i> -rock fusion	<i>Pansori</i> inflected slow rock	Yes
<i>Han ōbaengnyŏn</i> 한오백년 "Five hundred years"	1980	Cho Yong- pil	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	<i>Pansori</i> / <i>Kyŏnggi minyo</i> inflected ballad	<i>Mr Trot</i>	Kang Tae-kwan	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	<i>Pansori</i> / <i>Kyŏnggi minyo</i> inflected ballad	No
<i>Yŏllaksŏn</i> 연락선 "Ferry ship"	1975	Cho Mimi	<i>Sin minyo</i> ; jazz orchestra, no synthesizer	<i>Sin minyo</i>	<i>I Am a Trot Singer</i>	Kim Yong-im	<i>Kug'ak</i> fusion	<i>Kug'ak</i> inflected trot ballad	Yes

the opening drawn-out line to *Nim*, "*Kanda! Kanda!*" ("[My love] departs! [My love] departs!"), Kim emulated a well-known passage from the *p'ansori* classic, *Hŭngbo-ga* (Song of Hŭngbo), that begins, "*Kanan iya, Kanan iya*" ("Poverty! Poverty!") and is sung in the slow *chin'yang* rhythm.⁴⁰ In the original recording of *Nim*, a soloing electric-guitar line interweaved with Kim's voice. This at once imbued a classic-rock sound, though in melodic shape and function the guitar was also evocative of the Koga-melody style. In contrast to contemporary *kug'ak*-fusion, the recording did not employ synthesizer but added accompaniment with a live horn section, thus adding a jazz-orchestra aspect. In 1985 a more purely rock-ballad style interpretation of the song was recorded by singer Kim Hyŏn-sik (1958–1990) for the Kim Chŏng-ho commemorative album. By contrast, contestant Chang Min's 2020 performance of *Nim* on *Mr Trot* rendered the song as a fuller *kug'ak*-rock fusion.⁴¹ This was achieved by foregrounding a solo *sogŭm* transverse flute and Chang's imitative-*p'ansori* vocal performance over the original slow-rock tempo and soloing electric guitar. This performance was one of the few from across the shows not to employ jazz orchestra. In place of the original horns, the texture was filled out with a background synthesizer that was itself evocative of the 1980s' *kug'ak* fusion, but less dominant. The *kug'ak* affect was visually rendered through Chang donning a translucent white, silk *hanbok* of clearly current-day *newtro* design, offset by side-parted hair, itself evocative of mid-twentieth-century styling.

Exemplified in the case of *Nim*, performative evocation of "traditional Korea" was most successful at substituting for the shows' homogenized "trot" sound, when the original songs could be sung with a similar vocal intensity as believed to be shared across *p'ansori*, *minyo*, and trot. This was negatively demonstrated in the team performance of *Hŭngbo ka ki ka mak'hyŏ* (1995) on *Mr Trot*.⁴² While otherwise well-received, the performance failed to convince judge Cho Yŏng-su, who noted that although trot and *kug'ak* are intertwined styles, the performance lacked any "trot" aspect. *Hŭngbo ka ki ka mak'hyŏ* is originally aberrant from *kug'ak* fusion for its electric dance beat. More crucial, however, in both the original version and the *Mr Trot* performance, the "*p'ansori*-rap" vocal style employed is imitative not of the slower, intense passages of *p'ansori* that resonate with rock and trot affect, but of faster and more comedic *p'ansori* passages that can achieve speeds and word-rhythms analogous to rap. Aside from *p'ansori*, this fast *kug'ak* style is typified in the traditional itinerant performers' song, *Chang t'arŏng*. I contend that what Cho expressed to be an absence of a "trot" aspect—a complaint that could have been equally leveled at the performances of *Nim* or *Han ōbaengnyŏn*—was in actuality an absence of the essentialized vocal affect transferable between *kug'ak*, rock, and trot.

The shows at once effected the boom, while variously transgressing and expanding reified genre boundaries. They nevertheless have not had a complete monopoly on performed understanding. A counterpoint is found in Chu Hyönmi TV.

Chu Hyönmi TV

Operated by Chu Hyönmi with her music director, Yi Pan-sök, the main content of Chu Hyönmi TV is a growing collection of newly recorded live performances of songs dating to past decades, broadly divided between pre-1980s covers and Chu Hyönmi's original catalogue of the 1980s onwards. In the first introductory video, Chu explained the channel's purpose as follows:

Through this channel, [I] will perform for you the songs, old songs (*yet norae*), that Korean people all love; at the same time, with a mind to protecting our traditional songs (*chönt'ong kayo*), [I] will strive to preserve and restore our songs that are being forgotten. Personally, I feel a truly great sense of loss, and that it is a shame that, with the passage of time, truly good old songs are disappearing from [collective] memory. With the voice of Chu Hyönmi, I will strive to sing for you those jewel-like songs that you loved of that [bygone] era, in as close as possible a manner to the original versions.⁴³

As expressed, Chu's motivations are focused on nostalgia and a sense of mission to preserve and revive a canon of "old songs." Organized as a single playlist and playlists by decade, within the channel the main terms used to refer to this repertoire are *yet kayo*, *yet norae*, and *chönt'ong kayo* (전통가요 "traditional song"). Chu avoids mention of "trot" or *ppongtchak*, and makes no explicit indication as to genre or musical style. The only clear characteristic we may deduce about the repertoire she was then planning to record is that the songs have been known within the living memory of her audience. However, the terms "old song" and "traditional song" that she employs both contain pertinent connotations. The former, *yet norae*, readily recalls the aforementioned practice of recording "old song" repertoire. "Traditional song," or *chönt'ong kayo*, meanwhile, although seemingly generic, is a specific term that was adopted in the early 2000s to refer to the same repertoire as is denoted by the term "trot" in the pre-boom reified narratives and popular parlance.⁴⁴ *Chönt'ong kayo* functions to overturn negative connotations of "trot" or *ppongtchak* while emphasizing a perceived lineage of twentieth-century popular music; qualified with "our" (*uri*) it further asserts relative autonomy from competing foreign genres.

Subsequent media features reinforce the equivalence between *yet norae*, *chönt'ong kayo*, and pre-boom understandings of "trot." An interview article with

the *Yösöng chosön* magazine of 12 June 2019 profiling Chu Hyönmi TV explicitly characterizes Chu as a "trot singer," while in her quoted answers, Chu refers only to "old songs that have flowed away [with time]" (*hüllögan yet norae*).⁴⁵ However, in a subsequent in-depth interview for the EBS television channel in December 2020, Chu speaks of "trot" and *yet norae* as if a single concept that she juxtaposes with "idol" and "K-pop" music, characterizing these latter as being under the influence of recent Western styles.⁴⁶ Her willingness to use "trot" for expedience of communication is likely a reflection of the term's restored respectability in light of the trot boom. In both interviews Chu states her desire that Chu Hyönmi TV serve as an archive and resource for singers to be able to study and learn "old songs" and that her goal is to record a thousand songs. We can thus understand Chu Hyönmi TV as a conscious curation project to document a perceived canon of "old songs" that would be popularly equatable to "trot."

Before turning to analysis of the repertoire that will extend into discussion of the "old song" practice, let us first consider some affective aspects of the recorded performances that situate Chu Hyönmi TV in contemporary discourses of retro and *newtro*. Each performance is consistently recorded as a trio with Chu's voice accompanied by accordion and acoustic guitar, played by Kim T'aeho and Yi Pansök, respectively. In its acoustic aspect and choice of instruments, the trio ensemble evokes a timeless, perhaps early-to-mid-twentieth-century era and place when electric instruments were not yet practical or favored. Although an acoustic guitar in particular can lend itself to later styles of music, such as strummed *minjung* folk or more recent "indie," Yi plays with a jazzier, pre-rock fingerstyle evocative of the original Koga-melody style. Combined with the accordion, for songs of early decades, particularly pre-1945, the ensemble's texture evokes an authentic aspect. For songs of later decades, the effect is increasingly one of timeless homogenization in style, which becomes particularly present in the renditions of Chu's own 1980s catalogue and recent releases. Through the consistent and limited ensemble, the homogenization of textures across each performance is even more thorough than in the case of the competition shows' studio orchestras. In particular, the absence of drums results in a relative de-emphasis of period- and genre-defining rhythms. This, in turn, allows for greater focus on the vocal melody together with Koga-style elaborations by the guitar and accordion.

Visually, the videos' *mise-en-scène* comprises elements that feel variously "timeless and current day." Chu wears a variety of elegant current-day fashions, without visible logos or branding and sometimes with a retro aspect alluding to the period of the specific song. The two accompanists similarly wear unbranded shirts and sport hair styles and moustaches somewhat evocative of pre-1945 styling. Rather than authentic re-enactment of a given period, the combination of Chu's

more contemporary feel with the musicians' retro styling—visually enhanced by their instruments—produces a sartorial effect reflecting current-day *newtro* fashion. In addition to the instruments, Chu's microphone is also visible. To date she has alternated between three microphones: initially between a current-day studio mic and a bottle-type tube mic, the latter marketed by companies today as a retro design. From October 2019 she introduced another retro-styled, chrome-plated microphone that is typically evocative of the 1950s. The trio recorded each performance, meanwhile, in a small space against a backdrop of bright monochrome color that imputes a period-less yet current-day feel. This pastel color scheme is carried over onto the YouTube channel itself. Similar to the competition shows, the overall production quality of the videos feels state-of-the-art to our current-day expectations. Each performance is captured with crystal-clear sound, and a picture quality indicative of high-end DSLR cameras. As viewers, we watch these performances through computers or smart devices that maintain the digital quality of sound and picture. In sum, the performances of stylistically homogenized “old songs” interspersed with Chu's newer repertoire, situated within a juxtaposition of analogue and retro styling, and the pastel colors and digital capture collectively contribute to Chu Hyönmi TV exhibiting a strong *newtro* affect.

In terms of repertoire, Chu Hyönmi TV differs to the competition shows in its focus on mid-twentieth-century songs. It consequently bears a greater similarity to the practice of recording “old song” collections. This is demonstrated through analysis of the first 132 performances uploaded between 26 November 2018 and 17 June 2020. Concerning temporal representation, some 92 (69.7%) of these songs date to between 1940 and 1969, with the 1950s being the most represented decade and 28 songs dating to pre-1945 (Table 1, right). Although the repertoire contains songs dating up to 2018, all fifteen songs dating from 1984 onwards are from Chu Hyönmi's own catalogue.⁴⁷ Excluding these songs, the temporal representation is squarely focused on decades prior to 1970. This temporal representation is the near mirror opposite to that of the competition shows, the only common feature being underrepresentation of songs from the 1970s. Nevertheless, thirteen of the 132 songs were also performed on the competition shows: nine on *I Am a Trot Singer*, three on *Mr Trot*, and just one—albeit that proved to be the winning final-round performance—on *Miss Trot*. A further similarity with the shows is that despite Chu Hyönmi TV's preference for earlier decades, the “golden-age” singers are largely neglected: from the sample Chu has recorded just two songs each for Pae Ho and Na Hun-a, and none for either Yi Mi-ja or Nam Chin. Given Yi Mi-ja's celebrated reputation as the most successful popular singer of the 1960s, and her close popular association with “trot,” we may speculate that either copyright or respect for her status as a still-living icon are contributing factors.⁴⁸ The same

may apply to Na and Nam; their gender is unlikely a factor as the top represented singers of the 132 songs are also all male, but those who were active in the 1940s and 1950s.

The Chu Hyönmi TV project not only curates a canon of “old songs” but asserts Chu Hyönmi as a successor to this lineage. While focused on mid-twentieth-century songs, the project extends the temporal scope of “old songs” forwards to include Chu's own repertoire of the mid-1980s. Since 2020, after the date of the analyzed sample, it has further included new material recorded in the same trio format from Chu's then upcoming album release.⁴⁹ In the above EBS interview, Chu situates this new album in discourses of both retro and trot. First, upon Chu mentioning that the physical album may be released only as an LP record, the surprised interviewer suggests that not many people still own record players, to which Chu replies, “But recently there is again a retro (*ret'üro*) sensibility,” implying that the main demand for a physical album will be from those who are practicing the trend of retro aesthetics.⁵⁰ In discussing the musical style of the new album she notes that on her previous album she had worked with younger composers recording songs of “a genre distinct from trot” but that in the current album she was *returning* to her own identity, that aims for a “traditional” (lit. “classical”) style arranged with a “current sensibility.”⁵¹ Chu thus characterizes her current work as returning to a style equated to trot from which she had temporally departed; through her mention of matching current sensibilities, she further situates her work in a performative discourse of updated tradition.

As demonstrated by the EBS interview, the “trot boom” triggered by the success of the competition shows clearly enabled Chu to adopt “trot” as a positive descriptor of her long-established musical identity. However, the emphasis of mid-twentieth-century repertoire on Chu Hyönmi TV, and Chu's discursive invocation of tradition clearly distinguishes Chu Hyönmi TV from the competition shows' own performed definitions of trot. Chu's framing of mid-twentieth-century repertoire as a discourse of tradition and nostalgia is instead analogous and essentially a continuation of the earlier practice of recording “old song” collections.

Old songs: quantifying the canon

The sample of songs on which I base the following analysis of the “old songs” repertoire is drawn from 35 albums dating between 1969 and 1989.⁵² These albums contain 542 individual recordings from a collective repertoire comprised of 277 individual songs.⁵³ For analysis, I subdivide this sample into the following three categories: collections dating between 1969 and 1979; collections dating to the 1980s; and Chu Hyönmi's medley albums also of the 1980s (Table 7). Quantitative

Table 7 Albums sampled as “old song” collections

Singer(s) / groups	Year	Korean title	Keyword / English translation of keywords	Record company	Album code
various ⁵⁴	1969.11.30	흘러간 그리운 한국Hits가요 / 타향살이	Cherished Korean hit songs that have flowed away with time	OK Taihei 오-케-太平文芸部 オ-ケ-太平音響株式会社	LSK-2039
Choe Chông-ja	1973	최정자 옛노래 앨범 제1집	<i>Yet norae</i>	Daihan Record Co. 大韓音響(株)	HL-3
Ŭnpangul chamae	1973.12.28	다시 불러본 옛노래 제2집	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Daihan Record Co.	KLS-82
Ŭnpangul chamae	1974.4.13	다시 불러본 옛노래 제3집	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Universal Record Company	KLS-83
Cho Yông-nam	1974.1.5	다시 부른 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Jigu Records 地球레코드公社	JLS-120791
Hong Min	1974.4.10	옛노래에창곡집	Favourite <i>yet norae</i>	Oasis Records 오아시스레코드사	OL1507
Kim Chû-ja	1974.6.8	다시 불러보는 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Universal Record Company	KLS-95
Ha Ch'un-hwa	19748.28	하춘화가 부르는 구리울 옛노래	Cherished <i>yet norae</i>	Jigu Records 지구레코드공사	JLS-120898
Na Hun-a	1976.11.1	20곡 나훈아 다시 부른 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Oasis Records	OL1853
various ⁵⁵	1976.2.10	다정한 옛노래: 흘러간 가요 씨리즈 Vol.1	Affectionate <i>yet norae</i> : songs flowed away with time	Daihan Record 대한음반제작소	SLD-1023
Kûm kwa ün (Two Ace)	1976.5.15	금과 은 옛노래 모음	<i>Yet norae</i>	Universal Record Co.	K-APPLE-821
Yi Sông-ae	1976.6.12	이성애의 열창 옛노래 20 Vol. 1	<i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Records지구레코드공사	JLS-1201116
Paek Sôl-hûi & Yi Mi-ja	1976.6.1	백설화와 이미지 옛노래 20 Vol.2	<i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Records지구레코드공사	JLS-1201117

Cho Mi-mi	1976.8.17	조미미 다시 부른 옛노래 20곡	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Oasis Record Co. 오아시스레코드사	OL1832
Mun Chu-ran	1977.2.5	문추란의 정다운 옛노래 20곡집	Affectionate <i>yet norae</i>	Jigu Records Corp. 지구레코드공사	JLP-1070
Kim Hun	1977.5.25	옛노래 모음	<i>Yet norae</i>	Universal Record Co. 유니버어살레코드사	K-APPLE-839
Na Hun-a	1978.10.12	나훈아 다시 부른 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	오아시스레코드사 Oasis Record Co.	OL2067
Yi Mi-ja & Ha Ch'un-hwa	1979.2.16	열창: 이미지 하춘화 같이 부른 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung together	Jigu Records Corp. 지구레코드공사	JLS-1201428
Sawôl-ga owôl	1979.8.1	4월과 5월의 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i>	HIT Record Co. 히트레코드사	HM10011
Yi Mi-ja & Paek Sôl-hûi	1979.10.1	그리운 노래 12집	Cherished songs	Seoul Record Co. 서울음響	SLP-7852
Pak Il-nam & Chông Hun-hûi	19801.10	박일남 장춘희: 다시부른옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Oasis Record Co. 오아시스레코드사	OL2233
Paek Nan-a	1980.6.5	왕년의 톱가수 백난아가 부른 옛노래Hits트곡20	Hit <i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Record Corp. 지구레코드	JLS-1201552
Kim Chông-ho	1981.3.26	영혼을 노래하는 김정호	Kim Chông-ho singing [his] soul	Shinseye Sound Ind Co. 新世界音響工業株式会社	SIS-81117
Cho Yong-p'il	1984.2.6	슈퍼스타 조용필 옛노래1집	<i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Record Corp.	JLS-1201841
Cho Yong-p'il	1984.3.9	슈퍼스타 조용필 옛노래2집	<i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Record Corp.	JLS-1201842
Pak Il-nam & O Ki-taek	1984.9.30	박일남-오기택 옛노래 경창	<i>Yet norae</i>	Jigu Record Corp.	JLS-1201893
Chông Chong-t'aek	1986.5.20	다시부른 옛노래	<i>Yet norae</i> sung again	Oasis Record Co. 오아시스레코드사	OL-2703
Kim Chun-gyu	1986.3.29	쌍쌍파티 김준규 옛노래	<i>Ssangssang</i> party	Jigu Record Corp.	JLS-1201996
Na Hun-a	1989.8.10	흘러간옛노래모음집	<i>Yet norae</i> that have flowed away with time	ASIA Record Co. 아세아레코드	ALS-1854

Table 7 (continued)

Singer(s) / groups	Year	Korean title	Keyword / English translation of keywords	Record company	Album code
Chu Hyönmi & Kim Chun-gyu	1984.12.25	쌍쌍파티 1집	Ssangssang party 1	Oasis Record Co. 오아시스레코드사	ORC-1029 (OL-2616)
Chu Hyönmi & Kim Chun-gyu	1985.1.25	쌍쌍파티 2집	Ssangssang party 2	Oasis Record Co.	ORC-1012 (OL-2617)
Chu Hyönmi & Kim Chun-gyu	1985.3.25	쌍쌍파티 3집	Ssangssang party 3	Oasis Record Co.	ORC-1013
Chu Hyönmi & Kim Chun-gyu	1985.6.5	쌍쌍파티 4집	Ssangssang party 4	Oasis Record Co.	ORC-1014
Chu Hyönmi	1985.10.20	추현미 디스코 파티	Chu Hyönmi disco party	TGR 태광음반(주)	AN-031
Chu Hyönmi & Kim Chun-gyu	1985.11.15	쌍쌍파티 5집	Ssangssang party 5	Oasis Record Co.	ORC-1047

analysis of this significant-sized sample enables us to delineate the core repertoire of the “old songs” canon. This is the same canon that the reified narratives have equated to “early trot,” and that is also evoked by Chu Hyönmi.

In making comparisons both among the three “old song” album subcategories and between those categories and the repertoire of the TV shows and Chu Hyönmi TV, we should consider two types of representation: frequency of occurrence across the total number of songs inclusive of repetition, and relative patterns of representation when counting the occurrence of individual songs only once within a given category. Comparing the total frequency reveals the most often recorded or performed songs. These songs constitute the core repertoire of the canon. Representation by individual songs, meanwhile, provides an overview of the total diversity and relation to period. For example, and to highlight a key characteristic of the total old songs’ repertoire, a relatively small number of pre-1945 songs have been recorded with highest frequency, placing these songs individually at the core of the “old song” canon. By contrast, the temporal bracket of the 1950s accounts both for the greatest frequency of songs organized by period, as well as the largest variety of individual songs. However, precisely because of this variety, relatively fewer individual songs dating to the 1950s occur with a frequency comparable to the most frequently occurring pre-1945 songs. Table 8 tabulates occurrence of songs by period across the subcategories and total repertoires. The key temporal divisions are pre-1945, the 1950s, and the 1960s.⁵⁶

The clearest characteristic of the “old song” repertoire across all three subcategories is the dominance of 1950s’ period songs: for the combined categories, the figure is around 36%, both for frequency including repetition and for the number of individual songs. The most insightful difference among the subcategories is thus relative representation of the pre-1945 and 1960s brackets. Across the 1969–1979 subcategory, frequency of total occurrence according to time period is evenly spread between pre-1945 (39%) and the 1950s (38%), while the category of the 1960s (15%) is less than half of either of these. However, by individual songs (excluding repetition), representation of the 1950s (40%) rises, while the pre-1945 bracket (26%) drops to a level closer to the 1960s (24%). In short, the collective repertoire by individual song comprised a similar number of songs of pre-1945 and the 1960s, however, the pre-1945 songs were recorded more often than those of the 1960s.

In the 1980s subcategory, the pattern of representation among the three main periods of pre-1945, 1950s, and 1960s is more even. Across the frequency of total occurrence, the representation of the 1960s (27.4%) has closed the gap with pre-1945 (29%), indicating that a greater number of specific songs of the 1960s were being recorded more often, and thus gaining a place in the canon.

Table 8 Temporal representation of “old song” collection repertoire by songs’ original release dates

	1969–1979 “old songs” 20 albums		1980s “old songs” 9 albums		Chu Hyönmi medleys 1980s 6 albums		All 1980s 15 albums		All categories 1969–1989 35 albums	
	Individual (154)	With repetition (282)	Individual (102)	With repetition (135)	Individual (118)	With repetition (125)	Individual (188)	With repetition (260)	Individual (277)	With repetition (542)
Pre-1945	40 26.0%	111 39.4%	22 22.6%	39 28.9%	12 10.17%	14 11.1%	23 12.2%	53 20.38%	43 15.5%	164 30.3%
1945–1949	11 7.1%	19 6.7%	4 3.9%	4 3.0%	1 0.85%	1 0.8%	5 2.66%	5 1.92%	11 3.97%	24 4.43%
1950s	62 40.3%	107 37.6%	40 39.2%	47 34.8%	39 33.1%	43 34.4%	66 35.1%	90 34.6%	98 35.4%	196 36.2%
1960s	37 24.0%	42 14.9%	30 29.4%	37 27.4%	36 30.5%	37 29.6%	60 31.9%	74 28.5%	87 31.4%	116 21.4%
1970s	4 2.6%	4 1.4%	6 5.9%	8 5.9%	23 19.5%	23 18.4%	27 14.4%	31 11.9%	31 11.2%	35 6.46%
1980s	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	7 5.93%	7 3.72%	7 3.72%	7 2.69%	7 2.53%	7 1.29%

Concerning representation by individual songs, the number of songs of the 1960s (29%) surpasses those of pre-1945 (23%). This indicates that by the 1980s, the period of the 1960s was emerging as a new source of recent “old-song” nostalgia.

The subcategory of Chu Hyönmi’s medley albums exhibits notably lower total representation of pre-1945 songs (11%) and higher representation both of the 1960s (28%) and also of the 1970s (14%) and 1980s (12%). Appearance of 1980s material is aberrant as it represents newly composed repertoire added into the mix. We should further bear in mind that in contrast to the preceding subcategories, Chu’s medley albums were less explicitly marketed as “old song” collections: a part of their success may, indeed, have been the repertoire’s wide temporal scope appealing to a wide listenership. Similar to the other categories, however, Chu’s medley repertoire remained clearly anchored in the 1950s and maintained representation of core pre-1945 songs.

In contrast to the modest overlap of nineteen songs between Chu Hyönmi TV and the TV shows, the overlap between Chu Hyönmi TV and the “old song” collections is considerably higher. Across the total collections (all three subcategories, comprising 277 songs), some 83 individual songs overlapped. This overlap accounted for 62% of the Chu Hyönmi TV and 30% of the collections by individual song. However, inclusive of repetition the overlap accounts for just under 49% of the collections’ total volume of songs (542). This indicates that in the first 132 songs, the Chu Hyönmi TV project has already covered close to half of the “old song” collections by total volume of song frequency.

In contrast to Chu Hyönmi TV, the overlap between the collections and the repertoire of the TV shows is relatively small. Despite the larger size of the TV shows’ collective repertoire than that of Chu Hyönmi TV, the number of individual songs that overlap is just 29. This figure accounts for just over 10% both of the shows’ repertoire and of the “old song” collections by individual song. Of the collections by total volume (inclusive of repetition) it rises to just 14%. The small overlap is principally due to the TV shows’ repertoire having a greater focus on songs of the 1980s onwards. Of the overlapping songs, just three date to the early 1980s, all occurring on the Chu medleys.⁵⁷ However, if we limit comparison of the TV shows’ repertoire to pre-1980s (59 individual songs), the remaining 26 songs that overlap now account for 44% of the shows’ pre-1980 repertoire. Of these, four date to the 1970s, while eight songs date to the 1960s and account for 40% of the total shows’ songs of the same decade (20 songs). For pre-1960, fourteen songs overlap and notably account for 100% of the shows’ pre-1960 repertoire. Thus, although numerically small, the representation of pre-1980s and especially pre-1960s repertoire on the TV shows closely aligns with the repertoire of the

Table 9 Overlap of repertoire between “old song” collections and Chu Hyönmi TV (left), and TV shows (right)

	“Old song” and medley albums by category				Overlap with Chu Hyönmi TV 132 songs				Overlap with TV shows 279 individual; 316 with repetition				
	Total songs		Number of overlapping songs:		As % of Chu TV	As % of category with repetition	As % of category by individual songs	Number of overlapping songs:		As % of TV shows by individual songs	As % of TV shows with repetition	As % of category by individual songs	As % of category with repetition
	Individual songs	With repetition	Individual songs	With repetition among the categories	No. of overlapping songs divided by 132	Sum of overlapping songs: divided by total individual songs of category	Sum of overlapping songs: divided by total songs of category with repetition	With repetition among the categories	With repetition among the TV shows repertoire	Sum of overlapping songs from TV shows: divided by 279	Sum of overlapping songs from TV shows: divided by 316	Sum of overlapping songs: divided by total individual songs of category	Sum of overlapping songs from category with repetition
1969–1979	154	282	54	146	40.9%	35.1%	51.8%	16	17	5.7%	5.4%	10.4%	13.1%
Other 1980s	102	135	41	64	31.1%	40.2%	47.4%	15	16	5.4%	5.1%	14.7%	16.3%
Chu medleys 1980s	118	125	48	54	36.4%	40.7%	43.2%	18	21	6.5%	6.6%	15.3%	15.2%
All 1980s	188	260	69	118	52.3%	36.7%	45.4%	27	31	9.7%	9.8%	14.4%	15.8%
All 1969–1980s	277	542	83	264	62.9%	30.0%	48.7%	29	33	10.4%	10.4%	10.5%	14.4%

“old song” collections, indicating the shows to have rooted their repertoire in the “old song” canon.

As one way to encapsulate both internal and comparative features of the collections, Table 10 lists the top thirty-two most often recurring songs from the total of the “old song” repertoire, together with the occurrence of these songs across Chu Hyönmi TV and the TV shows. While each “old song” and medley album contains its own specific selection of songs, this list distils a sample that may be considered archetypal of the core repertoire corresponding to the currently perceived canon of “early trot,” as delineated in popular music histories. Each of these songs occurred between four and thirteen times across the collections; inclusive of repetition they account for 37.6% (204) of the total recordings. Seventeen songs date to pre-1945, and by frequency account for 62.3% (127 recordings) of the top thirty-two songs. By contrast fourteen of the thirty-two songs date between 1948 and 1959 and represent 35.8% (73) recordings. Only one song, an Yi Mi-ja hit, dates to the early 1960s. Of these top thirty-two most frequently occurring songs, 24 have also been recorded by Chu Hyönmi TV, while just seven were performed on the TV shows. Among the shows, only one of these latter seven songs, *Tanjung üi Miari kogae* (“Heartache at Miari Pass” 1956), was performed on *Miss Trot*, as the final performance by winning contestant, Song Ka-in.⁵⁸

Conclusion: triangulating trot

The above analysis has contextualized the content of the TV shows through comparison with Chu Hyönmi TV and earlier “old song” collections. The choice of comparison has been premised first, on relative relations of each of the three media to pre-existing notions of “trot,” typified by reified narratives, such as popular music histories, and second, on interrelations between the three media independent to the trot discourse.

To summarize, all three media have exhibited an imperfect relationship to reified and popular notions of “trot.” The TV shows positively invoked pre-existing discourses of “trot” through their usage of the term in their titles; their success engendered the notion of a “trot boom,” but in their choice of repertoire and performances, they deviated from pre-boom expectations. Chu Hyönmi TV is fronted by a singer popularly associated with trot, but the project itself has eschewed mention of the term. Across both the TV shows and Chu Hyönmi TV, repertoire of the popularly regarded “golden-age” trot singers of the 1960s and 1970s was underrepresented, thus distancing the two media from the diachronic centre and archetypes of reified trot. Chu Hyönmi TV and the earlier “old song” collections, meanwhile, manifest a common repertoire that today is regarded

Table 10 Top 32 most often recurring songs of "old song" sample, and their occurrence on Chu Hyŏnmi TV and TV shows

Title	Date	Composer	Original Singer	All 1969-1989	1969-1979	Other 1980s	Chu 1980s medleys	Chu Hyŏnmi TV	Trot Singer	Miss Trot	Mr Trot
<i>Nunmul chŏiŭn Tumanŏgang</i> 눈물 젖은 두만강 "The tear-drenched Tumen River"	1938	Yi Si-u	Kim Chŏng-ku	13	9	2	2	1			
<i>Nagŭne sŏrum</i> 나그네 설움 "A traveller's sorrow"	1940	Yi Chae-ho	Paek Nyŏn-sŏl	12	8	3	1	1			
<i>Hwangŏsŏng yettŏ hwangŏetŏ</i> "Site of the fortress ruins" (1928)	1932	Chŏn Su-rin	Yi Aerisu	10	6	3	1	1			
<i>Aesu ūi soyangok</i> 애수의 소야곡 "Serenade of grief"	1937	Pak Si-chŭn	Nam In-su	9	5	3	1	1			
<i>Mokpŏ ūi nunmul</i> 목포의 눈물 "Tears of Mokpo"	1935	Son Mok-in	Yi Nan-yŏng	9	5	3	1	1			
<i>Taŏyang sari</i> 타향살이 "Living in a foreign land"	1934	Son Mok-in	Ko Pok-su	9	7	2		1			
<i>Taeji ūi hanggu</i> 대지의 항구 "Port on the continent"	1941	Yi Chae-ho	Paek Nyŏn-sŏl	9	5	4		1			
<i>Chŏngch'ŭn kobaek</i> 청춘고백 "Confession of youth"	1955	Pak Si-chŭn	Nam In-su	8	5	1	2				
<i>Pomnal ūn kanda</i> 봄날은 간다 "Spring days pass"	1954	Pak Si-chŭn	Paek Sŏl-hŭi	8	6	2		1	1		
<i>Pŏnji ŏmmŭn chumak</i> 변지 없는 주막 "A drinking place with no address"	1940	Yi Chae-ho	Paek Sŏl-hŭi	8	6	1	1	1			
<i>Kkum kkunŭn Paengmagang</i> 꿈꾸는 백마강 (alt. 추억의 백마강) "Dreaming of Paekma River" (alt. Ch'ŭok ūi Paengmagang "Memories of Paekma River")	1940	Im Kŭn-sik	Yi In-kwon	7	5	1	1	1			
<i>Taejŏn purŭsŭ</i> 대진 부르스 (alt. Taejŏn puru-su 대전부르스) "Taejŏn Blues"	1959	Kim Pu-hae	An Chŏng-ae	7	3	3	1	1			1
<i>Tanjŏng ūi Miri kogae</i> 단장의 미아리 고개 "Heartache at Miri Pass"	1956	Yi Chae-ho	Yi Hae-yŏn	7	5	1	1	1			1
<i>Tchak sarang</i> 짝사랑 "Unrequited love"	1937	Son Mok-in	Ko Pok-su	7	5	1	1				
<i>Pulhyŏja nŭn umniida</i> 불효자는 읊니다 "An unfilial child cries"	1940	Yi Chae-ho	Chin Pang-nam	6	3	2	1	1			
<i>Altŭrihan tangsin</i> 애틁한 당신 "Precious you"	1936	Chŏn Su-rin	Hwang Kŭm-sim	5	3	2		1			
<i>Hongdo ya uji mara</i> 홍도야 울지 마라 "Hongdo, don't cry!"	1939	Kim Chun-yŏng	Kim Yŏng-chŭn	5	3		2	1			1
<i>Hŏimang-ga</i> 희망가 "Song of hope"	1910s	anon.	anon.	5	4	1					1
<i>Mulbangŏ tonŭn naenyŏk</i> 물방아 도는 내력 "inner power of the water mill"	1954	Yi Chae-ho	Pak Chae-hong	5	3	2		1			
<i>Pi naerinŭn Honamsŏn</i> 비 내리는 호남선 "The Honam rail line in the rain"	1956	Pak Chŭn-sŏk	Son In-ho	5	3	1	1	1			1
<i>Sŏnch'ang</i> 선창 "Ships captain"	1941	Yi Pong-ryong	Ko Un-bong	5	3	1	1	1			
<i>Ulga nŏmmŭn Paktaljae</i> 울고 넘는 박달재 "Crossing Paktal Ridge in tears"	1950 (1948)	Kim Kyo-sŏng	Paek Chae-hong	5	3		2	1			
<i>Amerika Ch'aina t'au</i> 아메리카 차이나타운 "American Chinatown"	1954	Pak Si-chŭn	Paek Sŏl-hŭi	4	3	1					

Table 10 (continued)

Title	Date	Composer	Original Singer	All 1969–1989	1969–1979	Other 1980s	Chu 1980s medleys	Chu Hyön- mi TV	Trot Singer	Miss Trot	Mr Trot
<i>Hyonyö Simchöng</i> 효녀 심청 "Filial daughter Simchöng"	1957	Chön O-süng	Kim Yong-man	4	3		1				
<i>Ibyöl üi Pusan chönggöjong</i> 이별의 부산 정거장 "Parting at Pusan station"	1954	Pak Si-ch'un	Nam In-su	4	3		1	1	1		
<i>Kamgyök sidae</i> 감격시대 "Age of emotion"	1939	Pak Si-ch'un	Nam In-su	4	4			1			
<i>Kkum sok üi sarang</i> 꿈속의 사랑 "Love within a dream"	1956	Son Sök-u (arranger) ⁵⁹	Hyön In	4	1	2	1				
<i>Na hana üi sarang</i> 나 하나 의 사랑 "My one love"	1955	Son Sök-u	Son Min-to	4	3	1					
<i>Na nün uröñne</i> 나는 울었네 "I cried"	1954	Pak Si-ch'un	Son In-ho	4	3		1	1			
<i>Nim ira purürikka</i> 님이라 부르리가 (alt. Im... 임) "Should I call you My Love?"	1963	Na Hwa- rang	Yi Mi-cha	4	3		1				
<i>Pi naeri nün</i> Komo nyöng 비 내리는 고모령 "Komo Pass in the rain"	1948	Pak Si-ch'un	Hyön In	4	3		1	1			
<i>Son pöjja mul</i> pöjja 산팔자 물팔자 "Mountain fate and river fate"	1940	Yi Chae-ho	Paek Nyön-söl	4	3	1		1			

as "early trot," however, dating to the mid-twentieth century, this repertoire predates the discursive genre-identity of trot that historically only emerged in the late 1960s. Finally, many of the "old song" collections were recorded by singers popularly associated with trot, including both "golden-age" singers and Chu Hyönmi, a circumstance that enables retrospective associations of normative mid-twentieth-century repertoire with "early trot;" however, such collections were also recorded by associatively non-trot singers and were thus not the preserve of trot-associated singers.

The three analyzed media exhibit the following series of interrelations. The television shows and Chu Hyönmi TV are contemporary, screen-based media that across 2019–2020 have been associated with the notion of a "trot boom." In substance, both comprise performative rendering of retro and *newtro* aesthetics. Despite these similarities, they differ in the temporal focus of their performed repertoire, the TV shows having a relative focus on the recent four decades; Chu Hyönmi TV being focused on the mid-twentieth century. The temporal focus of Chu Hyönmi TV better aligns with the repertoire of the "old song" collections. These two media further share a common framing of nostalgia. However, they differ in their temporal distance and relationship to the same mid-twentieth-century repertoire, and while the collections were commercial releases, Chu Hyönmi TV treats this material as a canon of national heritage. At a cursory glance, the TV shows and "old song" collections may appear the least interconnected. Their repertoires differ in temporal focus and the TV shows mostly avoid explicit appeals to "old-song" nostalgia. However, the two possess a significant commonality in the relative temporal distance to their respective repertoires. Both employed principally younger-generation singers to reactivate material of recent past decades: for listeners of the "old song" collections released across the 1970s and 1980s the decades were those of the mid-twentieth century; for audiences of the TV shows, this period is the 1980s to 2010s. The shows and collections thus appealed to lived-memories and nostalgia of recent decades, two forces that singer Chu Hyönmi also embodies through her iconic association with 1980s medleys.

The reified notion of "trot" as a diachronic genre-lineage fails to accurately historicize or sufficiently explain the cultural phenomenon of 2019–2020. De-centering this teleological narrative are trans-genre forces, including the performative practice of contemporary retro and *newtro* aesthetics, and a discourse of national Korean identity, tied both to that of twentieth-century South Korea and an essentialized "traditional Korea." This discourse of identity is itself performatively rendered through the mid-twentieth-century canon, *kug'ak* fusion, and Korean vocal affect. Finally, these trans-genre forces occupy a three-part series of temporal conceptualizations: 1) diachronic conceptualizations that span

not just trot, but the wider trajectory of normative South Korean popular music; 2) a performatively rendered *timeless yet contemporary* modality that collapses and homogenizes twentieth-century decades, intermittently interfusing them with evocations of “traditional Korea,” itself a twentieth-century construct; and 3) conceptualizations appealing to nostalgia of recent decades and lived-experience. I contend that, the success of the boom and the continued appeal for grouping music under the banner of “trot,” is precisely the ability of this term to signify the simultaneous operation of all three temporal aspects.

Notes

- In addition to the editors and anonymous reviewers, I extend special thanks to colleagues Max Balhorn, Saeyoung Park, Barbara Wall, and Sixiang Wang for pertinent online discussion. In 2021, I presented my analysis of Chu Hyönmi TV at the Korean Screen Culture Conference 2021 hosted by the University of Tübingen, and as a special lecture hosted on site by Princess Galyani Vahana Institute of Music, organized in collaboration with Mahidol University and Silpakorn University as a part of the Northeast and Southeast Area Studies Network in Finland and Thailand (NSEANET) project funded by the Finnish National Agency for Education's Asia Programme 2020.
- A portmanteau of “new” and “retro,” *nyut'üro* has two broad meanings. One denotes the present-day practice of directly consuming and engaging with past, or legacy content enabled through the uploading of such content to digital media platforms such as YouTube. Here, *newtro* differs to retro, with retro practice denoting the creation and consumption of new content that reenacts or takes inspiration from the past. For an informed discussion of *newtro* with an emphasis on this meaning, see Chu et al. (2020). The other meaning of *newtro* describes an aesthetic that synthesizes past and new elements in the present. This article principally adopts *newtro* for this latter meaning. Here, *newtro* provides better nuance to the reality of practices commonly referred to as retro or vintage trends as it absolves misplaced concern for historical accuracy or the mixing of periods, and foregrounds the connotation of *currentness* over nostalgia or reenactment.
- YouTube, “Chu Hyönmi TV” (추현미TV). <https://www.youtube.com/c/%EC%A3%BC%ED%98%84%EB%AF%B8TV>.
- This assertion is based on my own preliminary investigation of trot discourse in popular media of this period, and agrees with Kobayashi 2018:39. Both Yi Yöng-mi and Chang Yu-jöng similarly acknowledge that “trot” does not occur as a term pre-1945, Yi 2006:66n12 and 73n1, and Chang and Sö 2015:111. Chu Hyönmi has similarly observed that even into the 1980s, trot was one specific 2/4 rhythm rather than a broader genre, see Chu Hyönmi TV (추현미 TV). 2021. “Chu Hyönmi üi taldal hant'ok 2021 nyön 3 wöl” 추현미의 달달한톡 (2021년3월). YouTube video, 1:11:03 min., 24 March 2021. <https://youtu.be/k-9z8yRGtoE?t=2586,43:06> min.
- On medley trot, see Son, Min-Jung, “Regulating and Negotiating in T'ürot'ü, a Korean Popular Song Style,” *Asian Music* 37.1 (2006): 51–74, p. 61 and 65–67; and Son, Min-Jung, “Highway Songs in South Korea.” In *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, edited by Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006), pp. 72–81.
- Chu participated on *Mr Trot* (Episode 10, March 5, 2020) as a guest judge, and on another trot-branded show, SBS's *T'ürotsin i ttötta* 트롯신이 떴다 (2020.3.4–2020.9.9) as a full participant.

- Another survey history available in Korea is Pak Ch'an-ho. *Han'guk kayosa* (*Han'guk kayosa 1* (Seoul: Tosö ch'ulp'an, 2009); and Pak Ch'an-ho. *Han'guk kayosa 2* (Seoul: Tosö ch'ulp'an), 2009, first authored in Japanese by Zainichi Korean Paku Chyanho (朴燦鎬 박·찬호) and translated into Korean. In contrast to the South Korea-authored surveys, it does not define trot as a genre, but largely treats corresponding songs as normative popular music, against which incoming stylistic genres are distinguished.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa* (Seoul: Minsok'wön, 2006): 98; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron* (Seoul: Söng'andang, 2015): 106. On *sin minyo*, see Hilary Finchum-Sung, “New Folksongs: *Shin Minyo* of the 1930s.” In *Korean Pop Music: Riding the Wave*, edited by Keith Howard (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006), pp. 10–20.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 154; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 198, 202.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 199, 239; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 243.
- Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 237.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 269; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 264.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 301; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 274.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 74; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 57, 106.
- In the open scales of C major and A minor, the ascending major pentatonic corresponds to C-D-E-G-A, and the ascending minor pentatonic to A-B-C-E-F. Korean musicological discourse commonly refers to these pentatonic scales by the Japanese term *yonanuki* (“dropping fourth and seventh [notes]”); Yi 2006 uses *yonanuki*, but Chang and Sö, 2015, do not. Yi Yöng-mi. *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 73; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 113.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 143.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 189, 202.
- Archetypes of this vocal style include Pae Ho, Yi Mi-ja, and especially Na Hun-a.
- Yi Yöng-mi, *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 324; Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 412, 434.
- Chang Yu-chöng and Sö Pyöng-gi, *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 252; Yi Yöng-mi. *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 277; Pak Ch'an-ho, *Han'guk kayosa 1*.
- Kan'yangnok* (lit. “Record of herding sheep”) is the name given to a written account by scholar-official Kang Hang (姜沆 1567–1618) of his five-year experience as a prisoner of war in Japan, the title alluding to the biography of Han dynasty personage, Su Wu (蘇武 d.60 BCE). Cho's *Kan'yangnok* was composed as the theme music for an eponymous MBC dramatization that aired 9 September–26 December 1980. For a description of *Han obaengnyön*, see Michael Fuhr, “Voicing Body, Voicing Seoul: Vocalization, Body, and Ethnicity in Korean Popular Music.” In *Vocal Music and Contemporary Identities: Unlimited Voices in East Asia and the West*, edited by Christian Utz and Frederick Lau, 267–284 (New York: Routledge, 2013): 272, and for both songs, Kim Ik-du, *Sang'at'ap esö pon kungmin kasu Cho Yongp'il üi üm'ak segye: chöngghan üi norae, minjok üi norae* (Seoul: P'yöngminsa, 2010): 138–143.
- Chang Yu-jöng characterizes Kim's voice as “*ch'angböp* drenched in melancholy” (Chang and Sö, 2015:261). Similar to the earlier example of Sin Chung-hyön, some also argue that Kim's early compositions are based on indigenous musical elements, see: Ko Koeng-mu and Yi Chöng-guk *Myönggok üi t'ansaeng* (Changwon: Tosöch'ulp'an, 2018): 141, and comments from popular music critique Pak Söng-sö and Chang Yu-jöng in the documentary, Kwangju MBC (광주 MBC), 2019. “¹U~ saenggak üi malayo chinan'gan ildül ün ²”; Sim Ün-gyöng i purün kü norae wönjakcha | tasi purünün Kim Chöng-ho, hayran nabi (Kim Chöng-ho)”

- ♫ 우~생각을 말아요 지난간 일들은♫ 심은경이 부른 그 노래 원작자 | 다시 부르는 김정호, 하얀나비 (김정호) (Kim Chông-ho's *Hayan nabi* sung again). YouTube video, 25:59 min–27:35 min., 14 March 2019. <https://youtu.be/3Lu1lJyB-TI>.
23. Ko Koeng-mu and Yi Chông-guk, *Myônggok üi t'ansaeng*, p. 135.
 24. On *Nim*, see Ko Koeng-mu and Yi Chông-guk, *Myônggok üi t'ansaeng*, p. 144.
 25. For Anglophone discussion of the essentialized Korean voice in popular song, see Michael Fuhr, “Voicing Body, Voicing Seoul: Vocalization, Body, and Ethnicity in Korean Popular Music.”
 26. On Na, see Son, Min-Jung, “The Politics of the Traditional Korean Popular Song Style *T'ürot'üi*” (PhD thesis). University of Texas at Austin, 2004, p. 45; Yi Yông-mi. *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 324; Chang Yu-chông and Sô Pyông-gi. *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 238.
 27. Similar observation is made by Michael Fuhr, “Voicing Body, Voicing Seoul: Vocalization, Body, and Ethnicity in Korean Popular Music,” p. 271. On vocal techniques and sound in *minyö* and *p'ansori*, respectively see Roald Maliangkay, *Broken Voices: Postcolonial Entanglements and the Preservation of Korea's Central Folksong Traditions* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2017): 8 and Chan Park, *Voices From the Straw Mat: Toward an Ethnography of Korean Story Singing* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003): 190–201.
 28. For discussion of the *waesaek* accusations, Yi Yông-mi. *Han'guk taejung kayosa*, p. 208; Chang Yu-chông and Sô Pyông-gi, *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, p. 219 and pp. 225–230.
 29. Michael Fuhr, “Voicing Body, Voicing Seoul: Vocalization, Body, and Ethnicity in Korean Popular Music,” p. 272, suggests Chu Hyônmi as the female singer who, alongside Na, has “established the vocal standard of the genre.”
 30. Corroborated by Michael Fuhr, “Voicing Body, Voicing Seoul: Vocalization, Body, and Ethnicity in Korean Popular Music,” p. 274.
 31. Leaps are similarly identified by Yano in the homologous context of Japanese popular song. See Christine Yano, *Tears of Longing: Nostalgia and the Nation in Japanese Popular Song* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002): 109.
 32. Yano terms this “conversation.” See Yano, *Tears of Longing*, p. 107.
 33. On Koga melody in Japan, see Kikuchi Kiyomaro, *Hyôden Koga Masao: Seishun yori eien ni* (Tokyo: Atena shobô, 2014), p. 152, and Yano, *Tears of Longing*, pp. 36–37. Although neither directly equate or reduce Koga melody to the “conversation” element, Kikuchi notes the similarity of traditional shamisen accompaniment in *dodoitsu* 都々逸 and *gidayû-bushi* 義太夫節 performance genres that Koga adapted to guitar and popular song. The shamisen accompaniment exhibits the same conversational aspect, and so I contend this to be a defining feature of Koga melody, but note that Yano does not directly equate the “conversation” with Koga melody. On Koga's popularity in colonial Korea, see Pak Chin-su, “Tong Asia taejung üm'ak kwa kündae Ilbon üi 'Chosôn pum',” *Asia munhwa yôn'gu* 29 (2013): 165–186, pp. 176–177, and Pak Ch'an-ho, *Han'guk kayosa 1*, p. 217 and 303. Both Yi Yông-mi (*Han'guk taejung kayosa*) and Chang Yu-chông and Sô Pyông-gi (*Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*), however, assiduously avoid mention of Koga Masao's influence.
 34. The feature of instrumental elaborations serves well to distinguish “trot” from contemporary Western popular genres. It should be noted, however, that they are not unique to Korea or Japan, but common to many non-Western popular music traditions.
 35. The sample was principally collated from the songs listed on the Korean language Wikipedia entries for each show: Wik'ipaek kwa 위키백과, 2019, “Na nün t'ürot'ü kasu-da (나는 트로트 가수다)” https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/나는_트로트_가수다; Wik'ipaek kwa 위키백과, 2020, “Naeil ün misü t'ürot (내일은 미스터트롯).” https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/내일은_미스터트롯; and Wik'ipaek kwa 위키백과, 2020, “Naeil ün misüt'öt t'ürot (내일은 미스터트롯).” https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/내일은_미스터트롯.
 36. One song, *Ttaengböl* (“Wasp” 1987) originally recorded by Na Hun-a, was performed twice on *Trot Singer*.

37. See, T'ürot 869 (트롯869), 2020, “Hwansang üi hamoni Pak Ku-yun 'önü 60 tae no pubu iyagi' (featuring Ham Ch'un-ho) 1 #nanünt'ürot'ügasuda 1 EP.4 (환상의 하모니☆ 박규운 '어느 60대 노부부 이야기' [featuring 함춘호] 1 #나는트로트가수다 1 EP.4. Fantasy harmony: Pak Ku-yun “A 60-year-old elderly couple's story” featuring Ham Ch'un-ho.)” YouTube video, 5:19 min., 26 February 2020. <https://youtu.be/jkQywdwq988>; and TVCHOSUN, 2020, “Im Yông-ung 'önü 60 tae no pubu iyagi' ♪ ch'öt sojöl e tching ≈ (naeil ün misüt'öt'ürot) 8 hoe 20200220' (임영웅 '어느 60대 노부부 이야기' ♪ 첫 소절에 쟁 ≈ [내일은 미스터트롯] 8 회 20200220 Im Yông-ung 'A 60-year-old elderly couple's story.' From the first line, *tching*.)” YouTube video, 5:40 min., 20 February 2020. <https://youtu.be/cKp4W51u95Q>.
38. *The Tomorrow* shows used prerecorded music for initial audition rounds but thereafter switched to live orchestras.
39. TVChosun, 2019, “Hügügin esô kasu ro insaeng üi kön mudae!★ Kim Na-hüi 'kog'yesa üi ch'öt sarang' ♪ (naeil ün misüt'öt'ürot) 10 hoe 20190502 (회극인에서 가수로 인생을 건 무대!★ 김나희 'ogue사의 첫사랑' ♪ [내일은 미스터트롯] 10회 20190502).” YouTube video, 4:06 min., 2 May 2019. <https://youtu.be/zuXBgKjaSU8>. TVChosun, 2020, “Sin In-sôn 'ch'angbak üi yöja' ♪ romio üi aejörhan chökgyu..☆ (naeil ün misüt'öt'ürot) 8 hoe 20200220 (신인선 '창박의 여자' ♪ 로미오의 애절한 절규..☆ [내일은 미스터트롯] 8회 20200220).” YouTube video, 3:57 min., 20 February 2020. <https://youtu.be/asulCubw3G>. T'ürot869 (트롯869), 2020, “Nunmulsaem chagükhanün mudae Kim Yong-im 'mojông' ♪ ♪ #na nün t'ürot'ü kasuda (눈물샘 자극하는 무대 김용임 '모장' ♪ ♪ #나는트로트가수다) 1 EP.3. YouTube video, 19 February 2020. <https://youtu.be/9IINpWB-Q30>.
40. Song Sun-söp, *Tongpyönje Hüngbo-ga ch'angbon* (Kwangju: Unsan Song Sun-söp p'ansori yön'guwön, 2007): 67.
41. TVChosun, 2020, “*Sorüm* mich'in hübinnyök e kwan'gaektül chônggök... Chang Min-ho 'nim' ♪ (naeil ün misüt'öt'ürot) 6 hoe 20200206” *소름* 미친 흡입력에 관객들 정적... 장민호 '님' ♪ [내일은 미스터트롯] 6회 20200206. YouTube video, 4:27 min., 6 February 2020. <https://youtu.be/knHXConBPw>.
42. TVChosun, 2020, “Hathaeat'ae ha t'aesu 'Hüngboga kiga makh'yö' ♪ k'ü~ chôn'yul kü chach'e [naeil ün misüt'öt'ürot] 4 hoe 20200123 (하해하태 하태수 '홍보가 기가막혀' ♪ 크~ 전율 그 자체 [내일은 미스터트롯] 4회 20200123).” YouTube video, 4:50 min., 23 January 2020. <https://youtu.be/fA2iCXZJGKQ>.
43. “이 채널을 통해서 한국 사람들 모두가 사랑하는 노래를 들려 드리고, 아울러 우리 전통 가요를 지키는 마음으로 잊혀져가는 우리 노래를 보전하고 복원해 드리도록 합니다. 이제 시간이 많이 흘러서 정말 좋은 노래 옛노래가 기억 속에서 사라져가는 것이 개인적으로 참 많이 아쉽고 안타까운 마음이 들었어요. 그 시절 여러분이 사랑하셨던 그 주옥 같은 노래들을 저 주현미 목소리로 가장 원곡에 가깝게 불러 드리고 합니다.” Chu Hyônmi TV (주현미 TV), 2018, “Chu Hyônmi TV insa mal (주현미TV 인사말 Chu Hyônmi TV introductory greetings).” YouTube video, 1:39 min., 26 November 2018. <https://youtu.be/j8RVdEDTjq8>.
44. Chang Yu-chông and Sô Pyông-gi, *Han'guk taejung üm'aksa kaeron*, pp. 416–417, and Chôn Chi-yôn, *T'ürot'ü wa Han'guk üm'ak ül wihan pyônmyông* (Seongnam: Pukk'oria, 2016): 51, 127.
45. Im Ön-yông, “T'ürot'ü üi p'umgyök Chu Hyônmi,” *Yösông Chosôn*, 12 June 2019. https://woman.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?cate=C01&mcate=M1002&nNewsNumb=20190661420&fbclid=IwAR263KpdpdcbRdUq2fW4gtW-RmGmPPjZqkGNvZa01EjxDhM_p7tgSTJ5dE. Paraphrasing the same above quotation, they surreptitiously replace *chönt'ong kayo* (“traditional songs”) with *chôngt'ong kayo* (“orthodox songs”), another variant term that has been proposed in place of “trot.”
46. EBS Culture (EBS 교양), 2020, “EBS ch'o taesök—chönt'ong kayo 100 nyôn üi maek ül itta—Chu Hyônmi kasu_#002 (EBS 초대석 - 전통 가요 100년의 맥을 잇다 - 주현미 가수_#002 Ch'o Tae-sök: continuing the hundred-year lineage of traditional songs, Chu Hyônmi).” YouTube video, 24:30 min., 17 December 2010. <https://youtu.be/YzsXEKSpPXM>.

47. As the Chu Hyönmi TV project continues, the “golden age” singers will likely gain some representation but they have clearly not been prioritized. As of March 2022, from a total of 219 old song performances, the project has recorded 4 Pae Ho songs, 3 Na Hun-a, 2 Yi Mi-ja, and 1 Nam Chin. The first Nam Chin and Yi Mi-ja songs were the 205th and 210th recorded songs, respectively.
48. In this aspect, Chu’s discursive positioning and activities bear analogy to that of American jazz artist and advocate of “traditional” jazz, Wynton Marsalis.
49. EBS Culture (EBS 교양), 2020, 16:30 min, “그래도 요즈음 다시 레트로랄 감성이 있어.”
50. EBS Culture (EBS 교양), 2020, 17:33 min, “트로트를 벗어난 장르들 했어요. 30주년... 그래서 이번에는 다시 이제 내 정체성을 다시 불러서 요즈음 감각으로 편곡하고 좀 고전적으로 해서 발표를 하려고 했거든요.”
51. These albums were principally identified through the Naver database, “Han’guk taejung kayo aelböm 11000 (한국대중가요앨범11000),” using keyword searches for *yet norae* 옛노래, *küriun norae* 그리운 노래, and Chu Hyönmi 주현미. Album information is based on the Naver listing and accompanying scanned album covers. The sample is non-exhaustive. In particular, as in the case of Kim Chöng-ho’s album (see Table 7), many collections may have been released without using *yet norae* in their titles.
52. For the sake of analysis, one medley song from the 1969–1979 category has been omitted.
53. Pae Ho, Nam In-su, Kim Chöng-gu, Yi Hwa-ja, Paek Nyön-söl, Son In-ho, and Pak Chöng-im.
54. Han Pok-nam, Hwang Küm-sim, Kim Chöng-gu, Ko Pok-su, Nam In-su, Hwang Chöng-ja, Pak Chae-ran, and Son In-ho.
55. I designate the interwar liberation period of 1945–1949 as its own period; this was a liminal period of music production and cannot easily be subsumed under adjacent time divisions. Arguably any of the songs of the early pre- and wartime 1950s might also be better merged with this liberation period bracket, but precise months and years of this period of music cannot be easily verified. Although the precise periodization and placing of some inter-period songs may be inexact, the patterns of representation by category are broad enough to be meaningful.
56. These two songs are *Ulgin wae ur’ö* (“Cry, why cry?” 1982) and *Iröbörin samsip nyön* (“Thirty years lost” 1983), first recorded by Na Hun-a and Söl Un-do, respectively.
57. TV Chosun, 2019, “Tokpaek üro kwan’gaektül maeryo sik’in Song Ka-in ‘Tanjung üi miari kogae’ ♪ (naeil ün misüt’ürot) 10 hoe 20190502 (독백으로 관객들 매료시킨 송가인 ‘단장의 미아리 고개’ ♪ [내일은 미스트롯] 10회 20190502).” YouTube video, 3:53 min., 2 May 2019. <https://youtu.be/XlIrmcU0hxY>.
58. *Kkum sok üi sarang* was an arrangement of the Chinese song *Meng zhong ren* 夢中人 (“One in my dream” 1942) composed by Chen Gexin 陳歌辛.

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Book Review

Seo Young Park, *Stitching the 24-Hour City: Life, Labor, and the Problem of Speed in Seoul*

2021, Cornell University Press, pages 186, ISBN: 9781501754265

Christin Yu, Royal College of Art and University of the Arts London, Central St. Martins College

Fast fashion is defined by its rapid rates of production, circulation, consumption, and the accumulating material waste that is now considered a driving force of climate change. For fashion scholars, sustainability is often theorized through capitalism, as it relates to modernization, and the problem of speed. Marxist critiques of labour argue that the alienating power of material speed conditions the estrangement of labourers from not only the products of their labour, but also their practices and their work community. Thus, the designation of “fast” before fashion is reiteratively conceptualized as a problem for not only theorists, but governments, labour activists, and workers alike.

It is this problem of speed that is the key exploration of Seo Young Park’s *Stitching the 24-Hour City*. Vibrantly set among the flows of labour and material development of Tongdaemun’s garment industry, the centrally located district of Seoul is illuminated by the sounds, rhythms, tempos, and movements of its 24-hour marketplace. While the area was once a site of export-centered mass-manufacturing garment factories, the economic trajectory of modernization in South Korea has reshaped the labour structure into a decentralized system, organized for flexible production. It is within this network of informal home-factories and wholesale businesses that Park’s ethnographic research is set. Her thorough fieldwork, which was conducted between 2008 to 2010, records the microhistories of garment workers, and in doing so, complicates the “[i]ndividual, collective, and institutional practices and imaginations concerning the relationship between work and time” (143). That is, the accounts of everyday lives, from the subjective narratives of makers reveal passion and attachment for the clothing, which enriches our understanding of the theory of labour and the alienating nature of speed. The book serves as a contemporary history that

foregrounds the underrepresented voices of garment workers, highlighting the critical role of women's work and the unseen bonds of friendship and family that drove and continues to drive Tongdaemun's production and circulation of fashion.

Modernization, gender, and space in South Korea have been previously studied through the rise of the Asian Tigers, the new urban space in Jini K. Watson's *The New Asian City*, or alternatively Laurel Kendall's collection of essays, *Under Construction: The Gendering of Modernity, Class, and Consumption in the Republic of Korea*. Park's focus on garment manufacturing, however, explores the experiences of "one of the most marginalized professions in Korea and around the globe" (17). While South Korean histories have acknowledged the importance of garment workers in Tongdaemun for their role in labour activism in the 1970s and 1980s, the lived, embodied experiences of making clothes, and the affective, intimate attachment to work are virtually absent from histories of South Korean modernization and studies of gender. Through the steps, interactions, and histories of Park's interlocutors—formed of the designers, wholesalers, and garment makers of the district—our understanding of speed is made tangible through the rhythms and cycles of their everyday lives.

Park's argument develops through to two parts: "Speed as Experience" and "Problematization of Speed." In the first section, the embodied labour of the makers is captured by following the footsteps and interactions of the vendors, designers, and seamstresses in Tongdaemun's 24-hour market, as well as the home-factories of Changsin-dong. By mapping the physical journeys of the workers, the speed in which the materials are designed, selected, delivered, cut, sewn together, washed, and finished is illustrated through the detailed accounts of the unremarkable everyday interactions required to produce garments. It is within these details that Park builds a moving account of the makers' emotional attachments to material objects and the intimate networks of friends and family that develop beyond instrumental relationships of labour. Through their stories, Park expresses the love and care of the work itself. One such example is Yujin,¹ a seamstress who has been working in the home-factories for over thirty years. Lamenting on her inability to cook and look after her children, Yujin recalled how her skills were used instead to make clothes for them. In doing so, she "emphasized the tactility of clothes for her care and affection: clothes are put on and cover one's body and carry her hands' warmth and love" (63). In other words, her love was expressed through her making. It is within these quiet, intimate reflections revealed between Park and her participants that enrich our understanding of labour and its value.

In the second half of the book, Park's problematization of speed is developed through her fieldwork at MANI,² a nongovernmental organization (NGO) built from the legacy of South Korean social activism and labour union movements

in Tongdaemun of the 1970s and 1980s. Working with local garment workers to improve their skills and working conditions, their mandate encourages a "new vision of labor advocacy and social enterprise to produce clothes at a slow, human pace" (102). Yet, this politics of slowness is also found to perpetuate a controlling mandate for labour that invalidates each makers' experiential skill set, and denies their own agency for making clothes. As Park notes, "[l]ike fastness, slowness is not neutral" (111). While Park's book does not serve to rebuke the politics that acknowledges the precarity of Tongdaemun's garment workers, it aims to texture an understanding of embodied labour and the 24-hour city. By mapping the material flows alongside stories of making, *Stitching the 24-Hour City* offers an insightful ethnography of labour, humanizing the people involved in producing and distributing the fast-fashion market.

Notes

1. All the names have been changed to protect the identities of the participants.
2. The author uses a pseudonym.

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The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences that examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions that include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

Persons submitting manuscripts for consideration must note the following requirements:

1. Manuscripts must be submitted only in English, using American spelling conventions.
2. The body of the manuscript should normally be between 5,000 and 10,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.
3. All style matters are determined by *The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th Edition* or later versions. The manuscript must use endnotes, carry a list of references, and follow *The Chicago Manual of Style* for endnotes, references, and other matters of writing style. For example, endnotes are placed after punctuation; all quotations must carry double quotation marks, except when a quotation contains an embedded quotation, and then the embedded quotation carries single marks; the use of single quotation marks for “figures of speech” is not acceptable. “Figures of speech” must carry double marks. Sentence endings or transitions (e.g., periods or commas) must be inside quotation marks, even when there is no punctuation in the quoted material. Authors must use the serial comma. Centuries must be spelled out. Authors must never use *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, or any other Latin abbreviation. When citing a work initially in an endnote, a full citation is required; when citing the work again, authors must state: author’s surname, first few words of the title, date of publication, and page number. If an ordinary or common noun (not a proper noun) is not found in standard reference dictionaries (e.g., *Merriam-Webster* or the *Oxford*

English Dictionary), it is foreign. All foreign nouns must be italicized. Note that, according to the *Chicago Manual of Style*, endnotes and references are constructed differently, and authors must adhere to these different styles. Only references actually cited in the manuscript are listed under “References.” Inline citations indicating page numbers are acceptable only for book reviews.

The following offer a few examples of **Reference** styles. Note the order of the information in the entries, and note that only the romanised titles are italicised, not the translations of the titles.

- **Pre-modern book** (title is italicized)

Yu Sōng-yong 柳成龍, penname Sōae 西厓. *Chingbirok* (懲慙錄) (first printed 1633). In Taedong Munhwa Yōn’guwōn, Sōnggyun’gwan Taehakkyo 大東文化研究院, 成均館大學校, ed. *Sōae munjip* (西厓文集). Seoul: Tongguk Munhwasa, 1958.

Note no translation of premodern book titles.

- **Modern book**

Choi, Jang-jip 최장집. *Minjuhwa ihu ūi minju chuūi: Han’guk minju chuūi ūi posu-chōk kiwōn kwa wigi* (민주화 이후의 민주주의: 한국 민주주의의 보수적 기원 과 위기 Democracy after democratization: The crisis and origin of conservative democracy in South Korea). Seoul: Humanitas, 2002.

Yow, Valerie Ralieggh. *Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences*. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2005.

Note translation of modern book title.

- **Electronic book**

Nydam, Ronald J. *Adoptees come of age: Living within two families*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999. <http://www.netlibrary.com> (accessed 8 July 2005).

- **Chapter in a modern book**

Chi, Tu-hwan 池斗煥. “Chosōn chōngi sahoe-kyōngje wa Pusan (조선전기 사회 경제와 부산 The social economy of early Chosōn and Pusan).” In Pusan chikhal-si sa p’yōnch’an wiwōnhoe 釜山直轄市史編纂委員會, ed. *Pusan-si sa* (釜山市史 History of Pusan City), vol.1, Pusan: Pusan Chikhal-si, pp. 606–632, 1989.

- **Journal article**

Han, Yōng-guk 韓榮國. “Ho-sō e silsi toen Taedongbōp: Taedongbōp yōn’gu ūi ilch’ōk (湖西에 實施된 大同法 (上)—大同法研究의 一齣 — Implementation of the Taedongbōp in Ch’ungch’ōng Province: One installment in a study of the Taedongbōp),” *Yōksa hakpo* (歷史學報) 13 (1960.10): 77–107.

Banks, William. “A Secret Meeting in Boise.” *Midwestern Political Review* 6 (1958): 26–31.

- **Electronic journal or newspaper article**

Carbado, Devon W. “Black Male Racial Victimhood.” *Callaloo* 21.2 (1998): 337–361. <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed 8 July 2005).

The following offer a few examples of **Endnote** styles. Note the order of the information in the entries.

(a) First appearance:

1. Valerie Ralieggh Yow. *Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences* (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2005), p. 32.
 - 1.a. (If no page number is given, then the form is:) Valerie Ralieggh Yow. *Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences* (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press), 2005.
2. Han Yǒng-guk. "Ho-sǒ e silsi toen Taedongbǒp (part one): Taedongbǒp yǒn'gu ū ilch'ǒk," *Yǒksa hakpo* 13 (1960.10): 100.
3. Devon W. Carbado. "Black Male Racial Victimhood," *Callaloo* 21.2 (1998), <http://www.jstor.org/> (accessed 8 July 2005).
4. Ronald J. Nydam. *Adoptees come of age: Living within two families* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), <http://www.netlibrary.com> (accessed 8 July 2005).

(b) Second appearance:

5. Yow, *Recording*, 2005, p. 33.
 6. Han, "Ho-sǒ, sang," 1960, p. 101.
 7. Devon, "Black male," 1998 (accessed 8 July 2005).
 8. Nydam, *Adoptees*, 1999 (accessed 8 July 2005).
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The European Journal of Korean Studies acknowledges the generous support of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2021-P11).

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